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Review of Economic Design最新文献

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The stock market reaction to political and economic changes: the Spanish case 股市对政治和经济变化的反应：西班牙案例
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-05-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00353-1
Leticia Castaño, José E. Farinós, Ana M. Ibáñez
{"title":"The stock market reaction to political and economic changes: the Spanish case","authors":"Leticia Castaño, José E. Farinós, Ana M. Ibáñez","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00353-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00353-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>As other European countries, Spain has experienced a turmoil in which new political parties emerged with force after the global financial crisis in 2008. In this context, we analyze whether the empirical implications of the opportunistic and partisan theories, as well as the Uncertain Information Hypothesis, are met in the Spanish stock market, considering the size and the industry of the companies. The horizon of our study takes into account the seven general elections, 24 regional elections and 4 European elections held from 2002 to 2019, period in which Spain is fully integrated in the economic and monetary union and under the macroeconomic imbalance procedure. Our results do not support the opportunistic and partisan theories, or the Uncertain Information Hypothesis. Our evidence suggests that the short-term negative market reaction to the general elections is linked to the uncertainty with a change in the political sign of the incumbent. Besides, it is not related to size or industry characteristics.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140927792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Generalized cumulative offer processes 广义累积报价过程
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00350-4
Inácio Bó, Jörgen Kratz, Makoto Shimoji
{"title":"Generalized cumulative offer processes","authors":"Inácio Bó, Jörgen Kratz, Makoto Shimoji","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00350-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00350-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the context of the matching-with-contracts model, we generalize the cumulative offer process to allow for arbitrary subsets of doctors to make proposals in each round. We show that, under a condition on the hospitals’ choice functions, the outcome of this generalized cumulative offer process is independent of the sets of doctors making proposals in each round. The flexibility of the resulting model allows it to be used to describe different dynamic processes and their final outcomes.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140563028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multi-battle contests over complementary battlefields 互补战场上的多场战斗竞赛
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00351-3
Daniel Stephenson
{"title":"Multi-battle contests over complementary battlefields","authors":"Daniel Stephenson","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00351-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00351-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies contests with complementary prizes where each agent simultaneously distributes a fixed budget over multiple battlefields. Each battlefield has a single prize which is divided among the competitors in proportion to an arbitrary power function of their investment levels. A unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is shown to exist under arbitrarily sensitive battlefield success functions if objective functions exhibit constant subunitary elasticity of substitution between prize shares. In contrast, Blotto contests with linear objectives have only mixed strategy Nash equilibria if battlefield success functions are sufficiently sensitive to investment levels. Sufficient complementarity between prize shares allows pure strategy Nash equilibria to exist under arbitrarily sensitive battlefield success functions.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140563109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal student allocation with peer effects 具有同伴效应的最佳学生分配
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00349-x
Roberto Sarkisian, Takuro Yamashita
{"title":"Optimal student allocation with peer effects","authors":"Roberto Sarkisian, Takuro Yamashita","doi":"10.1007/s10058-024-00349-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-024-00349-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies an optimal assignment problem of heterogenous students to schools with a particular kind of preference complementarity: peer effects, defined by the average ability of those in the same school. The tractability of the problem allows us to characterize the optimal assignment mechanism, which has a simple “(stochastic) pass-fail” structure. Its shape is mainly determined by the convexity/concavity of the attainment function, interpreted as the preference for/against having diverse-ability students in different schools. We also provide comparative statics as to when more or less mixture of heterogenous ability types would be desirable.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140153590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A fair procedure in a marriage market 婚姻市场中的公平程序
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-02-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4
Aditya Kuvalekar, Antonio Romero-Medina
{"title":"A fair procedure in a marriage market","authors":"Aditya Kuvalekar, Antonio Romero-Medina","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is a Rawlsian stable matching if the number of men and women is equal. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139750727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale 有转售的拍卖中的价值排序解密
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5
Sanyyam Khurana
