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ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)最新文献

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Contest Theory: A Survey 竞赛理论:综述
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-07-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2811686
Luis C. Corchón, Marco Serena
{"title":"Contest Theory: A Survey","authors":"Luis C. Corchón, Marco Serena","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2811686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2811686","url":null,"abstract":"This paper surveys recent work in the area of contest theory.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129052762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Ex-Ante Fairness in the Boston and Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms Under Pre-Exam and Post-Exam Preference Submission 考试前和考试后偏好服从下的波士顿事前公平和系列独裁机制
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-07-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2714677
J. Lien, Jie Zheng, Xiaohan Zhong
{"title":"Ex-Ante Fairness in the Boston and Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms Under Pre-Exam and Post-Exam Preference Submission","authors":"J. Lien, Jie Zheng, Xiaohan Zhong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2714677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2714677","url":null,"abstract":"In a school choice mechanism, school priorities are often based on student exam scores, by which student true ability may not be perfectly revealed. An ex-post fair matching mechanism (for example, Serial Dictatorship) can be undesirable in that it is not ex-ante fair: it may not match students with higher abilities to better schools, although it always matches students with higher scores to better schools. In this paper we consider a potential way of improving ex-ante fairness – a Boston mechanism with the requirement that students submit their preferences before the exam score is realized (the “pre-BOS mechanism”). This mechanism is more likely to achieve complete ex-ante fairness, in that students with higher ability are always matched with better schools. However, the other mechanisms (pre-/post-SD and post-BOS) can always implement stochastic ex-ante fairness (students with higher ability having higher probability of admission to better schools), while pre-BOS may not.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128032939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 34
Unanimous Implementation: A Case for Approval Mechanisms 一致实施:批准机制的案例
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2728337
Matías Núñez, Dimitrios Xefteris
{"title":"Unanimous Implementation: A Case for Approval Mechanisms","authors":"Matías Núñez, Dimitrios Xefteris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2728337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2728337","url":null,"abstract":"We design the class of (indirect) Approval mechanisms which allow the players' strategies to coincide with the subsets of the outcome space. By focusing on the single-peaked domain, we prove that: a) Each of these mechanisms is characterized by a unique equilibrium outcome, and b) for almost every implementable welfare optimum (outcome of a social choice rule), including the Condorcet winner alternative, there exists an Approval mechanism that unanimously implements it. That is, Approval mechanisms help a society achieve every feasible welfare goal, and, perhaps more importantly, they promote social coherence: The implemented outcome is approved by everyone.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131332043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Trust and Communication in a Property Rights Dilemma 产权困境中的信任与沟通
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2810270
T. Ahn, Loukas Balafoutas, Mongoljin Batsaikhan, Francisco Campos-Ortiz, L. Putterman, Matthias Sutter
{"title":"Trust and Communication in a Property Rights Dilemma","authors":"T. Ahn, Loukas Balafoutas, Mongoljin Batsaikhan, Francisco Campos-Ortiz, L. Putterman, Matthias Sutter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2810270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2810270","url":null,"abstract":"We study a laboratory social dilemma game in which incentives to steal from others lead to the socially inefficient diversion of resources from production unless the members of a given minisociety can abide by norms of non-theft or engage in low cost collective protection of their members’ wealth accumulations. We compare two treatments in which subjects have opportunities to exchange free-form messages to one without such opportunities, finding that most subjects allocate far less to theft and most groups achieve much greater efficiency in the presence of communication. Ease of identifying who has engaged in theft varies across the two communication treatments, but is of minor importance to the outcome. We find several coding-amenable elements of message content to be statistically significant predictors of group and individual outcomes.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133207646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Game Theory & Gamification Applications to Property & Casualty Ratemaking 博弈论和游戏化在财产和伤亡率制定中的应用
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2798045
Syed Danish Ali
{"title":"Game Theory & Gamification Applications to Property & Casualty Ratemaking","authors":"Syed Danish Ali","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2798045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2798045","url":null,"abstract":"Game Theory and Gamification can have fruitful applications for Property & Casualty Ratemaking and it should be used as a supplement in the Actuary's toolkit.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126152480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Doing It When Others Do: A Strategic Model of Procrastination 别人做的时候做:拖延症的策略模型
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2804418
Claudia Cerrone
{"title":"Doing It When Others Do: A Strategic Model of Procrastination","authors":"Claudia Cerrone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2804418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2804418","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a strategic model of procrastination in which present-biased agents prefer to do an onerous task in the company of someone else. This turns their decision of when to do the task into a procrastination game – a dynamic coordination game between present-biased players. The model characterises the conditions under which interaction mitigates or exacerbates procrastination. Surprisingly, a procrastinator matched with a worse procrastinator may do her task earlier than she otherwise would: she wants to avoid the increased temptation that her peer's company would generate. Procrastinators can thus use bad company as a commitment device to mitigate their self-control problem. Principals can reduce procrastination by matching procrastinators with each other, but the efficient matching may not be stable.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128011510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Generalized Second Price Auctions with Allocative Externalities 具有配置外部性的广义二次价格拍卖中的贝叶斯-纳什均衡
