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The Ability to Substitute - The Game Theory Application for Analysis of the Control Over the Corporation 替代能力——博弈论在公司控制权分析中的应用
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-04-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2944938
A. Gudkov
{"title":"The Ability to Substitute - The Game Theory Application for Analysis of the Control Over the Corporation","authors":"A. Gudkov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2944938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2944938","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the ability of controlling shareholder to substitute stakeholders of corporations. I argue that the main feature and advantage of controlling shareholder over stakeholders is the ability to substitute every stakeholder at the table of the corporation, except the minority shareholders (we are not taking into account dilution cases). The ability to substitute any stakeholder ensures the power to control the corporation. The full control over the corporation is possible even there is no control over every coalition or stakeholder of the corporation. The controlling shareholder has to be viewed as a shadow director with duties to disclosure information and liabilities for the company's criminal behavior, incurred damages and insolvency. Cooperation with stakeholder provides the greater control of the controlling shareholder over corporation.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114444621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-Player Asymmetric Tullock Contests with Intermediate Discriminatory Power 具有中间歧视权的二人非对称Tullock竞争均衡的唯一性
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2942142
Xin Feng, Jingfeng Lu
{"title":"Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-Player Asymmetric Tullock Contests with Intermediate Discriminatory Power","authors":"Xin Feng, Jingfeng Lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2942142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2942142","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a different approach to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in Tullock contests between two players with asymmetric valuations, when the discriminatory power r is between 1 and 2. Our result complements that of Ewerhart (2017) in filling up the remaining gap in the literature on the uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126285734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Speculation Rather than Enterprise? Keynes’ Beauty Contest Revisited in Theory and Experiment 投机还是创业?在《理论与实验》中重新审视凯恩斯的选美比赛
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-03-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2929999
Kene Boun My, Camille Cornand, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira
{"title":"Speculation Rather than Enterprise? Keynes’ Beauty Contest Revisited in Theory and Experiment","authors":"Kene Boun My, Camille Cornand, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2929999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929999","url":null,"abstract":"In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fundamental value and the conventional value expected to be set by the market. They thus respond to fundamental and coordination motives, respectively, the prevalence of either being set exogenously. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a valuation game in which agents strategically choose how to weight each motive. This game emphasises public information leads agents to favour the coordination motive. Second, we test the game through a laboratory experiment. Subjects tend to conform to theoretical predictions, except when fundamental uncertainty is low relative to strategic uncertainty. Abstract In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fun","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126961977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation 经济适用房分配抽签和候补名单的设计
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-02-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2963178
N. Arnosti, Peng Shi
{"title":"Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation","authors":"N. Arnosti, Peng Shi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2963178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2963178","url":null,"abstract":"We study a setting in which dynamically arriving items are assigned to waiting agents, who have heterogeneous values for distinct items and heterogeneous outside options. An ideal match would both target items to agents with the worst outside options, and match them to items for which they have high value. \u0000 \u0000Our first finding is that two common approaches -- using independent lotteries for each item, and using a waitlist in which agents lose priority when they reject an offer -- lead to identical outcomes in equilibrium. Both approaches encourage agents to accept items that are marginal fits. We show that the quality of the match can be improved by using a common lottery for all items. If participation costs are negligible, a common lottery is equivalent to several other mechanisms, such as limiting participants to a single lottery, using a waitlist in which offers can be rejected without punishment, or using artificial currency. \u0000 \u0000However, when there are many agents with low need, there is an unavoidable tradeoff between matching and targeting. In this case, utilitarian welfare may be maximized by focusing on good matching (if the outside option distribution is light-tailed) or good targeting (if it is heavy-tailed). Using a common lottery achieves near-optimal matching, while introducing participation costs achieves near-optimal targeting.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126448338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Contests on Networks 网络竞赛
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3179547
Alexander Matros, David Rietzke
{"title":"Contests on Networks","authors":"Alexander Matros, David Rietzke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3179547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3179547","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is \"connected\" to a set of contests, and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under both the Tullock and all-pay auction contest success functions (CSFs), and show that many well-known results from the contest literature can be obtained by varying the structure of the network. We also obtain a new exclusion result: We show that, under both CSFs, equilibrium total effort may be higher when one player is excluded from the network. This finding contrasts the existing literature, which limits findings of this sort to the all-pay auction CSF. Our framework has a broad range of applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126472427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Is Trustworthiness Written on the Face? 诚信写在脸上吗?
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2930064
A. Dilger, Julia Müller, Michael Müller
{"title":"Is Trustworthiness Written on the Face?","authors":"A. Dilger, Julia Müller, Michael Müller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2930064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2930064","url":null,"abstract":"Trust is an important driver of economic transactions, but how do people decide whom to trust? We conduct an experiment to investigate whether people are able to predict trustworthiness by judging the face of a stranger. The behavior of the second player in the Trust Game is used as a measure of trustworthiness. Other subjects assess the trustworthiness of the second players of the Trust Game in the second stage using standardized photos of their faces. We find no significant interrelation in our statistical estimations between trustworthiness ratings and the behavior of the examined players. Surprisingly, players that were rated as more attractive sent back significantly less in the Trust Game.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121112935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
All-Pay Contests with Performance Spillovers 有绩效溢出效应的全薪酬竞争
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-11-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2868577
Jun Xiao
{"title":"All-Pay Contests with Performance Spillovers","authors":"Jun Xiao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2868577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2868577","url":null,"abstract":"This paper generalizes the results of Siegel (2009, 2010) to accommodate performance spillovers, with which a player’s performance in a contest may affect the performance cost of another player. More precisely, we show that, if for any player, the spillovers from other players’ performance enter his cost in an additively separable form, then an all-pay contest has a unique Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we construct the equilibrium payoffs and strategies. Both the equilibrium uniqueness and construction are generalized to multiplicatively separable spillovers in a two-player contest.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122305518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Procedural Egalitarian Solution 程序平等主义解决方案
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-10-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2848963
Bas J. Dietzenbacher, P. Borm, R. Hendrickx
{"title":"The Procedural Egalitarian Solution","authors":"Bas J. Dietzenbacher, P. Borm, R. Hendrickx","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2848963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2848963","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124916544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
De-Biasing Strategic Communication 消除战略沟通的偏见
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2723374
T. Gesche
{"title":"De-Biasing Strategic Communication","authors":"T. Gesche","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2723374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2723374","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same time also to more biased messages. This benefits rational receivers but exerts a negative externality from them on naive or delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially inefficient. These results hold independently of the degree of receivers' risk-aversion and for an arbitrary precision of the disclosure statement.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123724302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Distribution of Matchings in Myerson's Network Formation Model Myerson网络形成模型中的匹配分布
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-08-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2382336
M. Ghachem
{"title":"Distribution of Matchings in Myerson's Network Formation Model","authors":"M. Ghachem","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2382336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2382336","url":null,"abstract":"Consider a population of n players playing a variant of Myerson’s network formation model. Each player simultaneously chooses k other players he would want to be connected to. If two players are in each other’s choice set, a matching occurs. We call the outcome of the network formation model a k-uniform Myerson graph and study the distribution of matchings on such graphs with homogeneous and heterogeneous populations.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125408545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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