解决纳什议价问题

ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-12-23 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1527349

Hak Choi

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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文在纳什(1950)的基础上建立了一个议价模型。为了获得更大的份额，谈判者必须更富有，更有耐心，和/或有更低的谈判成本。有时，谈判可能会在没有达成协议的情况下结束，但代价高昂的后果将使各方更加认真地进行谈判。协议是通过谈判双方相互自愿的让步达成的。与纳什模型的一个主要区别是，目前的模型不需要个人效用的比较。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Solving the Nash Bargaining Problem

This paper develops a bargaining model based on Nash (1950). To get a larger share, a negotiator has to be wealthier, more patient, and/or to have lower negotiation cost. Sometimes, negotiation may end without an agreement, but the costly consequences will bring the parties back to negotiate more seriously. Agreement is reached by the bargainers’ mutual and voluntary concession. A major difference from the Nash one is that the present model does not need personal comparison of utility.

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ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)

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