双买家顺序多单位拍卖的无政府价格

IF 1.1 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2020-07-20 DOI:10.1145/3584864

Mete cSeref Ahunbay, A. Vetta

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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文研究了具有两个买家和完全信息的第一/第二价格顺序多单元拍卖的效率。将求效率界的原始-对偶框架推广到这一序列设置，得到了无状态界的紧价。对于一般估价函数，我们证明无政府状态的价格恰好是1/T，拍卖有T个物品出售。对于凹形评价函数，我们证明了无政府状态的价格以1-1/e≃0.632为界。当出售的商品数量趋于无穷大时，这个界限是渐近紧的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

We study the efficiency of first-/second-price sequential multiunit auctions with two buyers and complete information. Extending the primal-dual framework for obtaining efficiency bounds to this sequential setting, we obtain tight price of anarchy bounds. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 1/T for auctions with T items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by 1-1/e≃ 0.632. This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.

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来源期刊

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: Agents in networks Algorithmic game theory Computation of equilibria Computational social choice Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy") Design and analysis of electronic markets Economics of computational advertising Electronic commerce Learning in games and markets Mechanism design Paid search auctions Privacy Recommendation / reputation / trust systems Systems resilient against malicious agents.