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-05-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2778533
Zongwei Lu, Christian Riis
{"title":"Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Generalized Second Price Auctions with Allocative Externalities","authors":"Zongwei Lu, Christian Riis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2778533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2778533","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate an incomplete information model of generalized second price auctions with allocative externalities originating from the heterogeneous match rates of bidders. A novel feature of our model is that it generates endogenous click-through rates (CTRs). In this setting, we establish existence of symmetric efficient equilibria for common classes of primitives. This contrasts with the findings of Gomes and Sweeney (2014), who study a similar model but with fixed CTRs. Moreover, non-existence results require strong assumptions on the primitives of the model. We conclude that existence of equilibria in GSP with incomplete information is quite general.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133367484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Winner Determination in Geometrical Combinatorial Auctions 几何组合拍卖中标者的确定
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-04-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2777489
Bart Vangerven, Dries R. Goossens, F. Spieksma
{"title":"Winner Determination in Geometrical Combinatorial Auctions","authors":"Bart Vangerven, Dries R. Goossens, F. Spieksma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2777489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2777489","url":null,"abstract":"We consider auctions of items that can be arranged in rows. Examples of such a setting appear in allocating pieces of land for real estate development, or seats in a theater or stadium. The objective is, given bids on subsets of items, to find a subset of bids that maximizes auction revenue (often referred to as the winner determination problem). We describe a dynamic programming algorithm which, for a k-row problem with connected and gap-free bids, solves the winner determination problem in polynomial time. We study the complexity for bids in a grid, complementing known results in literature. Additionally, we study variants of the geometrical winner determination setting. We provide a NP-hardness proof for the 2-row setting with gap-free bids. Finally, we extend this dynamic programming algorithm to solve the case where bidders submit connected, but not necessarily gap-free bids in a 2-row and a 3-row problem.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127384614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
The Influences of Social Context on the Measurement of Distributional Preferences 社会背景对分配偏好测量的影响
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2759817
Matthias Greiff, K. Ackermann, R. O. Murphy
{"title":"The Influences of Social Context on the Measurement of Distributional Preferences","authors":"Matthias Greiff, K. Ackermann, R. O. Murphy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2759817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2759817","url":null,"abstract":"Different social contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and measure distributional preferences in resource allocation tasks with role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix games. Results show that, at the aggregate level, role uncertainty and decomposed games lead to higher degrees of prosociality when compared to role certainty. At the individual level, we observe considerable differences in behavior across the social contexts, indicating that the majority of people are sensitive to these different social settings but respond in different ways.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133823443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Does Rawls' 'Original Position' Induce Fairness? Experimental Findings on Selection Criteria in a Discrete Nash Demand Game Played from Behind the 'Veil of Ignorance' 罗尔斯的“原初立场”能诱导公平吗?“无知之幕”下的离散纳什需求博弈选择标准的实验研究
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-03-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2749496
S. Sarkar, Soumyakanti Chakraborty
{"title":"Does Rawls' 'Original Position' Induce Fairness? Experimental Findings on Selection Criteria in a Discrete Nash Demand Game Played from Behind the 'Veil of Ignorance'","authors":"S. Sarkar, Soumyakanti Chakraborty","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2749496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2749496","url":null,"abstract":"Rawls (1958) suggested that it is possible to arrive at a fair allocation in a 2-player Nash demand game by granting equal gains to both players. Rawls theorized that players themselves would select this allocation if they bargain from the 'original position'. Harsanyi (1958) suggested the utilitarian solution, wherein rational players playing the Nash demand game from behind the 'veil of ignorance' should maximize the aggregate payoff instead of equalizing the gains vis-a-vis endowment. Harsanyi (1975) shows that the utilitarian solution generates the fairest allocation. In this paper we experimentally examined whether subjects select the utilitarian solution while playing a Nash demand game from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. For the purpose of the experiment we used a Nash demand game with discrete strategies. We found that subjects without any exposure to game theory found it difficult to identify the utilitarian solution. Subjects with exposure to basic game theory could identify the utilitarian solution when it was one of the Nash equilibria of the Nash demand game. However, only a few could identify the utilitarian solution when it was not a Nash equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125603525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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