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Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal最新文献

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Assortative Multisided Assignment Games. The Extreme Core Points 分类多方分配博弈。极限核心点
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3490554
Javier Martínez-de-Albeniz, Carles Rafels, Neus Ybern
{"title":"Assortative Multisided Assignment Games. The Extreme Core Points","authors":"Javier Martínez-de-Albeniz, Carles Rafels, Neus Ybern","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3490554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3490554","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players’ abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"271 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125561535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Creating Balance in Dynamic Competitions 在动态竞争中创造平衡
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3300060
Derek J. Clark, T. Nilssen
{"title":"Creating Balance in Dynamic Competitions","authors":"Derek J. Clark, T. Nilssen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3300060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3300060","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider incentives for organizing competitions in multiple rounds, focusing on situations where there is heterogeneity among the contestants ex ante, which discourages effort in a single contest. Heterogeneity evolves across rounds depending upon the outcomes of previous rounds. We present conditions under which balance in such a competition can be created, by determining the number of rounds and dividing the prize fund carefully across them, so that full rent dissipation entails. In the model, each round is an all-pay auction where contestants differ in their abilities to gain a momentum from winning. We also discuss the case when negative prizes are feasible, demonstrating that this strengthens the full dissipation result; and we consider a case where the size of the winner’s momentum is related to the size of the prize attained, showing that the stronger this linkage, the less of the prize is awarded early on.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122556073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Why Variable-Population Social Orderings Cannot Escape the Repugnant Conclusion: Proofs and Implications 变人口社会秩序为何无法逃避令人反感的结论:证据与启示
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3468615
Dean Spears, Mark B. Budolfson
{"title":"Why Variable-Population Social Orderings Cannot Escape the Repugnant Conclusion: Proofs and Implications","authors":"Dean Spears, Mark B. Budolfson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3468615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3468615","url":null,"abstract":"The population literature in theoretical economics has long focused on attempts to avoid the repugnant conclusion. We advance the literature by proving that no social ordering in population economics can escape the repugnant conclusion in all instances. As we show, prior results depend on a formal definition of the repugnant conclusion that artificially excludes some repugnant cases. In particular, the literature traditionally formalizes the repugnant conclusion to exclude cases that include an unaffected subpopulation. We relax this normatively irrelevant exclusion, and others. We prove that any candidate social ordering that satisfies either a basic axiom of Aggregation or Non-Aggregation implies some instance of the repugnant conclusion. Therefore, the repugnant conclusion provides no methodological guidance for theory or policymaking, because it cannot discriminate among candidate social orderings. This result is of practical importance because evaluation of important climate or development policies depends on comparing social welfare across populations of differing sizes.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115790385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Approximation Notions in Concave Games 凹对策中的近似概念
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3467056
E. Melo
{"title":"Approximation Notions in Concave Games","authors":"E. Melo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3467056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3467056","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies three different approximation concepts in the context of n-person concave games. Formally, we establish the precise relationship between the notions of e-Nash Equilibrium, $hate-approximate solution, and δ-near Nash equilibrium. We apply our results to the class of Lipschitz games and discrete network games respectively.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123179572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Price of Entry into a Competition 进入竞争的最优价格
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3464832
Boris Ginzburg
{"title":"Optimal Price of Entry into a Competition","authors":"Boris Ginzburg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3464832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464832","url":null,"abstract":"A continuum of contestants are choosing whether to enter a competition. Each contestant has a type, and of those who enter, the ones with highest types receive prizes. A profit-maximising firm controls entry, and charges a price for it. I analyse how the mass and value of prizes determine equilibrium price and intensity of entry. An increase in the value of each prize leads the firm to increase the price while keeping intensity of entry fixed. Conversely, when the mass of prizes increases, the firm initially keeps the price constant while entry increases; and later – raises the price.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"196 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114999715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Two-person Bargaining with Lexicographic Altruistic Preferences 基于词典利他偏好的两人议价
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3464196
D. Glycopantis
{"title":"Two-person Bargaining with Lexicographic Altruistic Preferences","authors":"D. Glycopantis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3464196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464196","url":null,"abstract":"In bargaining theory a usual assumption is either that of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions or that of continuous preferences. Recently we considered in Glycopantis a bargaining model which breaks away from this traditional treatment by employing lexicographic preferences of a antagonistic type. In the present note we consider a bargaining model with lexicographic but altruistic preferences for the two players. We show that the Rubinstein et al., definition can again be used to obtain a Nash solution. This is of a different type from that of the antagonistic model. We also look briefly again at the alternating offers approach.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126647122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cooperative Game with Nondeterministic Returns 具有不确定收益的合作博弈
