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Finding your calling: Matching skills with jobs in the mutual fund industry 找到你的使命:将技能与共同基金行业的工作相匹配
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-11-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3732930
G. Cici, Mario Hendriock, A. Kempf
{"title":"Finding your calling: Matching skills with jobs in the mutual fund industry","authors":"G. Cici, Mario Hendriock, A. Kempf","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3732930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3732930","url":null,"abstract":"To best utilize labor, companies need to optimally match their employees’ skills with job types that best fit those skills. We examine this optimal matching process in the mutual fund industry. Mutual fund families enable their managers to try out funds with different investment styles in a learning-by-trying fashion until they find their optimal match. After this has happened, managers operate at higher productivity levels and tend to stay in the same investment style. Fund families respond to this rationally by allocating more capital to the optimally matched managers, while the optimally matched managers respond by taking more active bets.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129443228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Emergence and Persistence of Oligarchy: A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Political Power 寡头政治的产生与持续:一个内生政治权力的动态模型
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3177771
J. Jeon, Ilwoo Hwang
{"title":"The Emergence and Persistence of Oligarchy: A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Political Power","authors":"J. Jeon, Ilwoo Hwang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3177771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3177771","url":null,"abstract":"We study an infinite-horizon multilateral bargaining game in which the status quo policy, players’ recognition probabilities, and their voting weights are endogenously determined by the previous bargaining outcome. With perfectly farsighted players, we show that the equilibrium long-run outcome features the concentration of power by one or two players, depending on the initial bargaining state. If the players’ initial shares are relatively equal, they successfully prevent tyranny, but a two-player oligarchy nevertheless emerges and persists. If the players are imperfectly farsighted, the same results are obtained provided that the players’ shares are not too small. Our results highlight the importance of the initial power distribution and farsightedness in the long-run development of power configuration.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"205 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123018591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
An Empirical Bargaining Model with Left-digit Bias – A Study on Auto Loan Monthly Payments 一个带有左数偏差的议价模型——汽车贷款月供的研究
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3445171
Zhenling Jiang
{"title":"An Empirical Bargaining Model with Left-digit Bias – A Study on Auto Loan Monthly Payments","authors":"Zhenling Jiang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3445171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3445171","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies price bargaining when both parties have left-digit bias when processing numbers. The empirical analysis focuses on the auto finance market in the U.S., using a large data set of 35 million auto loans. Incorporating left-digit bias in bargaining is motivated by several intriguing observations. The scheduled monthly payments of auto loans bunch at both $9- and $0-ending digits, especially over $100 marks. In addition, $9-ending loans carry a higher interest rate and $0-ending loans have a lower interest rate. We develop a Nash bargaining model that allows for left-digit bias from both consumers and finance managers of auto dealers. Results suggest that both parties are subject to this basic human bias: the perceived difference between $9- and the next $0-ending payments is larger than $1, especially between $99- and $00-ending payments. The proposed model can explain the phenomena of payments bunching and differential interest rates for loans with different ending digits. We use counterfactual to show a nuanced impact of left-digit bias, which can both increase and decrease the payments. Overall, bias from both sides leads to a $33 increase in average payment per loan, compared to a benchmark case with no bias.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116604949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Should We Prevent Off-Label Drug Prescriptions? Empirical Evidence from France 我们应该防止超说明书药物处方吗?来自法国的经验证据
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-07-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3694632
Tuba Tunҫel
{"title":"Should We Prevent Off-Label Drug Prescriptions? Empirical Evidence from France","authors":"Tuba Tunҫel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3694632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3694632","url":null,"abstract":"After a drug obtains marketing authorisation, the usage depends on the regulation of off-label prescriptions for unapproved indications. Off-label prescriptions represent more than 20% of drug spending and treatment choices in many developed economies. We investigate the impact of regulation of off-label prescriptions on physicians' behavior, patients' health, treatment costs and pharmaceutical firms' pricing with a structural model of demand and supply. Exploiting rich panel data on physicians' activities and office visits in France over a nine-year period, we use a model of prescription choice and health outcomes with unobserved patient-level heterogeneity. We identify the demand for on-label and off-label drugs and the effect of prescription choice on health outcomes. On the supply side, we use a Nash-in-Nash bargaining model between the government and the pharmaceutical companies that allows the partial identification of the marginal costs of drugs. Counterfactual simulations show that when we remove off-label drugs from the choice set of physicians, substitution to on-label drugs at constant prices would lead to an increase of 15% in the expenditure on prescription drugs. If we allow bargaining adjustment on drug prices under a ban on off-label prescriptions, the ban would further increase the treatment cost, by 27%, without leading to an improvement in health outcomes.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"233 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134463290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On the Existence of Positive Equilibrium Profits in Competitive Screening Markets 论竞争筛选市场中正均衡利润的存在性
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-02-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3545488
Y. Levy, Andre Veiga