{"title":"Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale","authors":"Sanyyam Khurana","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00347-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consider a single-unit auction with resale and two risk neutral bidders. The ranking of the valuations is known to both the bidders—that is, the bidders know the identity of the highest and lowest valuation bidders. We show that, when the value-rankings are revealed, the classic result of “bid symmetrization” does not hold. Surprisingly, the bidder with the lowest valuation produces a stronger bid distribution than the bidder with the highest valuation. We also show that the revelation of value-rankings in auctions with resale <i>asymmetrizes</i> the bidding strategies. Finally, for a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139648838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The hierarchy of public governance: resource allocation versus bureaucratic inefficiency 公共治理的层次：资源分配与官僚低效
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-12-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00344-8
Susheng Wang, Jun Xiao
{"title":"The hierarchy of public governance: resource allocation versus bureaucratic inefficiency","authors":"Susheng Wang, Jun Xiao","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00344-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00344-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Should a social program be run at a higher or lower level of government? We consider a government-run program supplying a private good to consumers. We focus on a tradeoff between the advantage of a high level of government in resource allocation and its disadvantage in consumer information. We look into the effect of differences in income levels, marginal costs, and preferences on the organization of public governance. One general conclusion is that when regional differences are large, the central government should be in charge; otherwise, local governments should be in charge.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"128 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139068739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures 论不合格代理优先权结构下三代理任务分配的可解性
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6
Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang
{"title":"On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures","authors":"Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we study the problem of solvability for task allocation with unqualified agents (TAU) priority structures proposed by Ehlers and Westkamp (Theor Econ 13:1009-1041, 2018). In the TAU priority structure, at any position, either all agents have equal priority, or there exists exactly one agent who has the lowest priority and all others have equal highest priority. A priority structure is solvable if it admits a constrained efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, where a constrained efficient mechanism always produces a stable matching which can not be Pareto dominated by any other stable matching. We show that TAU priority structures with three agents are solvable via a top trading cycles mechanism with endogenous tie-breaking rules.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138743618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Job rotation or specialization? A dynamic matching model analysis 工作轮换还是专业化？动态匹配模型分析
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00345-7
Morimitsu Kurino, Yoshinori Kurokawa
{"title":"Job rotation or specialization? A dynamic matching model analysis","authors":"Morimitsu Kurino, Yoshinori Kurokawa","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00345-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00345-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Which is better for a firm, job rotation or specialization, can be considered as an endogenously formed worker-indivisible job matching problem. We model this problem as a firm’s profit maximization problem under uncertainty, with and without overlapping generations. In both models, we show that among all possible job allocations, the rotation and specialization schemes are the only variations that can be optimal in terms of profits. Moreover, the rotation scheme is better when the productivity difference between post- and under-training workers is smaller, the uncertainty about job continuation in the future is more significant, or the slope of seniority wages is larger. The results indicate that firms in different environments prefer different worker-job matchings.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138562048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations 产能受限合作采购的成本分担方法
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00343-9
Jop Schouten, Mirjam GrooteSchaarsberg, Peter Borm
{"title":"Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations","authors":"Jop Schouten, Mirjam GrooteSchaarsberg, Peter Borm","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00343-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00343-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes <i>capacity restricted cooperative purchasing (CRCP) situations</i> in which a group of cooperating purchasers face two suppliers with limited supply capacity. To minimize the total purchasing costs, we show that two extreme policies have to be compared: order everything at one supplier and the possible remainder at the other. Interestingly, as order quantities increase, various policy switches can occur. To find suitable cost allocations of the total purchasing costs, we model a CRCP-situation as a cost sharing problem. As increasing order quantities also imply concavity breaks due to a forced change in supplier, the corresponding cost function is piecewise concave. For cost sharing problems with concave cost functions, we show that the serial cost sharing mechanism satisfies two desirable properties, <i>unit cost monotonicity (UCM)</i> and <i>monotonic vulnerability for the absence of the smallest player (MOVASP)</i>. However, these properties are lost in the setting of piecewise concave cost functions. We develop a new context specific class of <i>piecewise serial rules</i> based on claims rules. We show that the <i>proportional rule</i> is the only claims rule for which the corresponding piecewise serial rule satisfies UCM. Moreover, the piecewise serial rule corresponding to the <i>constrained equal losses rule</i> satisfies MOVASP.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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