Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Assortment Rotation and the Value of Concealment","authors":"K. Ferreira, Joel Goh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2861521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2861521","url":null,"abstract":"Assortment rotation—the retailing practice of changing the assortment of products offered to customers—has recently been used as a competitive advantage for both brick-and-mortar and online retailers. We focus on product categories where consumers may purchase multiple products during a season and investigate a new reason why frequent assortment rotations can be valuable to a retailer. Namely, by distributing its seasonal catalog of products over multiple assortments rotated throughout the season, as opposed to selling all products in a single, fixed assortment, the retailer effectively conceals a portion of its full product catalog from consumers, injecting uncertainty into the consumer’s relative product valuations. Rationally acting consumers may respond to this structural difference by purchasing more products, thereby generating additional sales for the retailer. We refer to this phenomenon as the value of concealment and show that the retailer enjoys a positive and significant value of concealment under quite general conditions. However, we show that when consumers are forward looking, the value of concealment is context dependent. We present insights and discuss intuition regarding which product categories likely lead to a positive versus negative value of concealment. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129011667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Caught between Cultures: Unintended Consequences of Improving Opportunity for Immigrant Girls","authors":"Gordon B. Dahl, Christina Felfe, P. Frijters, Helmut Rainer","doi":"10.3386/w26674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26674","url":null,"abstract":"What happens when immigrant girls are given increased opportunities to integrate into the workplace and society, but their parents value more traditional cultural outcomes? Building on Akerlof and Kranton’s identity framework (2000), we construct a simple game-theoretic model which shows how expanding opportunities for immigrant girls can have the unintended consequence of reducing their well-being, since identity-concerned parents will constrain their daughter’s choices. The model can explain the otherwise puzzling findings from a reform which granted automatic birthright citizenship to eligible immigrant children born in Germany after January 1, 2000. Using survey data we collected in 57 schools in Germany and comparing those born in the months before versus after the reform, we find that birthright citizenship lowers measures of life satisfaction and self-esteem for immigrant girls. This is especially true for Muslims, where traditional cultural identity is salient. Birthright citizenship results in disillusionment where immigrant Muslim girls believe their chances of achieving their educational goals are lower and the perceived odds of having to forgo a career for family rise. Consistent with the model, immigrant Muslim parents invest less in their daughters’ schooling and have a lower probability of speaking German with their daughters if they are born after the reform. We further find that immigrant Muslim girls granted birthright citizenship are less likely to self-identify as German, are more socially isolated, and are less likely to believe foreigners can have a good life in Germany. In contrast, immigrant boys experience, if anything, an improvement in well-being and little effect on other outcomes. Taken together, the findings point towards immigrant girls being pushed by parents to conform to a role within traditional culture, whereas boys are allowed to take advantage of the opportunities that come with citizenship. Alternative models can explain some of the findings in isolation, while our identity model is consistent with all of the findings simultaneously.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131384249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Intelligence, Errors and Strategic Choices in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma","authors":"E. Proto, A. Rustichini, Andis Sofianos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3531435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3531435","url":null,"abstract":"A large literature in behavioral economics has emphasized in the last decades the role of individual differences in social preferences (such as trust and altruism) in influencing behavior in strategic environments. Here we emphasize the role of attention and working memory, and show that social interactions among heterogeneous groups are mediated by differences in cognitive skills. Our design uses a repeated prisoner’s dilemma; we compare rates of cooperation in groups of subjects separated according to their IQ, with those in integrated groups, where subjects of different IQ are pooled together. In integrated groups we observe higher aggregated cooperation rates and profits than in separated groups. There are gains in earnings among lower IQ subjects who learn how to cooperate faster than when they play separately, and smaller losses for higher IQ subjects. We also see that higher IQ subjects become less lenient when they are matched with lower IQ subjects than when they play separately. This pattern is an instance of a general phenomenon, which we demonstrate in an evolutionary game theory model, in which higher IQ among subjects induces –possibly thanks to better working memory– a lower frequency of errors in strategy implementation. We show that players indeed choose less-lenient strategies in environments in which subjects have higher error rates. Estimations of errors and strategies from the experimental data are consistent with the hypothesis and model’s predictions.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131485341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives","authors":"Antoine Camous, Russell Cooper","doi":"10.3386/w26654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26654","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the determination of income taxes in a dynamic setting with human capital accumulation. The goal is to understand the factors that support an outcome without complete redistribution, given a majority of relatively poor agents. In the analysis, the internal dynamics of income are not sufficient to prevent complete redistribution under majority rule without commitment. However, a political influence game limits the support for expropriatory taxation and preserves incentives. In some cases, the outcome of the game corresponds with the optimal allocation under commitment.