{"title":"A vaccine auction","authors":"Romans Pancs","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00359-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper describes an auction for selling vaccines in a pandemic. The environment borrows from the problem of allocating positions for sponsored links on web pages with search results but recognizes the externalities that one man’s vaccination imposes on another. The auction is the pivot Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism and, so, inherits its properties: efficiency and strategy-proofness. Crucially, the auction is designed to let each bidder bid not only on his own behalf but also on behalf of others. The auction requires neither the bidders nor the auctioneer to forecast the efficacy of the vaccine or the evolution of the pandemic.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Economic Design","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00359-9","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The paper describes an auction for selling vaccines in a pandemic. The environment borrows from the problem of allocating positions for sponsored links on web pages with search results but recognizes the externalities that one man’s vaccination imposes on another. The auction is the pivot Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism and, so, inherits its properties: efficiency and strategy-proofness. Crucially, the auction is designed to let each bidder bid not only on his own behalf but also on behalf of others. The auction requires neither the bidders nor the auctioneer to forecast the efficacy of the vaccine or the evolution of the pandemic.
期刊介绍:
Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design.
Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design