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The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 双边投资的双边市场乘数效应
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-01-11 DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000078277
D. Dizdar, B. Moldovanu, Nora Szech
{"title":"The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments","authors":"D. Dizdar, B. Moldovanu, Nora Szech","doi":"10.5445/IR/1000078277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5445/IR/1000078277","url":null,"abstract":"Agents in a finite two-sided market make costly investments and are then matched assortatively based on these investments. Besides signaling complementary types, investments also generate benefits for partners. We shed light on quantitative properties of the equilibrium investment behavior. The bilateral external benefits induce an investment multiplier effect. This multiplier effect depends in a complex way on agents' uncertainty about their rank within their own market side and on their uncertainty about the types and investments of potential partners. We study how the multiplier effect depends on market size and how it interacts with other important factors such as the costs of investment and the signaling incentives induced by competition for more desirable partners. We use our results to characterize equilibrium utilities in large markets. For small markets, our results lead to bounds on the hold-up problem.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126220556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Improved Matching, Directed Search, and Bargaining in the Credit Card Market 信用卡市场中的改进匹配、定向搜索和议价
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-01-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3100303
Gajendran Raveendranathan
{"title":"Improved Matching, Directed Search, and Bargaining in the Credit Card Market","authors":"Gajendran Raveendranathan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3100303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100303","url":null,"abstract":"I build a model of revolving credit in which consumers face idiosyncratic earnings risk, and credit card firms direct their search to consumers. Upon a match, they bargain over borrowing limits and borrowing interest rates — fixed for the duration of the match. Using the model, I show that improved matching between consumers and credit card firms, calibrated to match the rise in the population with credit cards, accounts for the rise in revolving credit and consumer bankruptcies in the United States. I also provide empirical evidence consistent with the two key features in my model: directed search and bargaining. The lifetime consumption gains from improved matching are 3.55 percent— substantially larger than those previously estimated by alternative explanations for the rise in revolving credit and consumer bankruptcies (0.03-0.57 percent). Finally, I analyze how the credit card firm’s bargaining power impacts the welfare of introducing stricter bankruptcy laws.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130393469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Taxation in Matching Markets 配对市场的税收
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-10-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3060746
Arnaud Dupuy, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe, S. Kominers
{"title":"Taxation in Matching Markets","authors":"Arnaud Dupuy, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe, S. Kominers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3060746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3060746","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be non-monotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative non-pecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114936374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Alternating-Offer Bargaining with the Global Games Information Structure 全球博弈信息结构下的交替报价议价
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-07-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2419314
A. Tsoy
{"title":"Alternating-Offer Bargaining with the Global Games Information Structure","authors":"A. Tsoy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2419314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2419314","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, I examine the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation approaches perfect. I characterize the Pareto frontier of the double limits and show that it is efficient, but the surplus split generally differs from the Nash Bargaining split. I then construct a double limit that approximates the Nash Bargaining split in the ex-post surplus, but with a delay. Further, I prove the Folk theorem when the range of the buyer's values coincides with the range of the seller's costs: any feasible and individually rational ex-ante payoff profile can be approximated by a double limit.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"04 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129059105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Market Power, Productivity and Wage Determination: Ukrainian Firm Level Evidence 市场支配力、生产率和工资决定:乌克兰企业水平证据
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-06-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2984859
Oleksandr Shepotylo, V. Vakhitov
{"title":"Market Power, Productivity and Wage Determination: Ukrainian Firm Level Evidence","authors":"Oleksandr Shepotylo, V. Vakhitov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2984859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2984859","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a theoretical model that explains intra-industry distribution of wages with variation in market power of firms, along with traditional variation in productivity. The model predicts that the outcome of the bargaining game between the firm owners and employees depends crucially on the demand side characteristics. As a result, variation in the firms’ markups serves as an important determinant of wage distribution. We provide micro foundations for this channel of wage determination. \u0000We test the model on the sample of Ukrainian firm-level data. We find that the average wage rises with an increase of the firm productivity, but falls with an increase of the market power. These effects are roughly of the same size in absolute value; the results are statistically significant and robust to various model specifications estimated at the firm or industry level.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121305140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Climate Change: Behavioral Responses from Extreme Events and Delayed Damages 气候变化:极端事件和延迟损害的行为反应
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-04-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2961762
