The antitrust victims of monopsony

IF 0.6 Q2 LAW

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2023-04-11 DOI:10.1093/jaenfo/jnad008

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The exercise of unlawful monopsony power by buyer cartels depresses both the price paid and the quantity purchased. Consequently, producer surplus and social welfare decline from competitive levels. There are six classes of antitrust victims, but only one has standing to sue for antitrust damages in the United States. The other five are neglected. We identify the neglected victims in this article. We also suggest some ways to expand the protection offered by section 4 of the Clayton Act.

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垄断的反垄断受害者

买方卡特尔行使非法垄断权，既压低了支付的价格，也压低了购买的数量。因此，生产者剩余和社会福利从竞争水平下降。在美国，有六类反垄断受害者，但只有一类有资格起诉反垄断损害赔偿。其他五个被忽略了。我们在这篇文章中确认了被忽视的受害者。我们还提出了一些扩大《克莱顿法案》第4条所提供保护的方法。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement LAW-

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

14.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The journal covers a wide range of enforcement related topics, including: public and private competition law enforcement, cooperation between competition agencies, the promotion of worldwide competition law enforcement, optimal design of enforcement policies, performance measurement, empirical analysis of enforcement policies, combination of functions in the competition agency mandate, and competition agency governance. Other topics include the role of the judiciary in competition enforcement, leniency, cartel prosecution, effective merger enforcement, competition enforcement and human rights, and the regulation of sectors.