{"title":"计算的实现","authors":"Barlo, Mehmet, Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün","doi":"10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite environments. In particular, we supply Python codes that identify (<i>i</i>) the domain of preferences that allows Nash implementation by a given mechanism, (<i>ii</i>) the maximal domain of preferences that a given mechanism Nash implements Pareto efficiency, (<i>iii</i>) all consistent collections of sets of a given social choice correspondence (SCC), the existence of which is a necessary condition for Nash implementation of this SCC, and (<i>iv</i>) check whether some of the well-known sufficient conditions for Nash implementation hold for a given SCC. Our results exhibit that the computational identification of all collections consistent with an SCC enables the planner to design appealing mechanisms.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"10 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Computational implementation\",\"authors\":\"Barlo, Mehmet, Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite environments. In particular, we supply Python codes that identify (<i>i</i>) the domain of preferences that allows Nash implementation by a given mechanism, (<i>ii</i>) the maximal domain of preferences that a given mechanism Nash implements Pareto efficiency, (<i>iii</i>) all consistent collections of sets of a given social choice correspondence (SCC), the existence of which is a necessary condition for Nash implementation of this SCC, and (<i>iv</i>) check whether some of the well-known sufficient conditions for Nash implementation hold for a given SCC. Our results exhibit that the computational identification of all collections consistent with an SCC enables the planner to design appealing mechanisms.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44537,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Economic Design\",\"volume\":\"10 6\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Economic Design\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Economic Design","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite environments. In particular, we supply Python codes that identify (i) the domain of preferences that allows Nash implementation by a given mechanism, (ii) the maximal domain of preferences that a given mechanism Nash implements Pareto efficiency, (iii) all consistent collections of sets of a given social choice correspondence (SCC), the existence of which is a necessary condition for Nash implementation of this SCC, and (iv) check whether some of the well-known sufficient conditions for Nash implementation hold for a given SCC. Our results exhibit that the computational identification of all collections consistent with an SCC enables the planner to design appealing mechanisms.
期刊介绍：
Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design.
Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design
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