ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation最新文献_第3页

Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Tradeoffs 偏好下的匹配:稳定性的强度和权衡

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2021-10-15 DOI: 10.1145/3485000

Jiehua Chen, P. Skowron, Manuel Sorge

引用次数: 19

Two-Sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-Ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance Procedures 双边随机匹配市场：延期承兑程序的事前等价性

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2021-10-15 DOI: 10.1145/3485010

Simon Mauras

引用次数: 0

Fairness Maximization among Offline Agents in Online-Matching Markets 线上匹配市场中线下代理的公平最大化

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2021-09-18 DOI: 10.1145/3569705

Will Ma, Pan Xu, Yifan Xu

{"title":"Fairness Maximization among Offline Agents in Online-Matching Markets","authors":"Will Ma, Pan Xu, Yifan Xu","doi":"10.1145/3569705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3569705","url":null,"abstract":"Online matching markets (OMMs) are commonly used in today’s world to pair agents from two parties (whom we will call offline and online agents) for mutual benefit. However, studies have shown that the algorithms making decisions in these OMMs often leave disparities in matching rates, especially for offline agents. In this article, we propose online matching algorithms that optimize for either individual or group-level fairness among offline agents in OMMs. We present two linear-programming (LP) based sampling algorithms, which achieve competitive ratios at least 0.725 for individual fairness maximization and 0.719 for group fairness maximization. We derive further bounds based on fairness parameters, demonstrating conditions under which the competitive ratio can increase to 100%. There are two key ideas helping us break the barrier of 1-1/𝖾~ 63.2% for competitive ratio in online matching. One is boosting, which is to adaptively re-distribute all sampling probabilities among only the available neighbors for every arriving online agent. The other is attenuation, which aims to balance the matching probabilities among offline agents with different mass allocated by the benchmark LP. We conduct extensive numerical experiments and results show that our boosted version of sampling algorithms are not only conceptually easy to implement but also highly effective in practical instances of OMMs where fairness is a concern.","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":"10 1","pages":"1 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42880422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures 达到个体稳定的联盟结构

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2021-05-18 DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16658

F. Brandt, Martin Bullinger, A. Wilczynski

{"title":"Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures","authors":"F. Brandt, Martin Bullinger, A. Wilczynski","doi":"10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16658","url":null,"abstract":"The formal study of coalition formation in multi-agent systems is typically realized in the framework of hedonic games, which originate from economic theory. The main focus of this branch of research has been on the existence and the computational complexity of deciding the existence of coalition structures that satisfy various stability criteria. The actual process of forming coalitions based on individual behavior has received little attention. In this article, we study the convergence of simple dynamics leading to stable partitions in a variety of established classes of hedonic games, including anonymous, dichotomous, fractional, and hedonic diversity games. The dynamics we consider is based on individual stability: an agent will join another coalition if she is better off and no member of the welcoming coalition is worse off. Our results are threefold. First, we identify conditions for the (fast) convergence of our dynamics. To this end, we develop new techniques based on the simultaneous usage of multiple intertwined potential functions and establish a reduction uncovering a close relationship between anonymous hedonic games and hedonic diversity games. Second, we provide elaborate counterexamples determining tight boundaries for the existence of individually stable partitions. Third, we study the computational complexity of problems related to the coalition formation dynamics. In particular, we settle open problems suggested by Bogomolnaia and Jackson, Brandl et al., and Boehmer and Elkind.","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":"11 1","pages":"1 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44649010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

A Fine-grained View on Stable Many-to-one Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas 具有上下配额的稳定多对一匹配问题的细粒度视图

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2020-09-29 DOI: 10.1145/3546605

Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger

引用次数: 9

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions 双买家顺序多单位拍卖的无政府价格

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2020-07-20 DOI: 10.1145/3584864

Mete cSeref Ahunbay, A. Vetta

引用次数: 2

Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing 自私与在线负载均衡中的纳什社会福利

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2020-07-16 DOI: 10.1145/3544978

