Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop最新文献

Process algebra and non-interference 过程代数与非干涉

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779775

P. Ryan, Steve A. Schneider

{"title":"Process algebra and non-interference","authors":"P. Ryan, Steve A. Schneider","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1999.779775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1999.779775","url":null,"abstract":"The information security community has long debated the exact definition of the term \"security\". Even if we focus on the more modest notion of confidentiality the precise definition remains controversial. In their seminal paper, Goguen and Meseguer (1982) took an important step towards a formalisation of the notion of absence of information flow with the concept of non-interference. This too was found to have problems and limitations, particularly when applied to systems displaying non-determinism which led to a proliferation of refinements of this notion and there is still no consensus as to which of these is \"correct\". We show that this central concept in information security is closely related to a central concept of computer science: that of the equivalence of systems. The notion of non-interference depends ultimately on our notion of process equivalence. However what constitutes the equivalence of two processes is itself a deep and controversial question in computer science with a number of distinct definitions proposed in the literature. We illustrate how several of the leading candidates for a definition of non-interference mirror notions of system equivalence. Casting these security concepts in a process algebraic framework clarifies the relationship between them and allows many results to be carried over regarding, for example, composition and unwinding. We also outline some generalisations of non-interference to handle partial and conditional information flows.","PeriodicalId":374159,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114642495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 238

I/O automaton models and proofs for shared-key communication systems 共享密钥通信系统的I/O自动化模型和证明

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779759

N. Lynch

引用次数: 55

Mixed strand spaces 混合链空间

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779763

F. Javier, Thayer, Fábrega, C. Jonathan, Herzog, Joshua

引用次数: 93

Honest functions and their application to the analysis of cryptographic protocols 诚实函数及其在密码协议分析中的应用

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779764

Alfred P. Maneki

{"title":"Honest functions and their application to the analysis of cryptographic protocols","authors":"Alfred P. Maneki","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1999.779764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1999.779764","url":null,"abstract":"J.D. Guttman, et al. (1998) have introduced \"strand spaces\" as a technique for describing and analyzing cryptographic protocols (i.e. schemes for exchanging messages between legitimate agents in a communications system for purposes of authentication or establishing session keys). The strands of such a protocol are directly mapped to traces of the messages which are transmitted and received by each agent. Strands may also be associated with the possible traces of a penetrator. J.D. Guttman, et al. (1998) use simple graph theoretic constructions to describe the underlying relations between legitimate agents and the penetrator. These researchers also develop an \"algebra\" for the set of all possible messages which may be transmitted in a given cryptographic protocol. They have successfully used strand spaces to prove correctness properties of several cryptographic protocols. In this paper we extend the theory of strand spaces to include a broad class of cryptographic protocols which could not be analyzed in the original framework provided by Guttman, et al. This class includes the TMN (Roscose's version) and SSHV2 protocols, i.e., protocols which use the exclusive-or and exponential functions for message generation. In an intuitive manner we define the class of \"honest\" functions and extend the theory to include these functions. We conclude this paper with an analysis of the TMN protocol.","PeriodicalId":374159,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117223045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

Formalization and proof of secrecy properties 保密属性的形式化和证明

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779765

D. Volpano

引用次数: 8

Safe simplifying transformations for security protocols or not just the Needham Schroeder pubic key protocol 安全简化安全协议的转换，或者不仅仅是Needham Schroeder公钥协议

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779760

M. Hui, G. Lowe

引用次数: 7

A formal framework and evaluation method for network denial of service 网络拒绝服务的形式化框架和评估方法

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779758

C. Meadows

引用次数: 201

What is intransitive noninterference? 什么是不及物不干涉?

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779776

A. W. Roscoe, Michael Goldsmith

引用次数: 156

Decision procedures for the analysis of cryptographic protocols by logics of belief 用信念逻辑分析密码协议的决策程序

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779761

D. Monniaux

引用次数: 19

Secure composition of insecure components 不安全组件的安全组合

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779769

Peter Sewell, J. Vitek

引用次数: 55