A fair procedure in a marriage market

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2024-02-10 DOI:10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4

Aditya Kuvalekar, Antonio Romero-Medina

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is a Rawlsian stable matching if the number of men and women is equal. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.

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婚姻市场中的公平程序

我们在双面婚姻市场中提出了一种新算法，市场双方在每一轮中都会提出建议。该算法总能得到稳定的匹配结果。而且，如果男女人数相等，结果就是罗尔斯稳定匹配。最后，该算法可以在多项式时间内计算，从实用的角度来看，可以用于对公平性有重要考虑的市场。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Economic Design ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

28.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design