重复协调博弈中的不完全信息

ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-24 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2905266

E. Rasmusen

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引用次数: 0

摘要

信息不对称有助于在重复协调博弈中实现有效的平衡。如果一个玩家在连续的行动中只能走一种的可能性很小，那么这个玩家就可以假装自己是受限型的，其他玩家就会配合他。然而，这破坏了纯策略均衡，从而损害了两性之间反复斗争的效率。

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Incomplete Information in Repeated Coordination Games

Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts efficiency in the repeated battle of the sexes, however, by knocking out the pure-strategy equilibria.

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ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)

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