Restrictions ‘by object’ after Generics, Lundbeck, and Budapest Bank: are we any wiser now?

IF 0.6 Q2 LAW
S. Enchelmaier
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

‘Restrictions “By Object” After Generics, Lundbeck, and Budapest Bank: Are We Any Wiser Now?’ summarizes the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the question when an agreement or a concerted practice between undertakings restricts competition ‘by object’ and when ‘by effect’, Article 101(1) TFEU. It turns out that there are few certainties in this area. Instead, there is a bewildering array of standards for assessing the consequences of agreements on the relevant market. Time and again, it is unclear how ‘abstract’ or ‘concrete’ the assessment has to be. Not much more clarity comes from the recent judgments in Generics, Lundbeck, and Budapest Bank on patent settlement agreements and price fixing, respectively. Nevertheless, they contain the elements of a simple and comprehensive test that dispenses with the complications that have built up in the case law.
继泛型、伦德贝克银行和布达佩斯银行之后,“按对象”限制:我们现在更明智了吗?
继泛型、伦德贝克和布达佩斯银行之后的“对象限制”:我们现在更聪明了吗?,总结了欧洲法院关于经营者之间的协议或协调实践何时“通过对象”限制竞争以及何时“通过效果”限制竞争的法理,TFEU第101(1)条。事实证明,在这个领域几乎没有确定的事情。相反,在评估协议对相关市场的影响方面,存在着一系列令人眼花缭乱的标准。一次又一次,我们不清楚评估应该是“抽象”还是“具体”。最近对仿制药公司、灵北银行和布达佩斯银行分别就专利和解协议和价格操纵作出的判决也没有让情况变得更加明朗。然而,它们包含了一种简单而全面的检验的要素,免除了判例法中建立起来的复杂性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
14.30%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The journal covers a wide range of enforcement related topics, including: public and private competition law enforcement, cooperation between competition agencies, the promotion of worldwide competition law enforcement, optimal design of enforcement policies, performance measurement, empirical analysis of enforcement policies, combination of functions in the competition agency mandate, and competition agency governance. Other topics include the role of the judiciary in competition enforcement, leniency, cartel prosecution, effective merger enforcement, competition enforcement and human rights, and the regulation of sectors.
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