发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties 溯因论和属性的科学现实主义案例
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-05 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000112
Matthew Tugby
{"title":"Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties","authors":"Matthew Tugby","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000112","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Traditionally, many arguments for realism about properties (universals or tropes) rely on a priori claims. The author argues that if we make use of an abductive principle that is commonly employed by scientific realists, a new argument for property realism can be formulated which is based firmly in scientific practice. The abductive principle says that we should believe in the existence of certain theoretical entities if they figure in the best explanation for what scientists observe. The scientific argument for property realism then says (roughly) that the best explanation for various behavioural patterns that physical scientists observe is that microscopic entities (such as electrons) instantiate stable, causally efficacious properties. After presenting the argument, the author defends it against possible objections. More generally, the article provides a case study for how science and metaphysics can work together to generate ontological claims.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-000112","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46526062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Analogical Inference in Gustav Theodor Fechner’s Inductive Metaphysics 古斯塔夫·西奥多·费希纳《归纳形而上学》中的类比推理
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-04 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000111
Ansgar Seide
{"title":"Analogical Inference in Gustav Theodor Fechner’s Inductive Metaphysics","authors":"Ansgar Seide","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000111","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Gustav Theodor Fechner was one of the main proponents of inductive metaphysics in the 19th century. The idea of inductive metaphysics is to use empirical sources and inductive forms of inference in metaphysics. Although this sounds like a research program which might well appeal to scientifically minded philosophers, some of Fechner’s metaphysical conclusions look very suspicious from a scientific viewpoint. For example, Fechner famously argues that the planets and stars are animated by a soul and that the same holds for the whole universe. In the present article it is shown that Fechner’s mystical cosmological views are based on a principle of analogy which is too permissive and that as a result of that his central argument to the conclusion that the earth is animated by a soul is not correct. As the article argues, the principle Fechner bases his inference on has to be supplemented by a causal condition along the lines of Mary Hesse’s account of analogical inferences, a condition Fechner at least implicitly recognizes but fails to meet.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47636626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Ontological Categories and the Transversality Requirement 本体论范畴与横向要求
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-26 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000116
Guido Imaguire
{"title":"Ontological Categories and the Transversality Requirement","authors":"Guido Imaguire","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000116","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Which categories of entities qualify as ontological categories? Which combinations of categories qualify as adequate systems of ontological categories? These are the two questions the author focuses on in this article. Contrary to the usual praxis in contemporary ontological literature, he addresses both questions conjointly. First, the author presents some problems of characterizing ontological categories in purely extensional terms, i.e. as widely inclusive natural classes. Second, he introduces the transversality requirement: ontological categories should be individually and naturally domain-transversal, i.e. ontological categories must be neutral concerning different scientific disciplines like physics, biology and mathematics. As a result, ontological categories must have instances in any domain of reality. Finally, the author checks the adequacy of some systems of ontological categories according to this criterion and meets some possible objections.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42151815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Ignorance and Its Disvalue 无知及其价值
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-20 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000106
A. Meylan
{"title":"Ignorance and Its Disvalue","authors":"A. Meylan","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000106","url":null,"abstract":"It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-000106","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47827900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Eudaimonia as Fundamentally Good 快乐从根本上说是好的
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-20 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000099
M. Lebar
{"title":"Eudaimonia as Fundamentally Good","authors":"M. Lebar","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000099","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In the ethical theories of the ancient Greeks, eudaimonia provided a grounding for the value of all other goods. But a puzzle for such views is that some things are good for us irrespective of the intervention of eudaimonia and its requirement of virtuous activity. In this article, the author considers challenges to the eudaimonist account of value on those grounds pressed by Nicholas Wolterstorff and Sophie Grace Chappell. The aim is ethical-theoretical, rather than historical. The author defends the thesis that a form of eudaimonism that is largely Aristotelian in form and content can meet these challenges.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-000099","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45746921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Place of Subjectivity 主体性的地位
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-20 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000104
