{"title":"Restrictions ‘by object’ after Generics, Lundbeck, and Budapest Bank: are we any wiser now?","authors":"S. Enchelmaier","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnac020","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n ‘Restrictions “By Object” After Generics, Lundbeck, and Budapest Bank: Are We Any Wiser Now?’ summarizes the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the question when an agreement or a concerted practice between undertakings restricts competition ‘by object’ and when ‘by effect’, Article 101(1) TFEU. It turns out that there are few certainties in this area. Instead, there is a bewildering array of standards for assessing the consequences of agreements on the relevant market. Time and again, it is unclear how ‘abstract’ or ‘concrete’ the assessment has to be. Not much more clarity comes from the recent judgments in Generics, Lundbeck, and Budapest Bank on patent settlement agreements and price fixing, respectively. Nevertheless, they contain the elements of a simple and comprehensive test that dispenses with the complications that have built up in the case law.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnac020","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
‘Restrictions “By Object” After Generics, Lundbeck, and Budapest Bank: Are We Any Wiser Now?’ summarizes the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the question when an agreement or a concerted practice between undertakings restricts competition ‘by object’ and when ‘by effect’, Article 101(1) TFEU. It turns out that there are few certainties in this area. Instead, there is a bewildering array of standards for assessing the consequences of agreements on the relevant market. Time and again, it is unclear how ‘abstract’ or ‘concrete’ the assessment has to be. Not much more clarity comes from the recent judgments in Generics, Lundbeck, and Budapest Bank on patent settlement agreements and price fixing, respectively. Nevertheless, they contain the elements of a simple and comprehensive test that dispenses with the complications that have built up in the case law.
期刊介绍:
The journal covers a wide range of enforcement related topics, including: public and private competition law enforcement, cooperation between competition agencies, the promotion of worldwide competition law enforcement, optimal design of enforcement policies, performance measurement, empirical analysis of enforcement policies, combination of functions in the competition agency mandate, and competition agency governance. Other topics include the role of the judiciary in competition enforcement, leniency, cartel prosecution, effective merger enforcement, competition enforcement and human rights, and the regulation of sectors.