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Truncation-Invariant Allocation Truncation-Invariant分配
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3453000
Jun Zhang
{"title":"Truncation-Invariant Allocation","authors":"Jun Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3453000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3453000","url":null,"abstract":"We consider an abstract allocation model that includes an initial state over which agents have private preferences. Agents' preferences can be strict or weak, and externalities can exist or not. A deterministic mechanism finds an allocation whereas a random mechanism finds a probability distribution over allocations. We say a mechanism, either deterministic or random, is truncation-invariant if after an agent truncates preferences, the found allocation is invariant in some respect as defined in the paper. Truncation-invariance is weaker than strategy-proofness and satisfied by some well-known manipulable mechanisms. For individually rational and truncation-invariant mechanisms, we prove two theorems that provide a unified explanation of seemingly unrelated results in several distinct models, which include object allocation, matching with contracts, and the abstract models of Sonmez (1999) and Alva and Manjunath (2019). The two theorems are straightforwardly implied by the definition of truncation-invariance, yet they are surprisingly useful in understanding existing results.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123208964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can Smart Contracts Ameliorate Adverse Selection in the Market for Second Hand Goods? 智能合约能改善二手商品市场的逆向选择吗?
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3451107
Rahul Singh Chauhan
{"title":"Can Smart Contracts Ameliorate Adverse Selection in the Market for Second Hand Goods?","authors":"Rahul Singh Chauhan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3451107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3451107","url":null,"abstract":"The essay explores how the advent of blockchain technology can augment digitally encoded smart contracts to replace trust-based third-party functions of verification and enforcement. Recent literature suggests that distributed and decentralized ledger of transactions could be leveraged to not only reduce transaction costs but also mitigate asymmetries of information. The essay endeavours to theoretically model and assess transactions on blockchain platforms via smart contracts versus conventional spot market trade. The essay finds that asset-quality delineation mechanism, history of similar transactions on the platform as well as associated verification costs play a key role in affecting incentives of buyers and sellers to trade using smart contracts.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"268 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133944450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Facets of the Stochastic Network Flow Problem 随机网络流问题的几个方面
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3449409
Alexander S. Estes, M. Ball
{"title":"Facets of the Stochastic Network Flow Problem","authors":"Alexander S. Estes, M. Ball","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3449409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449409","url":null,"abstract":"We study a type of network flow problem that we call the minimum-cost F-graph flow problem. This problem generalizes the typical minimum-cost network flow problem by allowing the underlying network...","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115009217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sequential vs. Simultaneous Trust 顺序信任vs同步信任
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3247329
Till O. Gross, Maroš Servátka, Radovan Vadovič
{"title":"Sequential vs. Simultaneous Trust","authors":"Till O. Gross, Maroš Servátka, Radovan Vadovič","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3247329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3247329","url":null,"abstract":"We examine theoretically and experimentally the implications of trust arising under sequential and simultaneous designs, where one player makes an investment choice, and another player decides whether to share the investment gains. We show analytically that in some cases the sequential design may be outperformed by the simultaneous design. In an experiment we find that the investment levels and sharing rates are higher in the sequential design, but there are no corresponding differences in beliefs. We conjecture that this happens because in the sequential design substantially more trust is necessary to induce cooperation. Our data strongly support this conjecture.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127247325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design 论动力学在稳健机构设计中的无用性
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3449698
S. Balseiro, A. Kim, Daniel Russo
{"title":"On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design","authors":"S. Balseiro, A. Kim, Daniel Russo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3449698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449698","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a principal who repeatedly interacts with a strategic agent holding private information. In each round, the agent observes an idiosyncratic shock drawn independently and identically from a distribution known to the agent but not to the principal. The utilities of the principal and the agent are determined by the values of the shock and outcomes that are chosen by the principal based on reports made by the agent. When the principal commits to a dynamic mechanism, the agent best-responds to maximize his aggregate utility over the whole time horizon. The principal’s goal is to design a dynamic mechanism to minimize his worst-case regret, that is, the largest difference possible between the aggregate utility he could obtain if he knew the agent’s distribution and the actual aggregate utility he obtains. We identify a broad class of games in which the principal’s optimal mechanism is static without any meaningful dynamics. The optimal dynamic mechanism, if it exists, simply repeats an optimal mechanism for a single-round problem in each round. The minimax regret is the number of rounds times the minimax regret in the single-round problem. The class of games includes repeated selling of identical copies of a single good or multiple goods, repeated principal-agent relationships with hidden information, and repeated allocation of a resource without money. Outside this class of games, we construct examples in which a dynamic mechanism provably outperforms any static mechanism.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131587558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Inference in Models of Discrete Choice with Social Interactions Using Network Data 基于网络数据的社会互动离散选择模型的推理
