{"title":"Stability and Substitutability in Dynamic Matching Markets","authors":"Keisuke Bando, Ryo Kawasaki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3933533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3933533","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a dynamic matching market where matching between agents is decided for each time period. To analyze this situation, we embed the situation into the framework of many-to-many matching with contracts where the contract includes the time period at which the matching occurs. While a general stability concept is already defined for the matching with contracts framework, in a dynamic matching model, a stable outcome may not exist when contracts exhibit complementarities across time periods. Thus, we define a stability concept called temporal stability that is more suitable to the dynamic nature of the model. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a temporally stable outcome, including a corresponding substitutability condition, ordered substitutability, for the dynamic matching model.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130366641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evidence Games: Lying Aversion and Commitment","authors":"Elif Osun, Erkut Y. Ozbay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3920654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3920654","url":null,"abstract":"Voluntary disclosure literature suggests that in evidence games, where the informed sender chooses which pieces of evidence to disclose to the uninformed receiver who determines his payoff, commitment has no value, as there is a theoretical equivalence of the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes coincide in a simple evidence game. Contrary to the theoretical equivalence, our results indicate that outcomes diverge and that commitment has value. We also theoretically show that our experimental results are explained by accounting for lying averse agents.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124558223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On a Competitive Selection Problem","authors":"Fabien Gensbittel, Dana Pizarro, Jérôme Renault","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3899925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3899925","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of the item, which is represented by a random variable following a known distribution with support contained in [0,1]. We consider two different settings for this problem. In the first one, namely competitive selection problem with no recall, agents observe the value of each item upon its arrival and decide whether to accept or reject it, in which case they will not select it in future. In the second setting, called competitive selection problem with recall, agents are allowed to select any of the available items arrived so far. For each of these problems, we describe the game induced by the selection problem as a sequential game with imperfect information and study the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs. We also study the efficiency of the game equilibria. More specifically, we address the question of how much better is to have the power of getting any available item against the take-it-or-leave-it fashion. To this end, we define and study the price of anarchy and price of stability of a game instance as the ratio between the maximal sum of payoffs obtained by players under any feasible strategy and the sum of payoffs for the worst and best subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, respectively. For the no recall case, we prove that if there are two agents and two items arriving sequentially over time, both the price of anarchy and price of stability are upper bounded by the constant 4/3 for any value distribution. Even more, we show that this bound is tight.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125813585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Implications of Strategic Inventory for Short-Term vs. Long-Term Supply Contracts in Non-Exclusive Reselling Environments","authors":"Abhishek Roy, S. Gilbert, Guoming Lai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3752131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3752131","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: Although it is well known that a reseller’s ability to hold strategic inventory under a short-term supply contract can potentially benefit both the reseller and a supplier, existing research on strategic inventory focuses almost exclusively on exclusive reselling environments. However, in practice, multiple suppliers often sell to the same nonexclusive reseller, and it is not uncommon for suppliers to ask for future commitments to order quantities from resellers in return for their own commitment to wholesale prices. We investigate how the possibility of strategic inventory influences competing suppliers’ choices between short-term transactional and long-term commitment contracts to a nonexclusive reseller. Methodology/results: Using a game-theoretic model, we consider the interactions between two partially substitutable suppliers and a single, nonexclusive reseller over a two-period horizon in which demand is deterministic. We demonstrate that in nonexclusive reselling environments, where more than one supplier sells its product through the same reseller, the use of strategic inventory under short-term contracts intensifies the price competition between suppliers. We show how this effect can be mitigated when one or both suppliers offer a long-term contract. Moreover, we show that long-term contracts can arise as an equilibrium outcome, particularly when products are more substitutable or holding costs are large. Managerial implications: By considering the interactions between two partially substitutable suppliers and a nonexclusive reseller in a multiperiod setting, we contribute to the literature on strategic contracting and long versus short-term contracts. Our research provides managers with a new explanation, beyond the need to encourage idiosyncratic investments or eliminate the possibility of hold-up, for why long-term contracts may benefit suppliers in practice, who face competition while selling through a nonexclusive reseller.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123923448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gate Working Paper Series, Claire Rimbaud, A. Soldá
