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The Political Economy of Services Trade Agreements 服务贸易协定的政治经济学
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2799601
Matteo Fiorini, M. Lebrand
{"title":"The Political Economy of Services Trade Agreements","authors":"Matteo Fiorini, M. Lebrand","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2799601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2799601","url":null,"abstract":"Why do governments sign services trade agreements? This paper focuses on the role of international agreements in the context of trade in services when services are used as intermediate inputs in downstream industries. Compared to goods, services inputs are mostly non-tradable and complementary to other factors of production. We build a theoretical trade policy framework in which firms use foreign investment to contest foreign markets in services sectors and governments can restrict the entry of multinationals. Commitment helps governments to avoid political pressures that would result in protectionist measures leading downstream industries to inefficiently reduce their production. First we show that the role of services as complementary inputs is central to explain governments’ commitment to services trade liberalization. Second we provide new results on the influence of lobbying by both national firms and foreign multinationals on trade policies and the gains from commitment. Finally we discuss how the bargaining power of the government, the size of national services sectors and the difference in valuation between national and foreign contributions affect the willingness of the government to sign a services trade agreement.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116136099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Destroying Surplus and Buying Time in Unanimity Bargaining 一致议价中的剩余破坏与时间购买
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-05-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2783350
V. Britz
{"title":"Destroying Surplus and Buying Time in Unanimity Bargaining","authors":"V. Britz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2783350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2783350","url":null,"abstract":"In non-cooperative bargaining games in the tradition of Rubinstein, the proposer derives bargaining power from the prospect of a costly delay which would follow the rejection of a proposal. We consider a unanimity bargaining game in which the proposer can strategically choose to prolong this delay. Prolonging the delay increases the proposer's bargaining power, but is assumed to come at a cost and thus cause an inefficiency. We use an appropriate refinement of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. We characterize equilibrium strategies and payoffs. We establish conditions on model parameters under which equilibrium is or is not efficient. For inefficient equilibria, we quantify the extent of the inefficiency. Moreover, we study the relation between the number of players and the degree of inefficiency. We find that inefficient equilibria become more inefficient the more players there are. Moreover, the parameter region in which an efficient equilibrium is possible shrinks when the number of players increases.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131980475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Workers Negotiate Collectively or Separately? An Application of a Coalitional Bargaining Game with Externalities 员工是集体谈判还是单独谈判?具有外部性的联盟议价博弈的应用
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-03-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2754439
F. Kiyotaki, Toshiji Miyakawa
{"title":"Do Workers Negotiate Collectively or Separately? An Application of a Coalitional Bargaining Game with Externalities","authors":"F. Kiyotaki, Toshiji Miyakawa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2754439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2754439","url":null,"abstract":"This study proposes a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game model to analyse wage negotiations between one employer and two workers. Here, randomly selected workers choose whether to negotiate their wage contracts together or separately, considering wage contract externalities. We show that if the two workers are sufficiently complementary or if externalities are more positive, there exists a grand-coalition SSPE of the bargaining game for any discount factor. However, if the two workers are sufficiently substitutable, there is no grand-coalition SSPE for any discount factor. In addition, we provide a sufficient condition for an SSPE to exist, in which each worker selects separate negotiations with the employer.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131758516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Final-Offer Arbitration with Uncertainty Averse Parties 不确定性厌恶方的最终报价仲裁
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2727022
Bogaçhan Çelen, Onur Özgür
{"title":"Final-Offer Arbitration with Uncertainty Averse Parties","authors":"Bogaçhan Çelen, Onur Özgür","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2727022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2727022","url":null,"abstract":"Final-offer arbitration (FOA) is a widely used binding dispute resolution mechanism, where an impartial arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the two final offers pro- posed by two disputing parties. We build an equilibrium model of FOA with agents averse to arbitral uncertainty to study three important issues: the role of FOA in incentivizing negotiated settlements, convergence of final offers, and the effect of diversity of arbitrator opinion on welfare. Uncertainty increases the likelihood of non-arbitrated settlement and make the final offers converge to each other. Risk aversion is not necessary. Precision and mean of arbitral uncertainty matter differently and can be con- trolled separately. Moreover, as also argued by the industry practitioners, diversity (of opinion) in the arbitrator pool increases the welfare of negotiating parties.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121747638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Talmud by Shapley 沙普利的《塔木德
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-11-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2688464
Hak Choi
{"title":"Talmud by Shapley","authors":"Hak Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2688464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2688464","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proves that Shapley’s value is a solution to bargaining problems. Indeed, it is capable of solving almost all bargaining problems, especially problems involving more than two persons. While it restores the proper role of Shapley’s value in the bargaining theory, this paper also warns of its economic limitations.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130065846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Cheng's Redundant Timing of Payment Theory 程的支付冗余时间理论