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3446926
Michael P. Leung
{"title":"Inference in Models of Discrete Choice with Social Interactions Using Network Data","authors":"Michael P. Leung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3446926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3446926","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies inference in models of discrete choice with social interactions when the data consists of a single large network. We provide theoretical justification for the use of spatial and network HAC variance estimators in applied work, the latter constructed by using network path distance in place of spatial distance. Toward this end, we prove new central limit theorems for network moments in a large class of social interactions models. The results are applicable to discrete games on networks and dynamic models where social interactions enter through lagged dependent variables. We illustrate our results in an empirical application and simulation study.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132830378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Dynamic Level-K and Cognitive Hierarchy Models of Repeated Normal-Form Games: A Note 重复正态博弈的动态水平- k和认知层次模型
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3672298
Jun Feng, Xiao-Yong Wang
{"title":"Dynamic Level-K and Cognitive Hierarchy Models of Repeated Normal-Form Games: A Note","authors":"Jun Feng, Xiao-Yong Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3672298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3672298","url":null,"abstract":"This note investigates a set of dynamic versions of the level-k (LK) and cognitive hierarchy (CH) models in repeated normal-form games. Conventional LK and CH models assume a reasoning process that does not allow learning. This can be a restrictive assumption: When facing a repeated game, individuals tend to gather information from various sources. Even individuals with the lowest reasoning levels tend to improve their decisions over time. We propose dynamic level-k (DLK) and dynamic cognitive hierarchy (DCH) models to enable the interplay between within-period reasoning and between-period learning. In our models, players first update their beliefs about the choices made by their opponents across periods. Then, within each period, conditional on their reasoning levels, players stochastically best respond to the predicted play of their opponents. We select five publicly available datasets from four well-established papers to test the proposed models. Compared with other static and dynamic models, our models have better or similar performance both in terms of the in-sample fits and out-of-sample validations. Moreover, we provide a more detailed discussion linking each component of the models to the performance outcomes. The results underscore the importance of both learning and reasoning in understanding the experimental observations in repeated normal-form games.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114262697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
General Nash Equilibrium: Unifying All Equilibrium Concepts 一般纳什均衡:统一所有均衡概念
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3443914
Susheng Wang
{"title":"General Nash Equilibrium: Unifying All Equilibrium Concepts","authors":"Susheng Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3443914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3443914","url":null,"abstract":"There are two independent lines of equilibrium concepts. To unify these two lines, we generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium to the concept of general Nash equilibrium such that it becomes applicable to all games. We also generalize the concept of general equilibrium in general equilibrium theory to a more general concept of general equilibrium such that it becomes applicable to all games. To illustrate the usefulness of these generalized concepts, we apply them to industrial organizations and general equilibrium theory.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"53 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133819226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Farsighted Manipulation and Exploitation in Networks 网络中的有远见的操纵和利用
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3456795
Péter Bayer, P. Herings, R. Peeters
{"title":"Farsighted Manipulation and Exploitation in Networks","authors":"Péter Bayer, P. Herings, R. Peeters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3456795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456795","url":null,"abstract":"Economic agents with an increased sophistication sometimes use their advantage to exploit their more naive counterparts. In public goods games played on networks, such an agent will attempt to manipulate as many of his neighbors as possible to produce the public good. We study the exploitation of a myopic population by a single farsighted player in such games. We show the existence and payoff-uniqueness of optimal farsighted strategies in every network structure. In the long run, the farsighted player’s effects are only felt locally. A simple dependence-withdrawal strategy reaches the optimal outcome for every network if the starting state is unfavorable, and reaches it for every starting state if the farsighted player is linked to all opponents. We characterize the lower and upper bounds of long-run payoffs the farsighted player can attain in a given network and make comparative statics with respect to adding a new link. The farsighted player always benefits from linking to more opponents (sociability) and is always harmed by his neighbors linking to each other (jealousy).","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133452868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Decisions on Extending Group Membership: Evidence from a Public Good Experiment 关于扩大群体成员的决定:来自公共物品实验的证据
Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal Pub Date : 2019-08-12 DOI: 10.3390/G11040061
C. Grund, C. Harbring, K. Thommes, Katja Tilkes
{"title":"Decisions on Extending Group Membership: Evidence from a Public Good Experiment","authors":"C. Grund, C. Harbring, K. Thommes, Katja Tilkes","doi":"10.3390/G11040061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/G11040061","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally compare the consequences for group cooperation of two decision mechanisms involving the extension of group membership. We analyze an exogenous decision (random draw) and an endogenous decision (made by a particular group member) mechanism to extend a temporary agent’s group membership. Our results reveal that the prospect of group membership extension affects not only the temporary but also the permanent group members’ contributions with an endogenous mechanism.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130718956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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