程序平等主义解决方案

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-10-05 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2848963

Bas J. Dietzenbacher, P. Borm, R. Hendrickx

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引用次数: 11

摘要

本文引入并分析了可转移效用博弈的程序平均主义解。这个新概念是基于一种联合谈判程序的结果，其中平等主义的考虑起着中心作用。程序平均主义解是第一个单值解，它与Dutta和Ray(1989)关于凸对策的约束平均主义解一致，并且存在于任何tu对策中。

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The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.

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ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)

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