{"title":"用信念逻辑分析密码协议的决策程序","authors":"D. Monniaux","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1999.779761","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Belief-logic deductions are used in the analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show a new method to decide such logics. In addition to the familiar BAN logic, it is also applicable to the more advanced versions of protocol security logics, and GNY in particular; and it employs an efficient forward-chaining algorithm the completeness and termination of which are proved. Theoretic proofs, implementation decisions and results are discussed.","PeriodicalId":374159,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1999-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"19","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Decision procedures for the analysis of cryptographic protocols by logics of belief\",\"authors\":\"D. Monniaux\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CSFW.1999.779761\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Belief-logic deductions are used in the analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show a new method to decide such logics. In addition to the familiar BAN logic, it is also applicable to the more advanced versions of protocol security logics, and GNY in particular; and it employs an efficient forward-chaining algorithm the completeness and termination of which are proved. Theoretic proofs, implementation decisions and results are discussed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":374159,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop\",\"volume\":\"56 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1999-06-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"19\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1999.779761\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1999.779761","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Decision procedures for the analysis of cryptographic protocols by logics of belief
Belief-logic deductions are used in the analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show a new method to decide such logics. In addition to the familiar BAN logic, it is also applicable to the more advanced versions of protocol security logics, and GNY in particular; and it employs an efficient forward-chaining algorithm the completeness and termination of which are proved. Theoretic proofs, implementation decisions and results are discussed.
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