面临禁令威胁的全球许可证:FRAND承诺、竞争法和管辖权之争

IF 0.6 Q2 LAW
Renato Nazzini
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引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇文章探讨了三个相互交织的问题,这三个问题是由最近关于在禁令威胁下的全球FRAND许可证的判例法引起的。首先,实施者在国家禁令的痛苦下为所有标准基本专利(SEP)所有者的相关SEP签订全球许可证的义务是否符合SEP所有者授予FRAND许可证义务的政策。其次,SEP所有者坚持要求实施者在禁令的威胁下签订全球许可证的行为是否符合英国第二章的禁令和TFEU第102条。第三,国家法院承担并行使解决全球许可条款的权力是否是解决全球FRAND许可纠纷的合理方式。从这三方面来看,得出的结论是,在FRAND许可证问题上偏离领土管辖权是不可取的,因为这会扭曲SEP所有者和实施者的激励机制,使FRAND许可和FRAND谈判不太可能反映或受基础技术价值的驱动。因此,全球FRAND许可证可能会对无效、非必要或未被侵犯的SEP征收过高的特许权使用费。国家执法体系更适合在SEP所有者和实施者的利益之间取得正确的平衡,在对社会福利和生产力的影响方面产生更好的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Global licences under threat of injunctions: FRAND commitments, competition law, and jurisdictional battles
This article examines three, intertwined questions arising from the recent case law on global FRAND licences under threat of injunction. First, whether the obligation of an implementer to enter into a global licence of all the standard-essential patent (SEP) owner’s relevant SEPs on pain of a national injunction is consistent with the policies underpinning a SEP owner’s obligation to grant a FRAND licence. Secondly, whether the conduct of a SEP owner insisting on an implementer entering into a global licence under threat of an injunction is compatible with the UK Chapter II prohibition and Article 102 TFEU. Thirdly, whether the assumption and exercise by national courts of the power to settle the terms of global licences is a rational way of resolving global FRAND licensing disputes. On all three counts, the conclusion is that departing from territorial jurisdiction in the matter of FRAND licences is not advisable as it has the effect of distorting the incentives of SEP owners and implementers in such a way that FRAND licences and FRAND negotiations are less likely to reflect, or be driven by, the value of the underlying technology. As a result, global FRAND licences may apply excessive royalties or royalties for SEPs that are invalid, not essential, or not infringed. A system of national enforcement is better suited to striking a right balance between the interests of SEP owners and implementers, producing better outcomes in terms of effects on social welfare and productivity.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
14.30%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The journal covers a wide range of enforcement related topics, including: public and private competition law enforcement, cooperation between competition agencies, the promotion of worldwide competition law enforcement, optimal design of enforcement policies, performance measurement, empirical analysis of enforcement policies, combination of functions in the competition agency mandate, and competition agency governance. Other topics include the role of the judiciary in competition enforcement, leniency, cartel prosecution, effective merger enforcement, competition enforcement and human rights, and the regulation of sectors.
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