ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Is the World Truly 'Flat'? Empirical Evidence from Online Labor Markets","authors":"Y. Hong, P. Pavlou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2371748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2371748","url":null,"abstract":"Visionaries have conjectured that the world is becoming a level playing field due to the Internet that allows people to connect from anywhere around the globe. We examine this “flat world” conjecture in the context of online labor markets by theoretically proposing and empirically quantifying the economic effects of a set of common global differences (language, time zone, cultural, and economic development differences across countries) on both employers’ hiring decisions and service providers’ pricing decisions. The empirical study integrates a unique dataset formed by a sample of 261,060 bids for 25,839 IT projects (software development) from a global online labor market matched with five archival sources on language, time zone, culture, economic development, and exchange rates. We quantify the role of global differences (“frictions”) in terms of the employers’ price elasticity and the service providers’ level of sensitivity to these differences. The econometric identification hinges on the exogenous variation of the exchange rate fluctuations of global currencies against the US dollar, as a “cost-shifter” type Instrumental Variable (IV). The results show that employers are negatively affected by global differences; notably, on average, a different language reduces an employer’s utility by about 5%; each hour time difference decreases the employer’s utility by about 0.71%; while a different culture reduces the employer’s utility. Contrary to the literature and industry expectations, controlling for compensation, employers prefer service providers from countries with higher economic development. On the other hand, when submitting their bids, providers are sensitive to language and time zone differences, but not to cultural differences. The strong economic effects of the proposed global differences imply that online labor markets are not a truly level (“flat”) playing field, particularly for service providers from poor, non-English speaking countries with traditional (religious versus secular) cultural values and a large time zone difference from employers’ geographical locations (predominantly North America and Europe). We discuss the study’s theoretical and managerial implications for reducing the “frictions” from these global differences and designing “flatter” online labor markets.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124760473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II: Sequential Proposer Protocol","authors":"Rakesh Chaturvedi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2914388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2914388","url":null,"abstract":"A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Chatterjee et. al. (1993). This mechanism is used to analyze two classes of coalitional games with transferable utility. One class is that of strictly supermodular games; the other has the property that per capita value is increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement his proposal with any subset of responders who have accepted it. It is shown that for all coalitional games in either class and for all sufficiently high discount factors, there exists an order-independent efficient subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies whose limiting outcome as players get more patient is the core-constrained Nash Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core is a binding constraint on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the other class it is not.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125010440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns","authors":"Martina N. Gogova, Jenny Kragl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2436554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2436554","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze optimal labor contracts when the worker is inequity averse towards the employer. Welfare is maximized for an equal sharing rule of surplus between the worker and the firm. That is, profit sharing is optimal even if effort is contractible. If the firm can make a take-it-or leave-it offer, the optimal contract is also state-dependent but always suboptimal with respect to welfare. The reason is that the firm will always pay the worker less than half of the surplus, thereby leading to agency costs due inequity aversion. If the parties bargain over the optimal contract, the optimal division of surplus is more equitable compared to the case with a purely selfish worker. Moreover, the optimal contract with bargaining approaches the welfare-optimal contract as the parties' bargaining power converges. Our results help explain why workers are willing to accept lower wages in times of crisis but demand higher wages in times of economic rise. Moreover, our findings imply that raising the bargaining power of the less powerful party may increase welfare","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"138 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127530390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Change in Risk and Bargaining Game","authors":"Hailin Sun, Sanxi Li, Tong Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2255556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2255556","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the comparative statics regarding changes in risk on Nash's solution to bargaining games with stochastic outcome and disagreement points. When absolute risk tolerance is linear with constant slope, the Nash's solution to bargaining with risky outcomes and risky disagreement points can be viewed as division of divisible certainty equivalent between two risk-averse agents. We show that whether a deterioration of a bargainer's risky prospect is advantageous to his opponent often depends on whether preference displays decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Specically, for perfectly correlated risky prospects, DARA a la Arrow-Pratt works to the concavity of the joint certainty equivalent with respect to a bargainer's initial wealth or size of risky exposure; for independent risky prospects, DARA a la Ross vulnerates his risk bearing under Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk taking the form of adding an independent noise, both leading to the bargainer's increased propensity for risk aversion as well as the joint size of the pie. These results illuminate how individual risky prospect as well as risk preference influence the cooperating partners' income shares and thus the market equilibrum of marriage formation. We also show that this result is robust under Rubinstein's non-cooperative bargaining game.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129841008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Equilibrium Computation of the Hart and Mas-Colell Bargaining Model","authors":"Zhigang Cao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2242266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2242266","url":null,"abstract":"The 8-th problem raised by [Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A., 2010. Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games. Journal of the European Economics Association 8 (1), 7–33], is solved. To be specific, I show that the set of SP equilibria can be determined by a finite number of systems of linear inequalities, which are efficiently solvable when there are two players. This is more or less surprising because the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining model and the SP equilibrium both seem to be rather complicated, and it is well known that an arbitrary Nash equilibrium is hard to compute, even when there are only two players. Using this algorithm, it is shown that players of Prisoners’ Dilemma can cooperate to some extent in the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining, and full cooperation is attainable as ρ, a parameter of this model, approaches to 1. Quantitative efficiency, i.e. price of anarchy, is also analyzed.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115688565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Simultaneous versus Sequential Group-Buying Mechanisms","authors":"Ming Hu, M. Shi, Jiahua Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1862465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1862465","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the design of group-buying mechanisms in a two-period game where cohorts of consumers arrive at a deal and make sign-up decisions sequentially. A firm can adopt either a sequential mechanism where the firm discloses to second-period arrivals the number of sign-ups accumulated in the first period, or a simultaneous mechanism where the firm does not post the number of first-period sign-ups and hence each cohort of consumers face uncertainty about another cohort's size and valuations when making sign-up decisions. Our analysis shows that, compared to the simultaneous mechanism, the sequential mechanism leads to higher deal success rates and larger expected consumer surpluses. This result holds for a multi-period extension and when the firm offers a price discount schedule with multiple breakpoints. Finally, when the firm can manage the sequence of arrivals, it should inform the smaller cohort of consumers first.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128050619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Breakdown in Multilateral Negotiations","authors":"D. Göller, M. Hewer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2159693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2159693","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers. Binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. In contrast to preexisting literature, we do not normalize the parties' reservation utilities to zero. We show that this assumption holds critical importance by demonstrating that a complete breakdown of negotiations may occur as the unique equilibrium outcome, even if only two sellers are present.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125529995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Violation of Monotonicity in a Noncooperative Setting","authors":"M. Montero, Juan J. Vidal Puga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2021291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2021291","url":null,"abstract":"A power measure is monotone if a player with a larger weight is assigned at least as much power as a player with a smaller weight in the same weighted majority game. Failure of a power index to satisfy monotonicity is often considered a pathological feature. In this paper, we show that monotonicity may fail in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a noncooperative bargaining game. A player with a smaller weight may have a higher expected payoff than a player with a larger weight. This is possible even though coalition formation and payoff division are endogenous, all players are rational and there is no asymmetry between the players other than in the weights.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129663452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Whom to Choose as a Team Mate? A Lab Experiment About In-Group Favouritism","authors":"Andreas Hammermann, Alwine Mohnen, Petra Nieken","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1999314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1999314","url":null,"abstract":"The practical relevance of favouritism among students of the same study path is evident in lifelong memberships in fraternities or sororities or in high donations to faculties. In our study, we focus on the in-group favouritism of students by examining the trade-off of acting based on in-group favouritism or a performance signal when decisions are made about whom to choose as a team mate. The novel feature of your study is that the choice of a team mate is either benevolence or relevant to the own output. In the first scenario, only the payoff of the chosen subject changed, whereas in the second scenario, the decision affected the decider's own payoff as well as that of the chosen subject. The subjects ex ante knew the group type (path of study) of the pool of possible team mates and received a signal giving weak information about their ability regarding the task. Intuitively, one would expect more favouritism if the own payoff was not affected by the performance of the chosen team mate. However, we found the opposite. The subjects exerted more favouritism in the revenue sharing scenario. Possibly they expected reciprocal behaviour and less free riding if they selected a team mate belonging to their own group. Interestingly, groups formed based on favouritism did not perform significantly different from groups formed based on the performance signal.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"28 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127770779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exclusive Channels and Revenue Sharing in a Complementary Goods Market","authors":"G. Cai, Yue Dai, Sean X. Zhou","doi":"10.1287/mksc.1110.0688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1110.0688","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates the joint impact of exclusive channels and revenue sharing on suppliers and retailers in a hybrid duopoly common retailer and exclusive channel model. The model bridges the gap in the literature on hybrid multichannel supply chains with bilateral complementary products and services with or without revenue sharing. The analysis indicates that, without revenue sharing, the suppliers are reluctant to form exclusive deals with the retailers; thus, no equilibrium results. With revenue sharing from the retailers to the suppliers, it can be an equilibrium strategy for the suppliers and retailers to form exclusive deals. Bargaining solutions are provided to determine the revenue sharing rates. Our additional results suggest forming exclusive deals becomes less desirable for the suppliers if revenue sharing is also in place under nonexclusivity. In our extended discussion, we also study the impact of channel asymmetry, an alternative model with fencing, composite package competition, and enhanced price-dependent revenue sharing.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131576613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}