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Review of Economic Design最新文献

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Allocating $$hbox {CO}_2$$ emissions: a dynamic claims problem 正在分配$$hbox{CO}_2$$排放：一个动态索赔问题
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-02-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00286-z
Eun Jeong Heo, Jinhyuk Lee
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引用次数: 3
A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces 具有丰富消息空间的竞争信令模型
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00279-y
Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer, Xu Tan
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引用次数: 0
Correction to: An analysis of managerial delegation in a market with vertically-integrated producer owning an essential input monopolistically 更正：垂直整合生产者垄断拥有基本投入的市场中的管理授权分析
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00287-6
C. Chou
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引用次数: 0
Stability of an allocation of objects 对象分配的稳定性
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5
Murat Yılmaz, Özgür Yılmaz
{"title":"Stability of an allocation of objects","authors":"Murat Yılmaz, Özgür Yılmaz","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45255096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Computational implementation 计算实现
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-08 DOI: 10.2174/9781681082691116010009
Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran
{"title":"Computational implementation","authors":"Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygün Dalkıran","doi":"10.2174/9781681082691116010009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/9781681082691116010009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47306344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Computational implementation 计算的实现
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3
Barlo, Mehmet, Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün
{"title":"Computational implementation","authors":"Barlo, Mehmet, Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite environments. In particular, we supply Python codes that identify (<i>i</i>) the domain of preferences that allows Nash implementation by a given mechanism, (<i>ii</i>) the maximal domain of preferences that a given mechanism Nash implements Pareto efficiency, (<i>iii</i>) all consistent collections of sets of a given social choice correspondence (SCC), the existence of which is a necessary condition for Nash implementation of this SCC, and (<i>iv</i>) check whether some of the well-known sufficient conditions for Nash implementation hold for a given SCC. Our results exhibit that the computational identification of all collections consistent with an SCC enables the planner to design appealing mechanisms.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"10 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism 帮助申请人:在即时录取机制内提供公平的竞争环境
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00283-2
Christian Basteck, M. Mantovani
{"title":"Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism","authors":"Christian Basteck, M. Mantovani","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00283-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00283-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"187 - 220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41711292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
An analysis of managerial delegation in a market with vertically-integrated producer owning an essential input monopolistically 纵向一体化生产者垄断拥有基本投入的市场中的管理委托分析
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00274-3
C. Chou
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引用次数: 0
Testing alone is insufficient. 仅仅进行测试是不够的
IF 0.3 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00295-6
Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai, Akhil Vohra, Rakesh Vohra
{"title":"Testing alone is insufficient.","authors":"Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai, Akhil Vohra, Rakesh Vohra","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00295-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10058-022-00295-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The fear of contracting a serious illness caused by a contagious disease limits economic activity even after reopening. Widespread testing alone will not alleviate this problem. We argue that targeted testing in concert with targeted transfers is essential. We propose a model with these features to determine where agents should be tested and how they should be incentivized. Agents with a low wage, a high risk of infection, and who bear a large cost of falling ill should be tested at work. When testing is very costly, agents with high wages and low expected costs associated with falling ill should be tested at home.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8886876/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44907584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
To sell public or private goods. 出售公共或私人物品。
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-08-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00305-7
Simon Loertscher, Leslie M Marx
{"title":"To sell public or private goods.","authors":"Simon Loertscher, Leslie M Marx","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00305-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10058-022-00305-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Traditional analysis takes the public or private nature of goods as given. However, technological advances, particularly related to digital goods such as non-fungible tokens, increasingly make rivalry a choice variable of the designer. This paper addresses the question of when a profit-maximizing seller prefers to provide an asset as a private good or as a public good. While the public good is subject to a free-rider problem, a profit-maximizing seller or designer faces a nontrivial quantity-exclusivity tradeoff, and so profits from collecting small payments from multiple agents can exceed the large payment from a single agent. We provide conditions under which the profit from the public good exceeds that from a private good. If the cost of production is sufficiently, but not excessively, large, then production is profitable only for the public good. Moreover, if the lower bound of the support of the buyers' value distribution is positive, then the profit from the public good is unbounded in the number of buyers, whereas the profit from selling the private good is never more than the upper bound of the support minus the cost. As the variance of the agents' distribution becomes smaller, public goods eventually outperform private goods, reflecting intuition based on complete information models, in which public goods always outperform private goods in terms of revenue.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"385-415"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9362552/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52123101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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