Riccardo Ghidoni, G. Calzolari, Marco Casari
{"title":"Climate Change: Behavioral Responses from Extreme Events and Delayed Damages","authors":"Riccardo Ghidoni, G. Calzolari, Marco Casari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2961762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2961762","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding how to sustain cooperation in the climate change global dilemma is crucial to mitigate its harmful consequences. Damages from climate change typically occur after long delays and can take the form of more frequent realizations of extreme and random events. These features generate a decoupling between emissions and their damages, which we study through a laboratory experiment. We find that some decision-makers respond to global emissions, as expected, while others respond to realized damages also when emissions are observable. On balance, the presence of delayed/stochastic consequences did not impair cooperation. However, we observed a worrisome increasing trend of emissions when damages hit with delay. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121280356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Incomplete Information in Repeated Coordination Games 重复协调博弈中的不完全信息
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2905266
E. Rasmusen
{"title":"Incomplete Information in Repeated Coordination Games","authors":"E. Rasmusen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2905266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2905266","url":null,"abstract":"Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts efficiency in the repeated battle of the sexes, however, by knocking out the pure-strategy equilibria.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123679126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Theory of Decentralized Matching Markets without Transfers, with an Application to Surge Pricing 无转移的去中心化匹配市场理论及其在动态定价中的应用
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2908532
Alfred Galichon, Yu-Wei Hsieh
{"title":"A Theory of Decentralized Matching Markets without Transfers, with an Application to Surge Pricing","authors":"Alfred Galichon, Yu-Wei Hsieh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2908532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2908532","url":null,"abstract":"Most of the literature on two-sided matching markets without transfers focuses on the case where a central planner (often an algorithm) clears the market, like in the case of school assignments, or medical residents. In contrast, we focus on decentralized matching markets without transfers, where prices are regulated and thus cannot clear the market, as in the case of taxis. In these markets, time waited in line often plays the role of a numeraire. We investigate the properties of equilibrium in these markets (existence, uniqueness, and welfare). We use this analysis to study the problem of surge pricing: given beliefs on random demand and supply, how should a market designer set prices to minimize expected market inefficiency?","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132519279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Bilateral Trade with Loss-Averse Agents 规避损失代理人的双边贸易
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2579661
Jean-Michel Benkert
{"title":"Bilateral Trade with Loss-Averse Agents","authors":"Jean-Michel Benkert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2579661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2579661","url":null,"abstract":"We study the bilateral trade problem put forward by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) under the assumption that agents are loss-averse, using the model developed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that the endowment effect increases the sellers information rent, and that the attachment effect reduces the buyer’s information rent. Further, depending on the distribution of types, loss-aversion can reduce the severity of the impossibility problem. However, the result cannot be reversed. Turning to the design of optimal mechanisms, we show that in both revenue and welfare maximizing mechanisms the designer optimally provides the agents with full insurance in the money dimension and with partial insurance in the trade dimension. In fact, when the stakes are large, loss-aversion can eliminate trade altogether. We show that all results display robustness to the exact specification of the reference point and provide some results on general mechanism design problems.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127368149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)? 市场参与者能否（足够）准确地报告他们的偏好？
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-07-01 DOI: 10.1287/MNSC.2020.3937
Eric Budish, Judd B. Kessler
{"title":"Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?","authors":"Eric Budish, Judd B. Kessler","doi":"10.1287/MNSC.2020.3937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/MNSC.2020.3937","url":null,"abstract":"In mechanism design theory it is common to assume that agents can perfectly report their preferences, even in complex settings in which this assumption strains reality. We experimentally test whether real market participants can report their real preferences for course schedules “accurately enough” for a novel course allocation mechanism, approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (A-CEEI), to realize its theoretical benefits. To use market participants’ real preferences (i.e., rather than artificial “induced preferences” as is typical in market design experiments), we develop a new experimental method. Our method, the “elicited preferences” approach, generates preference data from subjects through a series of binary choices. These binary choices reveal that subjects prefer their schedules constructed under A-CEEI to their schedules constructed under the incumbent mechanism, a bidding points auction, and that A-CEEI reduces envy, suggesting subjects are able to report their preferences accurately enough to realize the efficiency and fairness benefits of A-CEEI. However, preference-reporting mistakes do meaningfully harm mechanism performance. One identifiable pattern of mistakes was that subjects had relatively more difficulty reporting cardinal as opposed to ordinal preference information. The experiment helped to persuade the Wharton School to adopt the new mechanism and helped guide aspects of its practical implementation, especially around preference reporting. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.","PeriodicalId":420730,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127711173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
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