Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal最新文献

Expert-Based Knowledge: Communicating Over Scientific Models 基于专家的知识:基于科学模型的交流

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3938978

Philippe Coló

引用次数: 1

On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Auctions 信息稳健最优拍卖的结构研究

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3663721

Benjamin Brooks, Songzi Du

{"title":"On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Auctions","authors":"Benjamin Brooks, Songzi Du","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3663721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3663721","url":null,"abstract":"We study the design of profit-maximizing mechanisms in environments with interdependent values. A single unit of a good is for sale. There is a known joint distribution of the bidders' values for the good. Two programs are considered: (i) Max (over mechanisms) min (over information structures and equilibria) profit; (ii) Min (over information structures) max (over mechanisms and equilibria) profit. We show that it is without loss to restrict attention to solutions of (i) and (ii) in which actions and signals belong to the same linearly ordered space, equilibrium actions are equal to signals, and the only binding equilibrium constraints are those associated with local deviations. Under such restrictions, the non-linear programs (i) and (ii) become linear programs that are dual to one another in an approximate sense. In particular, the restricted programs have the same optimal value, which we term the profit guarantee. These results simplify the task of computing and characterizing informationally robust optimal auctions and worst-case information structures with general value distributions. The framework can be generalized to include additional feasibility constraints, multiple goods, and ambiguous value distributions.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116438032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Pseudo-Competitive Games and Algorithmic Pricing 伪竞争游戏和算法定价

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-09-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3925242

Chamsi Hssaine, Vijay Kamble, Siddhartha Banerjee

{"title":"Pseudo-Competitive Games and Algorithmic Pricing","authors":"Chamsi Hssaine, Vijay Kamble, Siddhartha Banerjee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3925242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3925242","url":null,"abstract":"We study a game of price competition amongst firms selling homogeneous goods defined by the property that a firm's revenue is independent of any competing prices that are strictly lower. This property is induced by any customer choice model involving utility-maximizing choice from an adaptively determined consideration set, encompassing a variety of empirically validated choice models studied in the literature. For these games, we show a one-to-one correspondence between pure-strategy local Nash equilibria with distinct prices and the prices generated by the firms sequentially setting local best-response prices in different orders. In other words, despite being simultaneous-move games, they have a sequential-move equilibrium structure. Although this structure is attractive from a computational standpoint, we find that it makes these games particularly vulnerable to the existence of strictly-local Nash equilibria, in which the price of a firm is only a local best-response to competitors' prices when a globally optimal response with a potentially unboundedly higher payoff is available. Our results thus suggest that strictly-local Nash equilibria may be more prevalent in competitive settings than anticipated. We moreover show, both theoretically and empirically, that price dynamics resulting from the firms utilizing gradient-based dynamic pricing algorithms to respond to competition may often converge to such an undesirable outcome. We finally propose an algorithmic approach that incorporates global experimentation to address this concern under certain regularity assumptions on the revenue curves.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"868 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113995509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Misalignment between Test Scores and Colleges' Preferences: Chinese College Admission Reconsidered 考试成绩与大学偏好的错位:重新考虑中国大学录取

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3914742

Yuanju Fang, Yosuke Yasuda

引用次数: 2

Strategic donation as a signal of cooperation intention: a laboratory experiment 战略捐赠作为合作意向的信号:实验室实验

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3915289

T. Kusakawa, Kazuhito Ogawa, Tatsuhiro Shichijo

引用次数: 0

Experimental Persuasion 实验说服力

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3906869

Ian Ball, José‐Antonio Espín‐Sánchez

引用次数: 6

Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control 在线广告、数据共享和消费者控制

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3898798

Justin P. Johnson, Thomas Jungbauer, M. Preuß

{"title":"Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control","authors":"Justin P. Johnson, Thomas Jungbauer, M. Preuß","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3898798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3898798","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how policies for the ownership and control of consumer-generated data affect market outcomes in the online advertising industry. When advertisers have strong property rights over data regarding consumers' active purchase interests, competition between ad exchanges leads to too little sharing of data between advertisers. This harms consumers, who receive too few pertinent ads, and advertisers themselves can also be harmed due to a situation resembling a prisoner's dilemma. We show that giving consumers property rights over their own data can improve outcomes; this happens when consumers can directly share data about their browsing history with ad exchanges. On the other hand, simpler consumer data rights, such as the right to not be tracked, can actually harm consumers due to how ad exchanges respond. Finally, initiatives by Apple and Google to limit third-party tracking, and introduce alternative tracking systems such as FLoCs, can benefit consumers by weakening the property rights of advertisers over consumer data. Because more data is shared by default under such systems, this is true even if these systems are less accurate than the third-party cookie system.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"169 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115131432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Meaning in Communication Games 交流游戏的意义

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3893109

A. Blume

引用次数: 0

Nash Bargaining Partitioning in Decentralized Portfolio Management 分散投资组合管理中的纳什议价分割

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3884009

Fancisco Benita, Stefano Nasini, R. Nessah

{"title":"Nash Bargaining Partitioning in Decentralized Portfolio Management","authors":"Fancisco Benita, Stefano Nasini, R. Nessah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3884009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3884009","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding how to distribute a fixed budget among decentralized intermediaries is a relevant investment problem, that has been recently introduced in the context of mathematical economics and operations research. While existing contributions focus on incentive mechanisms driving the actions of the decentralized intermediaries, the idea of a budget partitioning that balances fairness and efficiency has not been part of the debate. We consider the Nash bargaining partitioning for a class of decentralized investment problems, where intermediaries are in charge of the portfolio construction in heterogeneous local markets and act as risk/disutility minimizers. For the equilibrium characterization, we propose a reformulation that is valid within a class of risk/disutility measures (that we call quasi-homogeneous measures). This reformulation allows the reduction of a complex bilevel optimization model (resulting from the extensive formulation of the Nash bargaining partitioning in decentralized portfolio selection) to a convex separable knapsack problem. As empirically shown using stock returns data from U.S. listed enterprises, the notion of emph{quasi-homogeneity} not only allows to numerically characterize a budget partitioning that balances fairness and efficiency in decentralized investment, but also give rise to a computational approach that reduces its complexity and solves the vast majority of large-scale investment problems in less than a minute.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"934 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127023193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Respecting-Improvements Properties 稳定性、策略证明性和相对改进性质

Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3876865

D. Hirata, Yusuke Kasuya, Yasunori Okumura

引用次数: 0