Christoph Halbig
{"title":"The Place of Subjectivity","authors":"Christoph Halbig","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000104","url":null,"abstract":"The modern debate on the theory of prudential values is largely structured around the issue of how to accommodate the role of subjectivity: a prudentially good life (unlike, say, a morally good life) seems to be necessarily a life that is good for the person living it. The present article aims at clarifying this crucial role of subjectivity in the ontology of prudential values. It tries to show that this role, rightly understood, can be fully and satisfactorily accounted for by a strong realism in the theory of prudential value. Subjectivist intuitions that prove incompatible with such a realist framework, it is argued, can be convincingly rejected on independent grounds.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-000104","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43022450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Enriching the Cognitive Account of Common Ground 丰富对共同点的认知
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-20 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000105
Leda Berio, G. Vosgerau
{"title":"Enriching the Cognitive Account of Common Ground","authors":"Leda Berio, G. Vosgerau","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000105","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Classical notions of Common Ground have been criticized for being cognitively demanding given their appeal to complex meta-representations. The authors here propose a distinction between Immediate Common Ground, containing information specific to the communicative situation, and General Common Ground, containing information that is not situation-specific. This distinction builds on previous work by Horton and Gerrig [2016], extending the idea that common cognitive processes are part of the establishment and use of common ground. This is in line with the idea that multiple cognitive resources are involved in dialogue and avoids appealing to special-purpose representations for Common Ground purposes.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-000105","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45848467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Manifestation Account of Evil 邪恶的显现
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-20 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000102
P. Schwind, Felix Timmermann
{"title":"The Manifestation Account of Evil","authors":"P. Schwind, Felix Timmermann","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000102","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article defends a novel definition of evil. An action is evil if (1) a pro-attitude (or complete indifference) towards severe harm to a sentient being is (2) manifested in the action. The manifestation can take either of two forms: expressing the pro-attitude or attempting to realize its object. In order to exclude cases where the pro-attitude is the result of a positive attitude and the action does therefore not count as evil, the pro-attitude (3) must be generated from a morally reprehensible attitude such as greed or sadistic pleasure. As an implication of this definition, not every evil action is extremely bad, and some ‘merely’ wrong acts might be worse than some evil acts.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-000102","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42259589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Some Ancient Greek and Twentieth-Century Theories of Value 一些古希腊和二十世纪的价值理论
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-20 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000103
R. Kraut
{"title":"Some Ancient Greek and Twentieth-Century Theories of Value","authors":"R. Kraut","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000103","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Plato puts goodness at the center of all practical thinking but offers no definition of it and implies that philosophy must find one. Aristotle demurs, arguing that there is no such thing as universal goodness. What we need, instead, is an understanding of the human good. Plato and Aristotle are alike in the attention they give to the category of the beneficial, and they agree that since some things are beneficial only as means, there must be others that are non-derivatively beneficial. When G. E. Moore proposed in the early twentieth century that goodness is, as Plato had said, the foundation of ethics, he rejected not only the assumption that goodness needs a definition, but also that goodness is beneficial – that is, good for someone. This article traces the development of this debate as it plays out in the writings of Prichard, Ross, Geach, Thomson, and Scanlon.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-000103","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42488191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Anti-Realism and Anti-Revisionism in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics 维特根斯坦数学哲学中的反现实主义与反修正主义
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-20 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-000109
A. Nakano
{"title":"Anti-Realism and Anti-Revisionism in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics","authors":"A. Nakano","doi":"10.1163/18756735-000109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000109","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Since the publication of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein’s interpreters have endeavored to reconcile his general constructivist/anti-realist attitude towards mathematics with his confessed anti-revisionary philosophy. In this article, the author revisits the issue and presents a solution. The basic idea consists in exploring the fact that the so-called “non-constructive results” could be interpreted so that they do not appear non-constructive at all. The author substantiates this solution by showing how the translation of mathematical results, given by the possibility of translation between logics, can be seen as a tool for partially implementing the solution Wittgenstein had in mind.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/18756735-000109","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41251622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信