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Review of Economic Design最新文献

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A fair procedure in a marriage market 婚姻市场中的公平程序
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-02-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4
Aditya Kuvalekar, Antonio Romero-Medina
{"title":"A fair procedure in a marriage market","authors":"Aditya Kuvalekar, Antonio Romero-Medina","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is a Rawlsian stable matching if the number of men and women is equal. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139750727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale 有转售的拍卖中的价值排序解密
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5
Sanyyam Khurana
{"title":"Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale","authors":"Sanyyam Khurana","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consider a single-unit auction with resale and two risk neutral bidders. The ranking of the valuations is known to both the bidders—that is, the bidders know the identity of the highest and lowest valuation bidders. We show that, when the value-rankings are revealed, the classic result of “bid symmetrization” does not hold. Surprisingly, the bidder with the lowest valuation produces a stronger bid distribution than the bidder with the highest valuation. We also show that the revelation of value-rankings in auctions with resale <i>asymmetrizes</i> the bidding strategies. Finally, for a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139648838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The hierarchy of public governance: resource allocation versus bureaucratic inefficiency 公共治理的层次：资源分配与官僚低效
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-12-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00344-8
Susheng Wang, Jun Xiao
{"title":"The hierarchy of public governance: resource allocation versus bureaucratic inefficiency","authors":"Susheng Wang, Jun Xiao","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00344-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00344-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Should a social program be run at a higher or lower level of government? We consider a government-run program supplying a private good to consumers. We focus on a tradeoff between the advantage of a high level of government in resource allocation and its disadvantage in consumer information. We look into the effect of differences in income levels, marginal costs, and preferences on the organization of public governance. One general conclusion is that when regional differences are large, the central government should be in charge; otherwise, local governments should be in charge.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"128 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139068739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures 论不合格代理优先权结构下三代理任务分配的可解性
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6
Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang
{"title":"On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures","authors":"Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we study the problem of solvability for task allocation with unqualified agents (TAU) priority structures proposed by Ehlers and Westkamp (Theor Econ 13:1009-1041, 2018). In the TAU priority structure, at any position, either all agents have equal priority, or there exists exactly one agent who has the lowest priority and all others have equal highest priority. A priority structure is solvable if it admits a constrained efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, where a constrained efficient mechanism always produces a stable matching which can not be Pareto dominated by any other stable matching. We show that TAU priority structures with three agents are solvable via a top trading cycles mechanism with endogenous tie-breaking rules.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138743618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Job rotation or specialization? A dynamic matching model analysis 工作轮换还是专业化？动态匹配模型分析
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00345-7
Morimitsu Kurino, Yoshinori Kurokawa
{"title":"Job rotation or specialization? A dynamic matching model analysis","authors":"Morimitsu Kurino, Yoshinori Kurokawa","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00345-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00345-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Which is better for a firm, job rotation or specialization, can be considered as an endogenously formed worker-indivisible job matching problem. We model this problem as a firm’s profit maximization problem under uncertainty, with and without overlapping generations. In both models, we show that among all possible job allocations, the rotation and specialization schemes are the only variations that can be optimal in terms of profits. Moreover, the rotation scheme is better when the productivity difference between post- and under-training workers is smaller, the uncertainty about job continuation in the future is more significant, or the slope of seniority wages is larger. The results indicate that firms in different environments prefer different worker-job matchings.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138562048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders 关于预算有限的竞标者不可能进行多单位拍卖的说明
4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w
Jianxin Yi
{"title":"A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders","authors":"Jianxin Yi","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"84 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Characterization of maxmed mechanisms for multiple objects 多目标最大化机制的表征
4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x
Ranojoy Basu, Conan Mukherjee
{"title":"Characterization of maxmed mechanisms for multiple objects","authors":"Ranojoy Basu, Conan Mukherjee","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"214 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction 买方竞价双重拍卖中价格的渐近性与策略
4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6
Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis
{"title":"The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction","authors":"Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a model with correlated and interdependent values/costs, we identify for the buyer’s bid double auction the asymptotic distributions of the price and of two order statistics in the first order conditions for optimal bidding/asking, all of which are normal. Substitution of the asymptotic distributions into the first order conditions can permit the solution for approximately optimal bids/asks that provide insight into what is “ first order” in a trader’s strategic decision-making, which has been difficult to obtain through analysis of equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135153466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction 在日英拍卖中选择不同出价水平对收入的影响
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-07-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7
Ricardo Gonçalves, I. Ray
{"title":"Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction","authors":"Ricardo Gonçalves, I. Ray","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44765502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions 广义一致排序与自我执行联盟的形成
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00335-9
K. Jandoc, R. Juarez
{"title":"Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions","authors":"K. Jandoc, R. Juarez","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00335-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00335-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48869817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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