ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation最新文献_第4页

Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries 通过查询学习强大的替代品需求

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2020-05-04 DOI: 10.1145/3546604

P. Goldberg, Edwin Lock, Francisco Javier Marmolejo-Cossío

引用次数: 3

Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations for Matroid Rank Valuations 寻找矩阵秩估值的公平和有效分配

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_3

Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, Yair Zick

引用次数: 45

On Communication Complexity of Fixed Point Computation 不动点计算的通信复杂性

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2019-09-24 DOI: 10.1145/3485004

Anat Ganor, S. KarthikC., Dömötör Pálvölgyi

{"title":"On Communication Complexity of Fixed Point Computation","authors":"Anat Ganor, S. KarthikC., Dömötör Pálvölgyi","doi":"10.1145/3485004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485004","url":null,"abstract":"Brouwer’s fixed point theorem states that any continuous function from a compact convex space to itself has a fixed point. Roughgarden and Weinstein (FOCS 2016) initiated the study of fixed point computation in the two-player communication model, where each player gets a function from [0,1]^n to [0,1]^n, and their goal is to find an approximate fixed point of the composition of the two functions. They left it as an open question to show a lower bound of 2^{Omega (n)} for the (randomized) communication complexity of this problem, in the range of parameters which make it a total search problem. We answer this question affirmatively. Additionally, we introduce two natural fixed point problems in the two-player communication model. Each player is given a function from [0,1]^n to [0,1]^{n/2}, and their goal is to find an approximate fixed point of the concatenation of the functions. Each player is given a function from [0,1]^n to [0,1]^{n}, and their goal is to find an approximate fixed point of the mean of the functions. We show a randomized communication complexity lower bound of 2^{Omega (n)} for these problems (for some constant approximation factor). Finally, we initiate the study of finding a panchromatic simplex in a Sperner-coloring of a triangulation (guaranteed by Sperner’s lemma) in the two-player communication model: A triangulation T of the d-simplex is publicly known and one player is given a set S_Asubset T and a coloring function from S_A to lbrace 0,ldots ,d/2rbrace, and the other player is given a set S_Bsubset T and a coloring function from S_B to lbrace d/2+1,ldots ,drbrace, such that S_Adot{cup }S_B=T, and their goal is to find a panchromatic simplex. We show a randomized communication complexity lower bound of |T|^{Omega (1)} for the aforementioned problem as well (when d is large). On the positive side, we show that if dle 4 then there is a deterministic protocol for the Sperner problem with O((log |T|)^2) bits of communication.","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49648536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Auctions for Multiple Buyers with Ordinal Preferences over Fixed-Price Items 对固定价格物品有顺序偏好的多买家的收益最优确定性拍卖

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1145/3555045

Will Ma

引用次数: 1

Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information 最小统计信息下的稳健收益最大化

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2019-07-09 DOI: 10.1145/3546606

Y. Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças, Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis

{"title":"Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information","authors":"Y. Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças, Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis","doi":"10.1145/3546606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3546606","url":null,"abstract":"We study the problem of multi-dimensional revenue maximization when selling m items to a buyer that has additive valuations for them, drawn from a (possibly correlated) prior distribution. Unlike traditional Bayesian auction design, we assume that the seller has a very restricted knowledge of this prior: they only know the mean μj and an upper bound σj on the standard deviation of each item’s marginal distribution. Our goal is to design mechanisms that achieve good revenue against an ideal optimal auction that has full knowledge of the distribution in advance. Informally, our main contribution is a tight quantification of the interplay between the dispersity of the priors and the aforementioned robust approximation ratio. Furthermore, this can be achieved by very simple selling mechanisms. More precisely, we show that selling the items via separate price lotteries achieves an O(log r) approximation ratio where r = maxj(σj/μj) is the maximum coefficient of variation across the items. To prove the result, we leverage a price lottery for the single-item case. If forced to restrict ourselves to deterministic mechanisms, this guarantee degrades to O(r2). Assuming independence of the item valuations, these ratios can be further improved by pricing the full bundle. For the case of identical means and variances, in particular, we get a guarantee of O(log (r/m)) that converges to optimality as the number of items grows large. We demonstrate the optimality of the preceding mechanisms by providing matching lower bounds. Our tight analysis for the single-item deterministic case resolves an open gap from the work of Azar and Micali (ITCS’13). As a by-product, we also show how one can directly use our upper bounds to improve and extend previous results related to the parametric auctions of Azar et al. (SODA’13).","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46975411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

A Learning Framework for Distribution-Based Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts 基于分布的博弈论求解概念的学习框架

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2019-03-20 DOI: 10.1145/3580374

Tushant Jha, Yair Zick

引用次数: 12

The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy 液体民主的流体力学

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2018-08-06 DOI: 10.1145/3485012

Paul Gölz, Anson Kahng, Simon Mackenzie, A. Procaccia

引用次数: 62

Redesigning Bitcoin’s Fee Market 重新设计比特币的收费市场

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2017-09-26 DOI: 10.1145/3530799

R. Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar

引用次数: 61

Sequential Equilibrium in Games of Imperfect Recall 不完全回忆博弈中的顺序均衡

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2016-04-25 DOI: 10.1145/3485002

Joseph Y. Halpern, R. Pass

引用次数: 11