Kene Boun My, Camille Cornand, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira
{"title":"投机还是创业?在《理论与实验》中重新审视凯恩斯的选美比赛","authors":"Kene Boun My, Camille Cornand, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2929999","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fundamental value and the conventional value expected to be set by the market. They thus respond to fundamental and coordination motives, respectively, the prevalence of either being set exogenously. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a valuation game in which agents strategically choose how to weight each motive. This game emphasises public information leads agents to favour the coordination motive. Second, we test the game through a laboratory experiment. Subjects tend to conform to theoretical predictions, except when fundamental uncertainty is low relative to strategic uncertainty. Abstract In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fun","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Speculation Rather than Enterprise? Keynes’ Beauty Contest Revisited in Theory and Experiment\",\"authors\":\"Kene Boun My, Camille Cornand, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2929999\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fundamental value and the conventional value expected to be set by the market. They thus respond to fundamental and coordination motives, respectively, the prevalence of either being set exogenously. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a valuation game in which agents strategically choose how to weight each motive. This game emphasises public information leads agents to favour the coordination motive. Second, we test the game through a laboratory experiment. Subjects tend to conform to theoretical predictions, except when fundamental uncertainty is low relative to strategic uncertainty. Abstract In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fun\",\"PeriodicalId\":393761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-03-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929999\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929999","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Speculation Rather than Enterprise? Keynes’ Beauty Contest Revisited in Theory and Experiment
In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fundamental value and the conventional value expected to be set by the market. They thus respond to fundamental and coordination motives, respectively, the prevalence of either being set exogenously. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a valuation game in which agents strategically choose how to weight each motive. This game emphasises public information leads agents to favour the coordination motive. Second, we test the game through a laboratory experiment. Subjects tend to conform to theoretical predictions, except when fundamental uncertainty is low relative to strategic uncertainty. Abstract In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fun