{"title":"Governance and Accountability: The Regional Development Banks","authors":"E. Carrasco, Wesley V. Carrington, Heejin Lee","doi":"10.4324/9781315254098-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315254098-6","url":null,"abstract":"Good governance has become a mantra of the movement seeking to make multilateral financial institutions more accountable to their stakeholders while improving institutional governance. Although much of the visible criticism has been directed at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the \"regional\" development banks share many of the same governance and accountability problems. Important issues relating to governance and accountability include the banks' heavily unequal voting power based on capital contributions, limited transparency and disclosure requirements, questionable efficacy of monitoring programs on the impact of the banks' projects, and limited scope of the banks' private complaint mechanisms. This Article undertakes a thorough survey of the current state of governance and accountability at the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Understanding the banks' structures and policies relating to governance and accountability is crucial to evaluating critics' charges that the banks are ineffective, undemocratic, secretive, and even facilitate human rights violations and environmental destruction.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125966527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coercion and Exchange: How Did Markets Evolve?","authors":"A. Greif","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1304204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1304204","url":null,"abstract":"What causes distinct trajectories of market development? Why did the modern market economy, characterized by impersonal exchange, first emerge in the West? This paper presents a theory of market development and evaluates it based on the histories of England, China, and Japan. The analysis focuses on how distinct coercion-constraining institutions that secure property rights differentially interact with contract enforcement institutions. Although different combinations of coercion-constraining and contract-enforcement institutions can support markets, only some coercion-constraining institutions and institutions enforcing impersonal exchange can be an equilibrium. Among the analysis' insights are the relations between the internal organization of the state and legal development, and why impersonal exchange and political representation historically co-emerged.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"361 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125650968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian Trade: The Commenda and the Corporation","authors":"Ron Harris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1294095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1294095","url":null,"abstract":"The focus of this article is on legal-economic institutions that organized early-modern Eurasian trade. It identifies two such institutions that had divergent dispersion patterns, the corporation and the commenda. The corporation ended up as a uniquely European institution that did not migrate until the era of European colonization. The commenda that originated in Arabia migrated all the way to Western Europe and to China. The article explains their divergent dispersion based on differences in their institutional and geographical environments and on dynamic factors, claiming that institutional analysis errs when it ignores migration of institutions and providing building blocks for the modeling of institutional migration.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"155 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132634294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The (Im)possibility of Reverse Share Tenancy","authors":"Marc F. Bellemare","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1292957","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1292957","url":null,"abstract":"Under the assumption that the landlord is risk-neutral and the tenant is risk-averse, sharecropping is second-best in that it trades off risk sharing and incentives. Many, however, have reported instances of reverse share tenancy, or sharecropping in which the landlord is considerably poorer than the tenant. This note shows that reverse share tenancy is impossible under the canonical Stiglitzian model of sharecropping but becomes possible if and only if (i) both the landlord and the tenant can be assumed risk-averse; or (ii) there exist significant transactions costs making sharecropping more desirable than either a wage or fixed rent contract.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121422852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Building Better Agents: Toward a Science of Value Competition","authors":"Wayne Eastman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1290676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1290676","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to delineate certain elements of a potential utilitarian science of value competition. I first sketch out four significant dimensions on which I claim that modern societies from the late eighteenth century on have differentiated themselves from their predecessors by fostering a competition of values: 1) the good and the right-Benthamite utility against Kantian rights; 2) calculation and culture in management-Scientific Management and its scions against Human Relations and its scions; 3) democratic politics-the center-left against the center-right; and 4) individual and community welfare-personal self-realization against the good of the whole. This initial part of the paper assesses briefly the extent to which value competition in the four dimensions has contributed to enhanced social welfare in modern societies. In the second section, I argue that competing values can be understood as vehicles to align politicians, managers, professionals, and individuals with social welfare and to reduce the costs of their doing socially valuable work. The third section applies the agency perspective to each of the essay's four dimensions of value competition, analyzing how the alignment and misalignment of agents' incentives with social welfare occurs in the different types of value competition and the particular difficulties of achieving proper alignment in situations in which coercive authority is exercised. The fourth section examines ways in which a philosophy and sciences of value competition may support efforts to make societies and the institutions and people within them better. The fifth section contends that conditions in the early twenty-first century favor the birth and development of a science of value competition by comparison with conditions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The final section of the paper reflects upon possible problems of nihilism and demoralization associated with a potential science of value competition.