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131583811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On Convexity in Games with Externalities","authors":"J. M. Alonso-Meijide, M. Álvarez-Mozos, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, A. Jiménez-Losada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3520503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3520503","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"59 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131672135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"First Mover Advantage, Time to Finance, and Cash Holdings","authors":"Liangbo Ma, A. Mello, Youchang Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2973581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973581","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the strategic role of cash in a two-stage competition model featuring a first-mover advantage in product markets and time delays in outside financing. Due to the joint effect of the first-mover advantage, time to finance, market profitability, participation cost, and the arrival rate of investment opportunities, large cash holdings can arise in equilibrium in both concentrated and diffuse industries, leading to a rich relation between industry concentration and cash holdings. The model also reveals novel interactions of these drivers of cash holdings that are consistent with empirical evidence. Furthermore, despite that cash is held to enable fast responses to investment opportunities, the correlation between cash holdings and realized investment is low. Our model provides an explanation for the large variation in cash holdings across industries and over time, and the strong correlation between cash holdings and R&D.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117080810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bargaining over Contingent Contracts Under Incomplete Information","authors":"Geoffroy de Clippel, Jack Fanning, Kareen Rozen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3527102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3527102","url":null,"abstract":"We study bargaining over contingent contracts in problems where private information becomes public or verifiable when the time comes to implement the agreement. We suggest a simple, two-stage game that incorporates important aspects of bargaining. We characterize equilibria in which parties always reach agreement, and study their limits as bargaining frictions vanish. We show that under mild regularity conditions, all interim-efficient limits belong to Myerson (1984)’s axiomatic solution. Furthermore, all limits must be interim-efficient if equilibria are required to be sequential. Results extend to other bargaining protocols.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115265852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Multidimensional Strategic Communication with Uncertain Salience","authors":"Benjamin G. Ogden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3491847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3491847","url":null,"abstract":"In many areas where strategic communication models are applied (e.g., lobbying by interest groups), the relevant uncertainty about the sender is not over the direction of their bias, but their priority over different issues. Within a model of multidimensional cheap talk, if the salience of different issues to the sender is unknown by the receiver, the expert may use the dimensions that are of less importance (to them) in order to achieve further manipulation of the policy-maker. The sender will do this unless he is sufficiently unbiased such that he has little conflict of interest with the receiver. This is inefficient from the policy-maker’s perspective, as she will be taking a loss (relative to babbling) from the dimensions on which she is receiving “false” information. Moreover, even with two senders, one is not able to recreate the reporting mechanism of Battaglini (2002), and instead potentially ends up with less information transmission than with a single sender. I propose a novel linear tax on lobbying along different dimensions in order to align the incentives of the receiver and sender when it comes to information acquisition and cross-dimensional manipulation.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129491596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Stackelberg Versus Cournot Oligopoly With Private Information","authors":"Eray Cumbul","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3199987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3199987","url":null,"abstract":"We compare an n-firm Cournot model with a Stackelberg model, where n-firms choose outputs sequentially, in a stochastic demand environment with private information. The expected total output, consumer surplus, and total surplus are lower, while expected price and total profits are higher in Stackelberg perfect revealing equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. These rankings are the opposite to the rankings of prices, total output, surplus, and profits under perfect information. We also show that the first n-1 firms' expected profits form a decreasing sequence from the first to the (n-1)st in the Stackelberg game. The last mover earns more expected profit than the first mover if n<5 or the ratio of the signals' informativeness to the demand certainty is sufficiently low. Lastly, there is a discontinuity between the Stackelberg equilibrium of the perfect information game and the limit of Stackelberg perfect revealing equilibria, as the noise of the demand information of all firms vanishes to zero at the same rate. We provide various robustness checks for the results when the precision of signals are asymmetric, there is public information or cost/quality uncertainty, or the products are differentiated.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128725920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Multiple Games Analysis: A Petri Dish for Growing Polycentric Orders","authors":"Abigail N. Devereaux","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3477461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477461","url":null,"abstract":"Game theory, as originally envisioned, is a tool to theorize about social interaction. As game theory became geared towards prediction and control, branching into mechanism and market design theory, its mathematical sophistication focused on solution spaces and, ultimately, the attainment of steady states or simple patterned behavior. I contend that game theory can also describe complex behavior like spontaneous emergence, the development process of polycentric influence hierarchies, and the emergence and survival of institutional forms. Multiple games analysis expands the solution spaces of classic games like the prisoner’s dilemma and the principal agent game, not by including conditioning stages or evolving the game in a repeating fashion, but through a detailed expansion of the game itself.","PeriodicalId":423216,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123073312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}