{"title":"论不合格代理优先权结构下三代理任务分配的可解性","authors":"Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we study the problem of solvability for task allocation with unqualified agents (TAU) priority structures proposed by Ehlers and Westkamp (Theor Econ 13:1009-1041, 2018). In the TAU priority structure, at any position, either all agents have equal priority, or there exists exactly one agent who has the lowest priority and all others have equal highest priority. A priority structure is solvable if it admits a constrained efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, where a constrained efficient mechanism always produces a stable matching which can not be Pareto dominated by any other stable matching. We show that TAU priority structures with three agents are solvable via a top trading cycles mechanism with endogenous tie-breaking rules.\n</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures\",\"authors\":\"Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In this paper, we study the problem of solvability for task allocation with unqualified agents (TAU) priority structures proposed by Ehlers and Westkamp (Theor Econ 13:1009-1041, 2018). In the TAU priority structure, at any position, either all agents have equal priority, or there exists exactly one agent who has the lowest priority and all others have equal highest priority. A priority structure is solvable if it admits a constrained efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, where a constrained efficient mechanism always produces a stable matching which can not be Pareto dominated by any other stable matching. We show that TAU priority structures with three agents are solvable via a top trading cycles mechanism with endogenous tie-breaking rules.\\n</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44537,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Economic Design\",\"volume\":\"3 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Economic Design\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Economic Design","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00346-6","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本文研究了 Ehlers 和 Westkamp（Theor Econ 13:1009-1041, 2018）提出的无资质代理（TAU）优先级结构任务分配的可解性问题。在TAU优先级结构中，在任意位置，要么所有代理人的优先级相等，要么正好存在一个优先级最低的代理人，而其他代理人的优先级相等，且所有代理人的优先级最高。如果一个优先级结构允许一个有约束的高效且不失策略的机制，那么它就是可解的，其中一个有约束的高效机制总是能产生一个稳定匹配，而这个稳定匹配不可能被任何其他稳定匹配所帕累托支配。我们的研究表明，有三个代理人的 TAU 优先权结构是可以通过具有内生平局打破规则的顶级交易循环机制来解决的。
On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures
In this paper, we study the problem of solvability for task allocation with unqualified agents (TAU) priority structures proposed by Ehlers and Westkamp (Theor Econ 13:1009-1041, 2018). In the TAU priority structure, at any position, either all agents have equal priority, or there exists exactly one agent who has the lowest priority and all others have equal highest priority. A priority structure is solvable if it admits a constrained efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, where a constrained efficient mechanism always produces a stable matching which can not be Pareto dominated by any other stable matching. We show that TAU priority structures with three agents are solvable via a top trading cycles mechanism with endogenous tie-breaking rules.
期刊介绍：
Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design.
Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