Vittorio Bilò, G. Monaco, L. Moscardelli, Cosimo Vinci

{"title":"Nash Social Welfare in Selfish and Online Load Balancing","authors":"Vittorio Bilò, G. Monaco, L. Moscardelli, Cosimo Vinci","doi":"10.1145/3544978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3544978","url":null,"abstract":"In load-balancing problems there is a set of clients, each wishing to select a resource from a set of permissible ones to execute a certain task. Each resource has a latency function, which depends on its workload, and a client’s cost is the completion time of her chosen resource. Two fundamental variants of load-balancing problems are selfish load balancing (a.k.a. load-balancing games), where clients are non-cooperative selfish players aimed at minimizing their own cost solely, and online load balancing, where clients appear online and have to be irrevocably assigned to a resource without any knowledge about future requests. We revisit both problems under the objective of minimizing the Nash Social Welfare, i.e., the geometric mean of the clients’ costs. To the best of our knowledge, despite being a celebrated welfare estimator in many social contexts, the Nash Social Welfare has not been considered so far as a benchmarking quality measure in load-balancing problems. We provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria and on the competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm under very general latency functions, including polynomial ones. For this particular class, we also prove that the greedy strategy is optimal, as it matches the performance of any possible online algorithm.","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":"10 1","pages":"1 - 41"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46639980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries 通过查询学习强大的替代品需求

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2020-05-04 DOI: 10.1145/3546604

P. Goldberg, Edwin Lock, Francisco Javier Marmolejo-Cossío

引用次数: 3

Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations for Matroid Rank Valuations 寻找矩阵秩估值的公平和有效分配

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_3

Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, Yair Zick

引用次数: 45

On Communication Complexity of Fixed Point Computation 不动点计算的通信复杂性

IF 1.2

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2019-09-24 DOI: 10.1145/3485004

Anat Ganor, S. KarthikC., Dömötör Pálvölgyi

{"title":"On Communication Complexity of Fixed Point Computation","authors":"Anat Ganor, S. KarthikC., Dömötör Pálvölgyi","doi":"10.1145/3485004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3485004","url":null,"abstract":"Brouwer’s fixed point theorem states that any continuous function from a compact convex space to itself has a fixed point. Roughgarden and Weinstein (FOCS 2016) initiated the study of fixed point computation in the two-player communication model, where each player gets a function from [0,1]^n to [0,1]^n, and their goal is to find an approximate fixed point of the composition of the two functions. They left it as an open question to show a lower bound of 2^{Omega (n)} for the (randomized) communication complexity of this problem, in the range of parameters which make it a total search problem. We answer this question affirmatively. Additionally, we introduce two natural fixed point problems in the two-player communication model. Each player is given a function from [0,1]^n to [0,1]^{n/2}, and their goal is to find an approximate fixed point of the concatenation of the functions. Each player is given a function from [0,1]^n to [0,1]^{n}, and their goal is to find an approximate fixed point of the mean of the functions. We show a randomized communication complexity lower bound of 2^{Omega (n)} for these problems (for some constant approximation factor). Finally, we initiate the study of finding a panchromatic simplex in a Sperner-coloring of a triangulation (guaranteed by Sperner’s lemma) in the two-player communication model: A triangulation T of the d-simplex is publicly known and one player is given a set S_Asubset T and a coloring function from S_A to lbrace 0,ldots ,d/2rbrace, and the other player is given a set S_Bsubset T and a coloring function from S_B to lbrace d/2+1,ldots ,drbrace, such that S_Adot{cup }S_B=T, and their goal is to find a panchromatic simplex. We show a randomized communication complexity lower bound of |T|^{Omega (1)} for the aforementioned problem as well (when d is large). On the positive side, we show that if dle 4 then there is a deterministic protocol for the Sperner problem with O((log |T|)^2) bits of communication.","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":"9 1","pages":"1 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49648536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4