Trade of a common value good

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-11-12 DOI:10.1007/s10058-022-00322-6

Steven R. Williams

引用次数: 0

Abstract

When traders have private information about a common value good, adverse selection alone is insufficient to prevent trade of the good and estimation of the common value based upon the traders’ private information. We explore sufficient conditions for nonexistence of trading mechanisms in which trade of a common good occurs, along with cases in which such mechanisms exist.

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有共同价值的商品的贸易

当交易者拥有关于共同价值商品的私人信息时，仅凭逆向选择不足以阻止该商品的交易和基于交易者的私人信息对共同价值的估计。我们探讨了共同利益的贸易机制不存在的充分条件，以及这种机制存在的情况。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Economic Design ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

28.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design