发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Cartel issues in plain sight 卡特尔问题显而易见
IF 0.7
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-05-16 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad019
William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, M. Meurer
{"title":"Cartel issues in plain sight","authors":"William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, M. Meurer","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44870061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Enforcement of US antitrust law in labour markets 美国反托拉斯法在劳动力市场的执行
IF 0.7
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-05-16 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad020
E. Posner
{"title":"Enforcement of US antitrust law in labour markets","authors":"E. Posner","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42130060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Global competition law turbulence: some consequences for US antitrust 全球竞争法动荡:对美国反垄断的一些后果
IF 0.7
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-05-16 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad018
D. Gerber
{"title":"Global competition law turbulence: some consequences for US antitrust","authors":"D. Gerber","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41828473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Methodological and normative elements of the new antitrust 新反垄断的方法论和规范要素
IF 0.7
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-05-15 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad016
Sanjukta Paul
{"title":"Methodological and normative elements of the new antitrust","authors":"Sanjukta Paul","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47732274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Looking backwards to move forwards: The role of history in current US antitrust enforcement? 回顾过去：历史在当前美国反垄断执法中的作用？
IF 0.7
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-05-03 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad007
R. Brandenburger, Jill Ottenberg
{"title":"Looking backwards to move forwards: The role of history in current US antitrust enforcement?","authors":"R. Brandenburger, Jill Ottenberg","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49650826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Competition enforcement versus regulation as market-opening tools: an application to banking and payment systems 竞争执法与监管作为市场开放工具:对银行和支付系统的应用
IF 0.7
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-04-20 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad010
J. Franck
{"title":"Competition enforcement versus regulation as market-opening tools: an application to banking and payment systems","authors":"J. Franck","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyses three routes for the formation of market-opening rules: competition enforcement, legislative rulemaking, and market investigation. Using examples and case studies related to facilitating market access in banking and payment systems, we illustrate essential features and limitations of the different modes of rulemaking. The interrelation between them is explored, emphasizing the merits of having them available in parallel.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48980395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Spamming the regulator: exploring a new lobbying strategy in EU competition procedures 向监管机构发送垃圾邮件:探索欧盟竞争程序中的新游说策略
IF 0.7
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-04-18 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad009
M. Jugl, William A M Pagel, Maria Camilla Garcia Jimenez, Jean Pierre Salendres, Will Lowe, Helena Malikova, Joanna J. Bryson
{"title":"Spamming the regulator: exploring a new lobbying strategy in EU competition procedures","authors":"M. Jugl, William A M Pagel, Maria Camilla Garcia Jimenez, Jean Pierre Salendres, Will Lowe, Helena Malikova, Joanna J. Bryson","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Regulation plays a central role in modern governance; yet, we have limited knowledge of how subjects of regulation—particularly, private actors—act in the face of potentially adverse regulatory decisions. Here, we document and examine a novel lobbying strategy in the context of competition regulation, a strategy that exploits the regulator’s finite administrative capacities. Companies with merger cases under scrutiny by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition appear to be employing a strategy of ‘spamming the regulator,’ through the strategic and cumulative submission of economic expert assessments. Procedural pressures may result in an undeservedly favourable assessment of the merger. Based on quantitative and qualitative analyses of an original dataset of all complex merger cases in the European Union 2005–2020, we present evidence of this new strategy and a possible learning process among private actors. We suggest remedies to ensure regulatory effectiveness in the face of this novel strategy.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41782315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The antitrust victims of monopsony 垄断的反垄断受害者
IF 0.7
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-04-11 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad008
{"title":"The antitrust victims of monopsony","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The exercise of unlawful monopsony power by buyer cartels depresses both the price paid and the quantity purchased. Consequently, producer surplus and social welfare decline from competitive levels. There are six classes of antitrust victims, but only one has standing to sue for antitrust damages in the United States. The other five are neglected. We identify the neglected victims in this article. We also suggest some ways to expand the protection offered by section 4 of the Clayton Act.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43010166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lasting change in competition law and policy 竞争法律和政策的持续变化
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-04-03 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad006
Spencer Weber Waller
{"title":"Lasting change in competition law and policy","authors":"Spencer Weber Waller","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This is a time of passionate debate on the fundamental goals of competition law. Should there be a single overarching goal for all competition law and policy? Should that goal be framed in purely economic terms? Should antitrust focus on protecting the competitive process, preventing unfair market conduct, or the abuse of superior bargaining position? Should antitrust promote and protect democracy, address social and racial injustice, or address climate change and sustainability? How should multiple goals be administered, weighed, and traded off in enforcement priorities and litigation? There is a progressive turn in the USA at the moment. But regardless of the nature and direction of the desired change, there is the equally important issue of how to achieve lasting change that survives the inevitable change in enforcement personnel and political leaders over time. In this essay, I focus on how to achieve that lasting change regardless of the goals and direction of change that any particular jurisdiction seeks to adopt. Most of the specific examples come from current developments in the USA, but are illustrative of the process of lasting change in competition. Enforcement agencies are key players in this process, but are constrained by the constitutions, treaties, legislation, and court decisions of their jurisdictions. Any campaign for change therefore depends on the wise use of the full substantive and procedural powers assigned to them by the political branches of the government. Successfully achieving substantial change rarely happens by accident, and most often requires a combination of such factors as: (i) creatively using the full statutory powers assigned to the agencies, (ii) striving for a unified whole-of-government approach to competition policy and (iii) deeply engaging the general public.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135465454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
EU antitrust in support of the Green Deal. Why better is not good enough 支持绿色协议的欧盟反垄断法。为什么更好还不够好
IF 0.7
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-03-24 DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnad005
E.M.H. Loozen
{"title":"EU antitrust in support of the Green Deal. Why better is not good enough","authors":"E.M.H. Loozen","doi":"10.1093/jaenfo/jnad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The European Union (EU) Commission proposes to ‘green up’ its enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU to allow producers to collectively overcome so-called first mover disadvantages that would result from inefficient market regulation. The Commission's reboot focuses on the last three exemption conditions. First, the consumer benefit condition is customized to use collective consumer benefits to determine whether consumers receive a ‘fair share’ of the benefits established under the efficiency condition. Here, the Commission bypasses the Dutch proposition to also take account of non-consumer benefits when investigating whether consumers are compensated for anticompetitive harm. Second, the indispensability condition is tasked to filter out greenwashing. Third, the residual competition condition is trusted to allow private collective action insofar it does not eliminate competition on price and/or innovation. Discussing both EU and Dutch proposals, this article finds that greening up Article 101(3) brings competition policy outside the limiting principles that define objective and effective competition enforcement in terms of voluntary exchange.","PeriodicalId":42471,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Antitrust Enforcement","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41595550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信