发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Review of Economic Design最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations 产能受限合作采购的成本分担方法
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00343-9
Jop Schouten, Mirjam GrooteSchaarsberg, Peter Borm
{"title":"Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations","authors":"Jop Schouten, Mirjam GrooteSchaarsberg, Peter Borm","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00343-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00343-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper analyzes <i>capacity restricted cooperative purchasing (CRCP) situations</i> in which a group of cooperating purchasers face two suppliers with limited supply capacity. To minimize the total purchasing costs, we show that two extreme policies have to be compared: order everything at one supplier and the possible remainder at the other. Interestingly, as order quantities increase, various policy switches can occur. To find suitable cost allocations of the total purchasing costs, we model a CRCP-situation as a cost sharing problem. As increasing order quantities also imply concavity breaks due to a forced change in supplier, the corresponding cost function is piecewise concave. For cost sharing problems with concave cost functions, we show that the serial cost sharing mechanism satisfies two desirable properties, <i>unit cost monotonicity (UCM)</i> and <i>monotonic vulnerability for the absence of the smallest player (MOVASP)</i>. However, these properties are lost in the setting of piecewise concave cost functions. We develop a new context specific class of <i>piecewise serial rules</i> based on claims rules. We show that the <i>proportional rule</i> is the only claims rule for which the corresponding piecewise serial rule satisfies UCM. Moreover, the piecewise serial rule corresponding to the <i>constrained equal losses rule</i> satisfies MOVASP.\u0000</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"5 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders 关于预算有限的竞标者不可能进行多单位拍卖的说明
4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w
Jianxin Yi
{"title":"A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders","authors":"Jianxin Yi","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"84 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135391210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Characterization of maxmed mechanisms for multiple objects 多目标最大化机制的表征
4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x
Ranojoy Basu, Conan Mukherjee
{"title":"Characterization of maxmed mechanisms for multiple objects","authors":"Ranojoy Basu, Conan Mukherjee","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"214 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Efficient mask allocation during a pandemic 大流行期间有效分配口罩
4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00340-y
Wei-Cheng Chen, Lin Chen, Yi-Cheng Kao
{"title":"Efficient mask allocation during a pandemic","authors":"Wei-Cheng Chen, Lin Chen, Yi-Cheng Kao","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00340-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00340-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135696382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey 偏好提交时间和大学录取结果:来自土耳其的证据
4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00339-5
Hayri Alper Arslan, Yang Song, Tong Wang
{"title":"Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey","authors":"Hayri Alper Arslan, Yang Song, Tong Wang","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00339-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00339-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"4664 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135385827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction 买方竞价双重拍卖中价格的渐近性与策略
4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6
Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis
{"title":"The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction","authors":"Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a model with correlated and interdependent values/costs, we identify for the buyer’s bid double auction the asymptotic distributions of the price and of two order statistics in the first order conditions for optimal bidding/asking, all of which are normal. Substitution of the asymptotic distributions into the first order conditions can permit the solution for approximately optimal bids/asks that provide insight into what is “ first order” in a trader’s strategic decision-making, which has been difficult to obtain through analysis of equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135153466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction 在日英拍卖中选择不同出价水平对收入的影响
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-07-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7
Ricardo Gonçalves, I. Ray
{"title":"Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction","authors":"Ricardo Gonçalves, I. Ray","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44765502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions 广义一致排序与自我执行联盟的形成
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00335-9
K. Jandoc, R. Juarez
{"title":"Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions","authors":"K. Jandoc, R. Juarez","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00335-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00335-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48869817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Communication and coordination with constraints 有约束的沟通和协调
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-07-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00336-8
Raghul S. Venkatesh
{"title":"Communication and coordination with constraints","authors":"Raghul S. Venkatesh","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00336-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00336-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I study incentives for communication and policymaking in the presence of information asymmetry and constraints on the set of feasible policies. An informed and an uninformed agent both take decisions in a coordination game such that their actions exhibit positive spillover and are imperfectly substitutable. When agents communicate via cheap talk prior to the coordination stage, there is full information revelation as long as constraints are not binding. When constraints bind, communication results in threshold equilibria and partial revelation of information. The most informative threshold equilibrium maximizes the welfare of both agents. This paper is the first in the literature to establish a relationship between action constraints and incentives for strategic communication.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"5 11-12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic team contests with complementary efforts 充满活力的团队以互补的努力进行竞争
4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-06-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00332-y
Maria Arbatskaya, Hideo Konishi
{"title":"Dynamic team contests with complementary efforts","authors":"Maria Arbatskaya, Hideo Konishi","doi":"10.1007/s10058-023-00332-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00332-y","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study dynamic team contests. In the framework of a Tullock contest between two teams that are generating impacts according to the Cobb–Douglas effort aggregation function, we examine how equilibrium efforts and winning probabilities depend on the timing of the actions. We show that in contrast to synchronous contests, asynchronous contests with publicly observable actions do not result in the same equilibrium outcome as the one-stage contest; they are strategically unbalancing, leading to more lopsided contests. The results have implications about the design of team contests in which efforts are complementary.","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134997444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信