{"title":"On the Existence of Positive Equilibrium Profits in Competitive Screening Markets","authors":"Y. Levy, Andre Veiga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3545488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3545488","url":null,"abstract":"We assume a fixed number of symmetric firms, competition in prices, constant returns to scale and frictionless consumer choices. Consumers differ in their preferences and profitability (e.g., due to heterogeneous risk aversion and loss probabilities), which creates adverse selection. Firms can offer multiple contracts to screen individuals, in equilibrium and in any deviation. We show that equilibrium profits vanish if each consumer has a unique optimizing bundle at equilibrium prices or, more generally, if there exists a linear ordering over of contracts that dictates the preferences of firms whenever consumers are indifferent between multiple optimal contracts. For instance, equilibrium profits vanish if the marginal rate of substitution of quality for price is sharper for profit than for utility. In particular, profit also vanishes if utility equals the sum of (negative) profit, and a surplus (eg, due to risk aversion). We provide examples of economies where there exists an equilibrium with strictly positive profit and show that these examples are robust (hold for an open set of economies).","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133829700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Pre-Matching Gambles 预匹配赌博
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-02-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2401388
Hanzhe Zhang
{"title":"Pre-Matching Gambles","authors":"Hanzhe Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2401388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401388","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates pre-matching gambles and provides a new reason to gamble: matching concerns. Examples of pre-matching gambles include occupational choices before the marriage market, college major choices before the labor market, and portfolio management before attracting future clients in the financial market. I show that people make risky investments they would not have made if not for their subsequent participation in a competitive matching market. A fundamental and unique feature of the competitive matching market, which I call the competitive matching effect, induces gambling. The paper also illustrates the relationship between social efficiency and inequality in this setting, and shows how progressive taxation eliminates social inefficiency, reduces inequality, and generates government revenue.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132332226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims 与更高或不相关要求的独立性讨价还价
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-11-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3486862
M. J. Albizuri, Bas J. Dietzenbacher, J. Zarzuelo
{"title":"Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims","authors":"M. J. Albizuri, Bas J. Dietzenbacher, J. Zarzuelo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3486862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3486862","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant claims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higher claims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim of another agent. Independence of irrelevant claims states that the payoffs should not change when the claims decrease but remain higher than the payoffs. Interestingly, in conjunction with standard axioms from bargaining theory, these properties characterize a new constrained Nash solution, a constrained Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and a constrained Kalai solution.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130620824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Repeated Matching, Career Concerns, and Firm Size Distributions 重复匹配、职业关注和公司规模分布
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2976516
Eunhee Kim
{"title":"Repeated Matching, Career Concerns, and Firm Size Distributions","authors":"Eunhee Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2976516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2976516","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a two-period matching model of firms and managers to argue that managerial career concerns may not guarantee assortative matching in the market for reputation. In the model, firms compete for managerial talent, and managers are concerned about their reputations. The market updates managers’ reputations whenever their performance is available, which leads to rematching in a subsequent period. We show that some talented managers sit out the market in an earlier period to secure their reputations in a later period. Moreover, the size distribution of firms—by influencing the wage distribution of managers—is a key determinant of early sitting out: managers’ sitting out never happens under a uniform distribution of firm size, whereas it may happen under a Pareto distribution. The model can be applied to analyzing cross-sectional patterns of managerial labor supply across industries or countries, depending on the size distributions of firms.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115660564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic Manipulation Induced by Moral Hazard: The 'Aim for Rejection' Problem in Japanese Daycare Allocations 道德风险诱导的策略操纵:日本日托分配中的“拒绝目标”问题
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-05-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3318831
Koji Yokote
{"title":"Strategic Manipulation Induced by Moral Hazard: The 'Aim for Rejection' Problem in Japanese Daycare Allocations","authors":"Koji Yokote","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3318831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3318831","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on a particular type of strategic manipulation observed in Japanese daycare allocations. Some parents intentionally apply to a highly demanded daycare and are rejected, because a certificate indicating that they were rejected is required to extend the parental leave period. This behavior, which we term \"aim for rejection\" behavior, induces several negative effects such as efficiency loss. To fix this problem, the Japanese government has proposed modifying the priorities over parents depending on the intensity of their desire to secure a slot. Using game-theoretic models, we analyze and propose a solution to this problem. First, using a two-sided matching model, we show that even after the modification of priorities, the \"aim for rejection\" problem persists. Second, using a two-stage bargaining model, we demonstrate that a parental leave policy adopted in Germany is more efficient than the Japanese policy. Our results indicate that game theory is a useful tool for designing a social security system.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131139847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An Index of Unfairness 不公平指数
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3350034
Victor H. Aguiar, Roland Pongou, R. Serrano, Jean-Baptiste Tondji
{"title":"An Index of Unfairness","authors":"Victor H. Aguiar, Roland Pongou, R. Serrano, Jean-Baptiste Tondji","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3350034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3350034","url":null,"abstract":"Aguiar et al. (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be considered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology, the latter profile defining the fair distribution. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley distance, and show that it can be used to determine the outcome of an underlying bargaining process. We also present applications highlighting how favoritism in income distribution, egalitarianism, and taxation violate the different ideals of justice that define the Shapley value. The analysis has implications that can be tested using real-world data sets.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125464491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
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