A vaccine auction

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Romans Pancs
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The paper describes an auction for selling vaccines in a pandemic. The environment borrows from the problem of allocating positions for sponsored links on web pages with search results but recognizes the externalities that one man’s vaccination imposes on another. The auction is the pivot Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism and, so, inherits its properties: efficiency and strategy-proofness. Crucially, the auction is designed to let each bidder bid not only on his own behalf but also on behalf of others. The auction requires neither the bidders nor the auctioneer to forecast the efficacy of the vaccine or the evolution of the pandemic.

疫苗拍卖
本文描述了大流行病中的疫苗销售拍卖。拍卖环境借鉴了网页搜索结果中赞助商链接位置的分配问题,但也认识到了一个人接种疫苗对另一个人造成的外部性。拍卖是维克雷-克拉克-格罗夫斯机制的枢纽,因此继承了它的特性:效率和策略防范。最重要的是,拍卖的目的是让每个投标人不仅代表自己投标,也代表其他人投标。拍卖既不要求投标人也不要求拍卖人预测疫苗的疗效或大流行病的演变。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
28.60%
发文量
37
期刊介绍: Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design
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