{"title":"Bargaining with Asymmetric Costs for Information","authors":"Vincent Glode, R. Lowery","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1880939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1880939","url":null,"abstract":"We generalize and correct a model of bargaining with endogenous information acquisition proposed by Dang (2008). Allowing for asymmetric information costs, we show that the opportunity to obtain information during the bargaining process can lead to inefficient outcomes when the responder's cost of obtaining this information is low. We then show that, for very low costs, this inefficiency is robust to allowing agents to voluntarily increase their own information costs and potentially eliminate adverse selection problems.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121237933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade","authors":"Dino Gerardi, Johannes Hörner, Lucas J. Maestri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2334345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2334345","url":null,"abstract":"This paper solves for the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which affects both his cost and the buyer's valuation, but the buyer is not. To characterize this payoff set, we derive an upper bound, using mechanism design with limited commitment. We then prove that this upper bound is tight, by showing that all its extreme points are equilibrium payoffs. Our results shed light on the role of different forms of commitment on the bargaining process. In particular, we show that it is the buyer's inability to commit to a contract before observing the terms of trade that precludes efficiency.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116075995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Solving the Nash Bargaining Problem","authors":"Hak Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1527349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1527349","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a bargaining model based on Nash (1950). To get a larger share, a negotiator has to be wealthier, more patient, and/or to have lower negotiation cost. Sometimes, negotiation may end without an agreement, but the costly consequences will bring the parties back to negotiate more seriously. Agreement is reached by the bargainers’ mutual and voluntary concession. A major difference from the Nash one is that the present model does not need personal comparison of utility.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114945042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Self-Enforcing Agreements on Water Allocation","authors":"E. Ansink","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1489303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1489303","url":null,"abstract":"Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing agreement. The solution induced by this particular agreement implements the “downstream incremental distribution”, an axiomatic solution to water allocation that assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream countries.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132397098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trade Agreements, Bargaining and Economic Growth","authors":"D. Peled, A. Sarid, Yishay D. Maoz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1466696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1466696","url":null,"abstract":"Rebelo's two-sector endogenous growth model is embedded within a two-country international trade framework. The two countries bargain over a trade agreement that specifies: (i) the size of the foreign aid that the richer country gives to the poorer one; (ii) the terms of the international trade that takes place after the aid is given. The aid is given not because of generosity, but because it improves the capital allocation across the world and thus raises total world production. This world production surplus enables the rich country to raise its equilibrium consumption and welfare beyond their no-aid levels. To ensure it, the rich country uses a trade agreement to condition the aid on favorable terms of trade.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114817062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Macroeconomic Interdependence Under Collective Wage Bargaining","authors":"Vincenzo Cuciniello","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1483626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1483626","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a two-country, sticky-price model with non-atomistic wage setters to study the role of collective wage bargaining in the propagation of monetary shocks. I find that the welfare transmissions of a monetary expansion are reinforced by different labor market structures. Non-atomistic domestic unions anticipate that their wage demands raise real labor income through a movement of the terms of trade. This leads to an additional channel of transmission of monetary policy that goes through aggregate supply. Yet, workers benefit more from a monetary expansion when the exchange rate pass-through is not limited and the elasticity of substitution across traded goods is sizable. It follows that wage mark-ups charged by unions endogenously vary with those structural parameters. In particular, labor and product market distortions are strategic substitute in affecting the perceived labor demand elasticity.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121719514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Withholding of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining","authors":"Ayse Mumcu","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9485.2010.00513.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2010.00513.x","url":null,"abstract":"The bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital is examined. It is shown that the worker's ability to withhold his/her skills strategically increases his/her bargaining power. Multiple efficient as well as inefficient equilibria involving delays in negotiation are characterized. When the firm has outside options, the range of both efficient and inefficient equilibria shrinks; moreover, delays are shortened in inefficient equilibria. The model predicts that wages are procyclical.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123017877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance","authors":"Anders U. Poulsen, Michael W. M. Roos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1371434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1371434","url":null,"abstract":"Game theory predicts that players make strategic commitments that may appear counter-intuitive. We conducted an experiment to see if people make a counter-intuitive but strategically optimal decision to avoid information. The experiment is based on a sequential Nash demand game in which a responding player can commit ahead of the game not to see what a proposing player demanded. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the optimal strategic commitment. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117228229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Non-Cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution","authors":"V. Britz, P. Herings, A. Predtetchinski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1259002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1259002","url":null,"abstract":"We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous probability and the next round starts with the complementary probability. As the risk of exogenous breakdown vanishes, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to the weighted Nash bargaining solution with the stationary distribution of the Markov process as the weight vector.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126335153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who is Best at Negotiating Pharmaceutical Rebates?","authors":"L. Abrams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1792662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1792662","url":null,"abstract":"This articles generates several insights into pharmaceutical rebates by viewing them through bargaining theory.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114938384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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