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Review of Economic Design最新文献

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Nonparametric identification and estimation of all-pay auction and contest models 全付费拍卖与竞赛模型的非参数辨识与估计
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00309-3
Ksenia Shakhgildyan
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引用次数: 0
Difference-form group contests 不同形式的小组竞赛
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-09-05 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00312-8
María Cubel, Santiago Sanchez-Pages
{"title":"Difference-form group contests","authors":"María Cubel, Santiago Sanchez-Pages","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00312-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00312-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper is the first to study difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups where their probability of victory depends on the absolute difference of their effective efforts. We show that key equilibrium variables in these contests can be expressed as a function of a modified version of the Watts poverty index. We use the properties of this index to study the impact of heterogeneity, both within and between groups. In the case of homogeneous groups, we show that multiple groups can be active in equilibrium and that more groups are active and aggregate effort is higher the more similar their valuations of victory are. We then characterize equilibria under heterogeneous groups. We show that within-group heterogeneity is typically detrimental to the success of a group in the contest. Groups may have an incentive to become more homogeneous in order to increase their chances of victory.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"8 3-4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems 在理赔问题中保证赔偿的资源分配
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-09-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00310-w
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, Josep E. Peris, María-José Solís-Baltodano
{"title":"Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems","authors":"José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, Josep E. Peris, María-José Solís-Baltodano","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00310-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00310-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"581 - 602"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44551573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contest divisioning 竞赛部门
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-08-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00311-9
Philip Brookins, Paan Jindapon
{"title":"Contest divisioning","authors":"Philip Brookins, Paan Jindapon","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00311-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00311-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we ask a fundamental design question in the theory of contests: Should contestants and reward money be pooled into a single grand contest, or should they be divided into parallel subcontests? We theoretically explore optimal divisioning using Tullock’s lottery contest framework and compare the performance, i.e., total effort generated, of the grand contest to the performance of contest divisioning based on players’ ability or risk attitude. When all players are risk neutral, contest divisioning is never optimal. However, given that players are heterogeneous in either ability or risk attitude, we find that contest divisioning is optimal when the degrees of absolute risk aversion are sufficiently large. Importantly, our results support the widespread use of divisioning seen in practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"8 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray 精心设计的激励计划：纪念塞米赫·科雷的特刊介绍
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-08-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00307-5
M. Sanver
{"title":"Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray","authors":"M. Sanver","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00307-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00307-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"247 - 254"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49610542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle 三种公共产品与词典编纂偏好:替代原则
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00306-6
Lars Ehlers
{"title":"Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle","authors":"Lars Ehlers","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00306-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00306-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"26 1","pages":"367 - 384"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52123154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective 超模收益和目标下序列信息设计的鲁棒实现
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-07-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00304-8
Hiroto Sato
{"title":"Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective","authors":"Hiroto Sato","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00304-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00304-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"269 - 285"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43980326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Entitlements to continued life and the evaluation of population health 继续生活的权利和人口健康的评价
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-06-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00303-9
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, L. P. Østerdal
{"title":"Entitlements to continued life and the evaluation of population health","authors":"Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, L. P. Østerdal","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00303-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00303-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"1 1","pages":"1 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45520242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Compromising as an equal loss principle 作为同等损失原则的妥协
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-05-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00302-w
O. Cailloux, Beatrice Napolitano, M. Sanver
{"title":"Compromising as an equal loss principle","authors":"O. Cailloux, Beatrice Napolitano, M. Sanver","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00302-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00302-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"547 - 560"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44076190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests 近乎真实的中间偏见调解使利益不一致的代理人之间能够进行信息交换
IF 0.7 4区 经济学
Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-04-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00301-x
Dmitry Sedov
{"title":"Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests","authors":"Dmitry Sedov","doi":"10.1007/s10058-022-00301-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00301-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44537,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Design","volume":"27 1","pages":"505 - 546"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46664042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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