Journal of Antitrust Enforcement最新文献_第6页

Enforcing the Digital Markets Act: institutional choices, compliance, and antitrust 执行《数字市场法案》:制度选择、合规和反垄断

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-03-20 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad004

Jacques Crémer, David Dinielli, Paul Heidhues, Gene Kimmelman, Giorgio Monti, Rupprecht Podszun, Monika Schnitzer, Fiona Scott Morton, Alexandre de Streel

引用次数: 0

Global licences under threat of injunctions: FRAND commitments, competition law, and jurisdictional battles 面临禁令威胁的全球许可证:FRAND承诺、竞争法和管辖权之争

IF 0.7

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-02-07 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad002

Renato Nazzini

{"title":"Global licences under threat of injunctions: FRAND commitments, competition law, and jurisdictional battles","authors":"Renato Nazzini","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines three, intertwined questions arising from the recent case law on global FRAND licences under threat of injunction. First, whether the obligation of an implementer to enter into a global licence of all the standard-essential patent (SEP) owner’s relevant SEPs on pain of a national injunction is consistent with the policies underpinning a SEP owner’s obligation to grant a FRAND licence. Secondly, whether the conduct of a SEP owner insisting on an implementer entering into a global licence under threat of an injunction is compatible with the UK Chapter II prohibition and Article 102 TFEU. Thirdly, whether the assumption and exercise by national courts of the power to settle the terms of global licences is a rational way of resolving global FRAND licensing disputes. On all three counts, the conclusion is that departing from territorial jurisdiction in the matter of FRAND licences is not advisable as it has the effect of distorting the incentives of SEP owners and implementers in such a way that FRAND licences and FRAND negotiations are less likely to reflect, or be driven by, the value of the underlying technology. As a result, global FRAND licences may apply excessive royalties or royalties for SEPs that are invalid, not essential, or not infringed. A system of national enforcement is better suited to striking a right balance between the interests of SEP owners and implementers, producing better outcomes in terms of effects on social welfare and productivity.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44455695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Supranational or cooperative? Rethinking the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement Competition Protocol institutional design 超国家还是合作？对非洲大陆自由贸易区协定竞争议定书制度设计的再思考

IF 0.7

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-02-03 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad003

Vellah Kedogo Kigwiru

{"title":"Supranational or cooperative? Rethinking the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement Competition Protocol institutional design","authors":"Vellah Kedogo Kigwiru","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 African countries are currently negotiating the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Competition Protocol (CP) to regulate competition in the created continental market. However, the most daunting task for the negotiators and African countries is which institutional design to adopt at the continental level, pitying against a supranational or cooperative institutional model. Drawing from a dearth of literature on institutional designs, I propose two factors that African countries should consider when deciding on the most appropriate institutional design for the AfCFTA CP. First are the benefits and costs of each institution design building on the experiences of existing regional competition regimes. Second is the institutional context in which the AfCFTA Continental Competition Regime (CCR) will be established, which constitutes African countries’ attitudes towards supranational institutions, preference heterogeneity, and power distributions. The findings of this article show that African countries should establish a less ambitious institution design that will attract business and political acceptance.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48519150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

What is fair and efficient in the face of climate change? 面对气候变化，什么是公平和高效的？

IF 0.7

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-01-13 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad001

M. Snoep

引用次数: 2

Third-generation competition law 第三代竞争法

IF 0.7

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-01-11 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnac035

Adrian Kuenzler

引用次数: 0

DMA begins DMA开始

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-01-09 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnac033

Giuseppe Colangelo

引用次数: 0

A critical reflection on the ‘Public Interest Exemption’ in China’s merger control regime 对中国并购管制制度中“公共利益豁免”的批判性反思

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-01-04 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnac030

Huizi Ai, Niels J Philipsen

{"title":"A critical reflection on the ‘Public Interest Exemption’ in China’s merger control regime","authors":"Huizi Ai, Niels J Philipsen","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnac030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnac030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in China allows the responsible authority for merger control to consider not only the competition interest but also other public interest reasons when it reviews a takeover or merger. Where the responsible authority considers that the benefits of a takeover or merger to the public interest outweigh the harms to competition, it may ‘exempt’ the transaction. This ‘public interest exemption’ has never been formally applied since the introduction of the law in 2008. One explanation for this can be found in the ambiguity of the law: there are no legal provisions that clarify the public interest considerations. A second explanation is that China did not establish a separate review procedure for this public interest exemption. In practice, some approval decisions made by the enforcement authority led to confusion, as it was unclear whether the transactions were ‘exempted’ for public interest reasons or for industrial policies. This article reflects on the role of the public interest exemption in China. By drawing lessons from the past and examining the public interest exemption regime in Germany, it aims to provide suggestions for future reforms, against the background of the promulgation of the Amendment to the AML in 2022.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135449937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Restrictions ‘by object’ after Generics, Lundbeck, and Budapest Bank: are we any wiser now? 继泛型、伦德贝克银行和布达佩斯银行之后，“按对象”限制:我们现在更明智了吗?

IF 0.7

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2022-10-12 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnac020

S. Enchelmaier

引用次数: 0

The interplay between antitrust law and intellectual property: stages of the European evolution 反垄断法与知识产权的相互作用:欧洲演进的各个阶段

IF 0.7

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnac025

G. Ghidini

引用次数: 0

What the Dutch Apple case can teach us about future challenges for competition enforcement 荷兰苹果案可以告诉我们竞争执法的未来挑战