重新设计比特币的收费市场

IF 1.1 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2017-09-26 DOI:10.1145/3530799

R. Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar

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引用次数: 61

摘要

比特币支付系统涉及两种代理类型:使用货币进行交易并支付费用的用户，以及负责授权交易并保护系统以换取这些费用的矿工。比特币面临的两个挑战是(i)在区块奖励减少的情况下确保足够的矿工收入，以及(ii)由于最大区块大小上限较小而减轻吞吐量限制。这些问题与增加最大区块大小可能会减少收入密切相关，因为比特币的“出价支付”方法。为了分离它们，我们分析了“垄断拍卖”[16]，显示(i)其收入不会随着最大区块大小的增加而减少，(ii)它对不受信任的拍卖商(矿工)具有弹性，以及(iii)交易发行者(投标人)的简单性，因为战略投标的平均收益(相对于投标的价值)随着投标数量的增加而减少。

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Redesigning Bitcoin’s Fee Market

The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin’s challenges are (i) securing sufficient miner revenues as block rewards decrease, and (ii) alleviating the throughput limitation due to a small maximal block size cap. These issues are strongly related as increasing the maximal block size may decrease revenue due to Bitcoin’s pay-your-bid approach. To decouple them, we analyze the “monopolistic auction” [16], showing (i) its revenue does not decrease as the maximal block size increases, (ii) it is resilient to an untrusted auctioneer (the miner), and (iii) simplicity for transaction issuers (bidders), as the average gain from strategic bid shading (relative to bidding one’s value) diminishes as the number of bids increases.

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来源期刊

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: Agents in networks Algorithmic game theory Computation of equilibria Computational social choice Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy") Design and analysis of electronic markets Economics of computational advertising Electronic commerce Learning in games and markets Mechanism design Paid search auctions Privacy Recommendation / reputation / trust systems Systems resilient against malicious agents.