And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2022-11-09 DOI:10.1007/s10058-022-00315-5

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Theodore L. Turocy

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We characterise the strategic equivalence among k-winner contests using simultaneous and sequential winner selection. We test this prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that simultaneous winner selection results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case.

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亚军是…:比较多赢家图洛克竞赛的获胜者选拔程序

我们用同时和顺序的赢家选择来描述k赢家竞争中的策略等价。我们通过一系列的实验室实验来验证这一战略等价的预测，对比了1胜和2胜的竞争，后者的结果是顺序显示的还是在单个阶段显示的。我们发现，从长远来看，在战略对等的竞争中，平均出价水平是相似的。然而，在双胜者竞赛中，适应速度较慢且缺乏系统性，这与同时选择胜者的结果比单胜者的结果更具随机性的特性是一致的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Economic Design ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

28.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design