产能受限合作采购的成本分担方法

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Jop Schouten, Mirjam GrooteSchaarsberg, Peter Borm
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了一组合作采购面对两个供应能力有限的供应商的产能限制合作采购情况。为了使总采购成本最小化,我们展示了必须比较两种极端策略:在一个供应商处订购所有产品,而在另一个供应商处订购可能的剩余产品。有趣的是,随着订单数量的增加,可能会发生各种策略切换。为了找到合适的总采购成本分配,我们建立了一个成本分担问题模型。由于订单数量的增加也意味着由于供应商的强制改变而导致的凹性断裂,相应的成本函数是分段凹的。对于具有凹代价函数的代价分担问题,我们证明了序列代价分担机制满足两个理想的性质,即单位代价单调性(UCM)和最小参与人缺位时的单调脆弱性(MOVASP)。然而,这些性质在分段凹代价函数的设置中丢失了。我们基于索赔规则开发了一种新的上下文特定的分段串行规则类。我们证明了比例规则是唯一的声明规则,对应的分段序列规则满足UCM。与约束等损失规则相对应的分段序列规则满足MOVASP。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations

Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations

This paper analyzes capacity restricted cooperative purchasing (CRCP) situations in which a group of cooperating purchasers face two suppliers with limited supply capacity. To minimize the total purchasing costs, we show that two extreme policies have to be compared: order everything at one supplier and the possible remainder at the other. Interestingly, as order quantities increase, various policy switches can occur. To find suitable cost allocations of the total purchasing costs, we model a CRCP-situation as a cost sharing problem. As increasing order quantities also imply concavity breaks due to a forced change in supplier, the corresponding cost function is piecewise concave. For cost sharing problems with concave cost functions, we show that the serial cost sharing mechanism satisfies two desirable properties, unit cost monotonicity (UCM) and monotonic vulnerability for the absence of the smallest player (MOVASP). However, these properties are lost in the setting of piecewise concave cost functions. We develop a new context specific class of piecewise serial rules based on claims rules. We show that the proportional rule is the only claims rule for which the corresponding piecewise serial rule satisfies UCM. Moreover, the piecewise serial rule corresponding to the constrained equal losses rule satisfies MOVASP.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
28.60%
发文量
37
期刊介绍: Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design
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