一些古希腊和二十世纪的价值理论

IF 0.3 0 PHILOSOPHY
R. Kraut
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引用次数: 0

摘要

柏拉图把善良放在所有实践思想的中心,但没有给出它的定义,并暗示哲学必须找到一个。亚里士多德对此表示异议,认为不存在普遍的善。相反,我们需要的是对人类善的理解。柏拉图和亚里士多德对利益范畴的关注是一致的,他们都认为,既然有些东西只是作为手段而有益,那么一定有其他东西是非衍生的有益的。当摩尔在20世纪初提出,正如柏拉图所说,善良是伦理学的基础时,他不仅拒绝了善良需要定义的假设,而且拒绝了善良是有益的——也就是说,对某人有益。本文追溯了这场争论在普里查德、罗斯、吉奇、汤姆森和斯坎伦的著作中展开的过程。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Some Ancient Greek and Twentieth-Century Theories of Value
Plato puts goodness at the center of all practical thinking but offers no definition of it and implies that philosophy must find one. Aristotle demurs, arguing that there is no such thing as universal goodness. What we need, instead, is an understanding of the human good. Plato and Aristotle are alike in the attention they give to the category of the beneficial, and they agree that since some things are beneficial only as means, there must be others that are non-derivatively beneficial. When G. E. Moore proposed in the early twentieth century that goodness is, as Plato had said, the foundation of ethics, he rejected not only the assumption that goodness needs a definition, but also that goodness is beneficial – that is, good for someone. This article traces the development of this debate as it plays out in the writings of Prichard, Ross, Geach, Thomson, and Scanlon.
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CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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