{"title":"Avoiding the Cost of your Conscience: Belief Dependent Preferences and Information Acquisition","authors":"Gate Working Paper Series, Claire Rimbaud, A. Soldá","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3911223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3911223","url":null,"abstract":"Pro-social individuals face a trade-off between their monetary and moral motives. Hence, they may be tempted to exploit the uncertainty in their decision environment in order to reconcile this trade-off. In this paper, we investigate whether individuals with belief-dependent preferences avoid the monetary cost of behaving according to their moral standards by strategically acquiring information about others' expectations. We test the predicitions of an information acquisition model in an online experiment. We use a modified trust-game in which we introduce uncertainty about the second movers' beliefs about first-movers' expectations. Our design enables to (i) identify participants with belief-based preferences and (ii) investigate their information acquisition strategy. Consistent with our predictions of subjective preferences, we find that most individuals classified as belief-dependent strategically select their source of information to avoid the cost of their conscience.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131647240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Piotr Evdokimov, R. Hakimov, Bertan Turhan
{"title":"Parallel Markets in School Choice","authors":"Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Piotr Evdokimov, R. Hakimov, Bertan Turhan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3866583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3866583","url":null,"abstract":"When applying to schools, students often submit applications to distinct school systems that operate independently, which leads to waste and distortions of stability due to miscoordination. To alleviate this issue, Manjunath and Turhan (2016) introduce the Iterative Deferred Acceptance mechanism (IDA); however, this mechanism is not strategy-proof. We design an experiment to compare the performance of this mechanism under parallel markets (DecDA2) to the classic Deferred Acceptance mechanism with both divided (DecDA) and unified markets (DA). Consistent with the theory, we find that both stability and efficiency are highest under DA, intermediate under DecDA2, and lowest under DecDA. We observe that some subjects use strategic reporting when predicted, leading to improved efficiency for all participants of the market. Our findings cast doubt on whether strategy-proofness should be perceived as a universal constraint to market mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130527081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities","authors":"M. Ekmekci, Hanzhe Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3262107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3262107","url":null,"abstract":"We study two-sided reputational bargaining with opportunities to issue an ultimatum---threats to force dispute resolution. Each player is either a justified type, who never concedes and issues an ultimatum whenever an opportunity arrives, or an unjustified type, who can concede, wait, or bluff with an ultimatum. In equilibrium, the presence of ultimatum opportunities can harm or benefit a player by decelerating or accelerating reputation building. When only one player can issue an ultimatum, equilibrium play is unique. The hazard rate of dispute resolution is discontinuous and piecewise monotonic in time. As the probabilities of being justified vanish, agreement is immediate and efficient, and if the set of justifiable demands is rich, payoffs modify Abreu and Gul (2000), with the discount rate replaced by the ultimatum opportunity arrival rate if the former is smaller. When both players' ultimatum opportunities arrive sufficiently fast, there may exist multiple equilibria in which their reputations do not build up and negotiation lasts forever.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125242467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How To De-reserve Reserves","authors":"Orhan Aygun, Bertan Turhan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3801466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3801466","url":null,"abstract":"Reserve systems have been designed and implemented for numerous real-world resource allocation problems. Often, de-reservation policies accompany reserve systems to prevent waste in instances of low demand for exclusive reserve categories. De-reservation policies must be executed carefully so that allocation mechanisms have desired properties. We evaluate the de-reservation policy that has been implemented in admissions to technical universities in India and reveal its shortcomings. We introduce two families of choice procedures—backward and forward transfers choice rules—and deferred acceptance mechanisms with respect to these choice rules to retrieve these shortcomings. We introduce a framework to compare choice rules on the basis of merit and show that forward transfers choice rules select more meritorious sets than backward transfers choice rules.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116979052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Value of a Coordination Game","authors":"W. Kets, W. Kager, Alvaro Sandroni","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3796188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3796188","url":null,"abstract":"The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone's payoffs can reduce welfare.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132333713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Water, Spillovers, and Free Riding: Provision of Local Public Goods in a Spatial Network","authors":"Rossa O’Keeffe-O’Donovan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3172733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3172733","url":null,"abstract":"In many low-income countries, local public goods are provided by non-governmental organizations and local communities, rather than by government. In rural Tanzania, more than 500 organizations install different technologies of water pumps which local communities are then responsible for maintaining. One third of pumps are non-functional, despite low access to clean water. I show evidence that communities free ride on their neighbors' pump maintenance investments, but also benefit from spillovers that reduce the cost of maintaining their own pump. When pump maintenance spillovers are large, maintenance decisions are strategic complements, but when spillovers are small, free riding effects dominate and maintenance decisions are strategic substitutes. I develop and estimate a spatial network model of communities' pump maintenance decisions to quantify the importance of free riding and maintenance spillovers on pump functionality and child outcomes, and to estimate the effects of two policies that have been proposed in Tanzania. The model estimates that: (i) water collection fees mitigate free riding -- if adopted universally, pump functionality rates would increase by 11 percentage points; (ii) pump technology standardization across communities reduces maintenance costs -- full coordination by installing organizations would increase pump functionality by 6 percentage points; (iii) increased pump functionality improves child outcomes -- a 10 percentage point increase in functionality increases the child survival rate by 0.9 percentage points and school attendance by 1.5 percentage points.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132294817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
