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Review of Economic Design最新文献

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Mechanism design for pandemics. 大流行病的机制设计。
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-01-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00270-7
Eric Maskin
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引用次数: 0
Correction to: Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium 更正:德布鲁-赫维奇均衡中社会-法律制度和纳什解决方案的实施
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2021-12-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00284-1
Claus-Jochen Haake, W. Trockel
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引用次数: 1
Correction to: Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter? 更正：集体竞赛中的奖项分享规则：社会规范何时重要？
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2021-11-30 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00277-0
D. Gupta
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引用次数: 0
Asymmetric price adjustment and price discovery in spot and futures markets of agricultural commodities 农产品现货和期货市场的不对称价格调整与价格发现
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2021-11-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00276-1
Zhuo Chen, Bo Yan, Han-Gyoun Kang, Liyu Liu
{"title":"Asymmetric price adjustment and price discovery in spot and futures markets of agricultural commodities","authors":"Zhuo Chen, Bo Yan, Han-Gyoun Kang, Liyu Liu","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00276-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00276-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"139 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48129998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization 消极投票的社会福利功能：一种表征
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2021-11-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5
Jac C. Heckelman
{"title":"Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization","authors":"Jac C. Heckelman","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"125 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45595454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter? 集体竞赛中的奖金分享规则:社会规范何时起作用?
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2021-11-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00273-4
D. Gupta
{"title":"Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter?","authors":"D. Gupta","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00273-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00273-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"221 - 244"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44421498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule 延迟接受规则和顶部交易周期规则的策略验证的统一方法
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2021-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00271-6
Hidekazu Anno, Sui Takahashi
{"title":"A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule","authors":"Hidekazu Anno, Sui Takahashi","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00271-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00271-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"133 - 137"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52123016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium 平衡可定义性建模的技巧
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2021-10-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2
A. Rubinstein, Kemal Yildiz
{"title":"An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium","authors":"A. Rubinstein, Kemal Yildiz","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44243645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Reorganizing a partnership efficiently 有效地重组合作伙伴关系
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2021-09-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00266-3
Eric S. Chou, Meng-Yu Liang, Cheng-Tai Wu
{"title":"Reorganizing a partnership efficiently","authors":"Eric S. Chou, Meng-Yu Liang, Cheng-Tai Wu","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00266-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00266-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"233 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52122977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Coalition-proof stable networks 防联盟稳定网络
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2021-09-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00264-5
Chenghong Luo, A. Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
{"title":"Coalition-proof stable networks","authors":"Chenghong Luo, A. Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00264-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00264-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"185 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47014605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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