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129149376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Brain Drain or Brain Gain? The New Economics of Brain Drain Reconsidered","authors":"J. Brzozowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1288043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1288043","url":null,"abstract":"The debate on the economic implications of skilled migration for the home countries is a long-lasting phenomenon. This issue has been discussed for almost fifty years. During this period, most of the scholars (eg. Bhagwati and Hamada 1974, Portes, 1976) believed that skilled migration is detrimental for the countries of origin, while the host economies benefited from the inflow of skilled labor. Thus the notion of brain drain - harmful for the developing economies, and brain gain - profitable for developed countries - came into being, and is still present in the literature. However, in the mid of 1990s, a new strand of research on skilled migration became visible. This new school - the new economics of brain drain - argued that brain drain must not be detrimental for the countries of origin. Under certain circumstances, migration of professionals from developing economies may be in fact a \"blessing in disguise\" - and the potential gains could be higher than costs.The economists (such as Mountford, 1997, Beine et al., 2001 and 2003, Stark, 2005) from the new economics of brain drain have renewed the discussion on the economic consequences of skilled migration. However, their optimistic view of brain drain has been heavily criticized. The paper presents the main propositions of this new approach. Then it discusses the claims of the opponents of new economics of brain drain and brings new explanations why the brain drain is detrimental: both on theoretical and empirical ground.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129634230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Peremptory Norms as an Aspect of Constitutionalisation in the International Legal System","authors":"Alexander Orakhelashvili","doi":"10.1007/978-90-6704-521-6_10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-521-6_10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124752914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiat without Authority under Vertical Integration","authors":"Giorgio Zanarone","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1285960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1285960","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a relational contracting model to show how fiat - a principal's ability to dictate her agent's performance - emerges in equilibrium under vertical integration, even when integration does not allocate distinctive formal authority to the principal. In a vertical structure, an efficient relational contract requires the downstream manager to take actions that maximize agrregate profits, in exchange for future rents. If the manager of a vertically integrated unit reneges, she benefits from greater free time, but does not appropriate the associated increase in unit profits. Therefore, when the actions that maximize aggregate profits and the individual unit's profits differ substantially - that is, when interest conflicts and spillovers between units are large - the manager's promise to perform will be more credible under vertical integration than under separation.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127590541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Finding the Way to Shambala: How to Intelligently Use the Tarp and Rescue the Financial System without Getting Lost in Myths","authors":"Carlos Mauricio Mirandola","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1291309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1291309","url":null,"abstract":"The implementation of the Troubled-Assets Relief Program - TARP will be a great challenge. Implementing authorities should focus on three issues: (a) conflicting policy orientations received from Congress, (b) the asymmetry of information between the government and the holders of troubled assets, and (c) the complex and sometimes perverse incentive structure under which government agents buying the assets will operate.This paper does two things. First, it questions the excessive faith in the isolated operation of four elements of the TARP: (1) the improved capacity of the Treasury to determine the value of troubled assets, (2) the use of auctions, (3) the external oversight and accountability clauses, and (4) the devices that allow the Treasury to hold in its portfolio troubled assets and shareholdings in financial institutions. Second, it proposes an implementation plan that emphasizes (a) a diversity and plurality of structures with more complex ownership, capital and control schemes; (b) sequencing; (c) mechanism and incentives scheme design.The implementation plan to be unveiled relies on a 4-stage timeframe and three different investment structures: (1) a government-managed fund, (2) government-sponsored hedge funds, and (3) leveraged private equity funds. Each structure should be deployed in the stage indicated by timeframe established in order to maximize gains and attain the policy goals sought. The first stage should seek to unfreeze and unclog the market, mildly recapitalize financial institutions, and create confidence; the second should seek to reignite the markets, make them move faster and correct some incentive problems; the third stage should seek to improve incentives, reduce taxpayers' exposure and increase private investors' participation, speed up the market, and boost liquidity; the fourth stage should seek to reduce risks for taxpayers and start recovering the investments/losses associated with the program.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132215142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Free Banking, the Real-Balance Effect, and Walras' Law","authors":"L. Van Den Hauwe","doi":"10.52195/PM.V7I1.286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.52195/PM.V7I1.286","url":null,"abstract":"The author of this article draws special attention to two particular claims of the free bankers concerning the supposed working characteristics of a fractional-reserve free banking system which may strike the reader as questionable. The first of these relates to the alleged absence of a real-balance effect under free banking. The second relates to the free bankers’ reference to Walras’ Law as providing a rationale for the free banking system’s «offsetting» actions when confronted with changes in the public’s demand to hold bank liabilities. This rationale is defective since it is based on an erroneous interpretation of Walras’ Law. The author’s conclusion does not imply that it is not at all possible, from a rational viewpoint, to make a plausible case for this variant of free banking, only that the argument should be freed from certain questionable tenets. \u0000Key words: Free banking, monetary systems, real-balance effects, Walras’ Law. \u0000JEL Classification: E0; E32; E42; E5; E51; E52. \u0000Resumen: El autor de esta nota llama la atención sobre dos alegaciones particulares relativas a las supuestas características operativas de una banca libre con reserva fraccionaria que podrían resultar cuestionables al lector. La primera se refiere a la supuesta ausencia de efectos de saldo real en la banca libre. El segundo guarda relación con la referencia de los teóricos de la banca libre con reserva fraccionaria a la Ley de Walras que constituiría la base lógica de las acciones «de compensación» de la banca libre al enfrentarse a cambios en la demanda de medios fiduciarios por parte del público. Esta base lógica es defectuosa puesto que parte de una interpretación errónea de la Ley de Walras. La conclusión del autor no implica que no sea posible en absoluto, desde un punto de vista racional, elaborar una argumentación plausible para esta variante de la banca libre, sino que la argumentación debe estar libre de determinados argumentos cuestionables. \u0000Palabras clave: Banca libre, sistemas monetarios, efectos de saldo real, Ley de Walras. \u0000Clasificación JEL: E0; E32; E42; E5; E51; E52.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123898229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}