Rachel Glennerster, Thomas Kelly, Claire T. McMahon, Christopher M. Snyder
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Booster shots for COVID-19 vaccines in the United States have undergone periodic updates to target circulating variants. However, the lengthy process of development, testing, and production has resulted lags between a variant’s initial detection and the corresponding booster's rollout, by which time the booster may no longer match the circulating variant. An innovation with realistic scientific potential—a universal COVID-19 vaccine, effective against existing and future variants—could provide much more value by preempting new variants. Averaged across Monte Carlo simulations, we estimate that, even under conservative assumptions on the arrival rate of variants, a universal COVID-19 vaccine would increase health benefits over variant-specific boosters by more than $900 billion. This social value eclipses the cost of an advance market commitment to incentivize the universal vaccine by several orders of magnitude.
期刊介绍：
Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design.
Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design
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