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-10-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2672470
Hak Choi
{"title":"Cheng's Redundant Timing of Payment Theory","authors":"Hak Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2672470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2672470","url":null,"abstract":"Timing of payment occurs when production takes time, when both buyer and seller are subject to uncertainty during the production process and the eventual dispute afterward. This paper points out a major mistake in Cheng’s model: his theory is redundant.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122719473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Standing United or Falling Divided? High Stakes Bargaining in a TV Game Show 团结还是分裂?电视游戏节目中的高风险讨价还价
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2344422
D. Dolder, M. V. Assem, Colin Camerer, R. Thaler
{"title":"Standing United or Falling Divided? High Stakes Bargaining in a TV Game Show","authors":"D. Dolder, M. V. Assem, Colin Camerer, R. Thaler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2344422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2344422","url":null,"abstract":"Bargaining is ubiquitous in our professional and private lives. Not surprisingly, bargaining has received considerable research attention. Because real-world settings generally entail a lack of control, most empirical insights derive from laboratory experiments. The external validity of laboratory findings is, however, still an open question (Levitt and List 2007; Camerer 2015; Baltussen, van den Assem, and van Dolder 2015). Two of the grounds for concern are the frequent use of student subjects and the small or hypothetical stakes. In the present study, we use data from the British TV show Divided. This game show combines high stakes and a diverse subject pool within a controlled setting. We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126295336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
A Theory of Efficient Negotiations 有效谈判理论
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2580894
M. Jackson, H. Sonnenschein, Yiqing Xing
{"title":"A Theory of Efficient Negotiations","authors":"M. Jackson, H. Sonnenschein, Yiqing Xing","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2580894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2580894","url":null,"abstract":"Negotiation involves determining not only an agreement's price, but also its content, which typically has many aspects. We model such negotiations and provide conditions under which negotiation leads to efficient outcomes, even in the face of substantial asymmetric information regarding the value of each aspect. With sufficient information about the overall potential surplus, if the set of offers that agents can make when negotiating is sufficiently rich, then negotiation leads the agents to efficient agreements in all equilibria. Furthermore, no \"planner\" or \"mechanism designer\" who knows the statistical structure of information is required: the same negotiation game works regardless of the setting. The theory and examples explore the anatomy of negotiation and may shed light on why many situations with significant asymmetric information exhibit little inefficiency.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116430048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
A Dynamic Network Model of the Unsecured Interbank Lending Market 无担保银行间拆借市场的动态网络模型
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2569056
F. Blasques, Falk Bräuning, I. van Lelyveld
{"title":"A Dynamic Network Model of the Unsecured Interbank Lending Market","authors":"F. Blasques, Falk Bräuning, I. van Lelyveld","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2569056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2569056","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a structural dynamic network model of the formation of lending relationships in the unsecured interbank market. Banks are subject to random liquidity shocks and can form links with potential trading partners to bilaterally Nash bargain about loan conditions. To reduce credit risk uncertainty, banks can engage in costly peer monitoring of counterparties. We estimate the structural model parameters by indirect inference using network statistics of the Dutch interbank market from 2008 to 2011. The estimated model accurately explains the high sparsity and stability of the lending network. In particular, peer monitoring and credit risk uncertainty are key factors in the formation of stable interbank lending relationships that are associated with improved credit conditions. Moreover, the estimated degree distribution of the lending network is highly skewed with a few very interconnected core banks and many peripheral banks that trade mainly with core banks. Shocks to credit risk uncertainty can lead to extended periods of low market activity, amplified by a reduction in peer monitoring. Finally, our monetary policy analysis shows that a wider interest rate corridor leads to a more active market through a direct effect on the outside options and an indirect multiplier effect by increasing banks' monitoring and search efforts.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127289139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 86
Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining with Asymmetric Information 地中海海盗:信息不对称讨价还价的实证研究
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-11-06 DOI: 10.3982/QE655
A. Ambrus, Eric Chaney, Igor Salitskiy
{"title":"Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining with Asymmetric Information","authors":"A. Ambrus, Eric Chaney, Igor Salitskiy","doi":"10.3982/QE655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3982/QE655","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the effect of delay on prices in bargaining situations using a data set containing thousands of captives ransomed from Barbary pirates between 1575 and 1692. Plausibly exogenous variation in the delay in ransoming provides evidence that negotiating delays decreased the size of ransom payments, and that most of the effect stems from the signaling value of strategic delay, in accordance with theoretical predictions. We also structurally estimate a version of the screening type bargaining model, adjusted to our context, and find that the model fits both the observed prices and acceptance probabilities well.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123740847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
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