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3474031
Jian Yang, Jianbin Li
{"title":"Cooperative Game with Nondeterministic Returns","authors":"Jian Yang, Jianbin Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3474031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3474031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study a non-traditional cooperative game where returns from coalitions are nondeterministic. The long-standing concept of core can be generalized to reflect players’ contentment with their allocations. It is now imperative to formalize the restrictions, such as those pertaining to information, on allocations. The latter are also at times more conducive to fractional representations. With probabilistic structures added, nondeterministic returns become random variables, utility functions attain risk-attitude connotations, and the timing of players’ allocation resolutions gains significance. Under various conditions for utility functions, we show how various core concepts of the general game can be related to its traditionally defined auxiliaries. These developments help pave the way for our illustrations, within two distinct settings, that players’ increased risk aversion would promote the formation of the grand coalition.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121141064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Evolutionary Economics and the Stra.Tech.Man Approach of the Firm Into Globalization Dynamics 演化经济学与全球化动态中企业的stra - tech - man方法
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI: 10.32861/bmer.510.146.160
Dimos Chatzinikolaou, Charis Vlados
{"title":"Evolutionary Economics and the Stra.Tech.Man Approach of the Firm Into Globalization Dynamics","authors":"Dimos Chatzinikolaou, Charis Vlados","doi":"10.32861/bmer.510.146.160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32861/bmer.510.146.160","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to examine whether the “Stra.Tech.Man” approach (Vlados, 2004), which explores the dialectical synthesis between strategy, technology, and management inside all socioeconomic organisms fulfills the requirements to be an analysis of evolutionary direction. It tries to answer this question, in particular, by examining the theoretical foundations of evolutionary economics and the subsequent evolutionary theorization of the firm that stems analytically from evolutionary economics. With this goal in mind, an overview of the relatively recent literature is attempted by presenting some of the significant contributions to evolutionary economics and the evolutionary theory of the firm. Next, it examines the specific way of building the Stra.Tech.Man approach on the production process of innovation and change management, by analyzing how this can lead to the structuration of an evolutionary direction of business planning for any socioeconomic organism.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131584574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Seeding the Herd: Pricing and Welfare Effects of Social Learning Manipulation 羊群播种:社会学习操纵的定价和福利效应
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3456139
Li Chen, Yiangos Papanastasiou
{"title":"Seeding the Herd: Pricing and Welfare Effects of Social Learning Manipulation","authors":"Li Chen, Yiangos Papanastasiou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3456139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456139","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is motivated by the recent emergence of various interference tactics employed by sellers attempting to manipulate social learning. We revisit the classic model of observational social learning and extend it to allow for (i) asymmetric information on product value between the seller and the consumers and (ii) the ability of the seller to “seed” the observational learning process with a fake purchase, in an attempt to manipulate consumer beliefs. We examine the interaction between social learning manipulation and equilibrium market outcomes as well as the impact of antimanipulation measures aimed at detecting and punishing misconduct. The analysis yields three main insights. First, we show that increasing the intensity of antimanipulation measures can have unintended consequences, often inducing higher levels of manipulation as well as higher equilibrium prices. Second, we find that although measures of high intensity can completely deter misconduct, such measures do not lead to any improvement in either seller or consumer payoffs, relative to the case where no measures are present. Third, we demonstrate that in many cases, measures of intermediate intensity can leverage seller manipulation to simultaneously improve both seller and consumer payoffs. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130493139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Repeated Games with Observable Actions in Continuous Time: Costly Transfers in Repeated Cooperation 连续时间内具有可观察动作的重复博弈:重复合作中的代价转移
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3614943
Mikhail Panov
{"title":"Repeated Games with Observable Actions in Continuous Time: Costly Transfers in Repeated Cooperation","authors":"Mikhail Panov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3614943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3614943","url":null,"abstract":"I propose a way to formulate and solve for sub-game perfect equilibria of continuous-time repeated games with both observable and unobservable actions. The main idea is to study directly self-enforcing agreements corresponding to the interaction, without setting up the full extensive-form game. To discipline observable deviations, I restrict that players are stuck with their deviations for a small amount of time. This restriction simultaneously makes the model tractable and ensures that agreements are well defined. To illustrate, I consider a setting with two players colluding with imperfectly observable productive actions and observable money transfers. Transfers are costly: only a fraction of the amount sent is delivered. I introduce self-enforcing public agreements, which mimic pure-strategy public perfect equilibria from discrete time. For a fixed interest rate, I characterize the set of payoffs attainable in such agreements. In optimal agreements, costly transfers are used rarely, only when the participation constraint of either player binds.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117144469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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