Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop最新文献_第2页

Trusted system construction 可信系统构建

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779768

C. O'Halloran

引用次数: 1

Authentication via localized names 通过本地化名称进行身份验证

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779766

C. Bodei, P. Degano, R. Focardi, C. Priami

引用次数: 18

A logic for SDSI's linked local name spaces: preliminary version 用于SDSI的链接本地名称空间的逻辑:初步版本

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779767

J. Halpern, R. V. D. Meyden

引用次数: 11

Security function interactions 安全功能交互

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779770

P. Bieber

引用次数: 3

Athena: a new efficient automatic checker for security protocol analysis 雅典娜:一个新的高效的自动检查安全协议分析

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779773

D. Song

{"title":"Athena: a new efficient automatic checker for security protocol analysis","authors":"D. Song","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1999.779773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1999.779773","url":null,"abstract":"We propose an efficient automatic checking algorithm, Athena, for analyzing security protocols. Athena incorporates a logic that can express security properties including authentication, secrecy and properties related to electronic commerce. We have developed an automatic procedure for evaluating well-formed formulae in this logic. For a well-formed formula, if the evaluation procedure terminates, it will generate a counter example if the formula is false, or provide a proof if the formula is true. Even when the procedure does not terminate when we allow any arbitrary configurations of the protocol execution, (for example, any number of initiators and responders), termination could be forced by bounding the number of concurrent protocol runs and the length of messages, as is done in most existing model checkers. Athena also exploits several state space reduction techniques. It is based on an extension of the Strand Space Model (Thayer et al., 1998) which captures exact causal relation information. Together with backward search and other techniques, Athena naturally avoids the state space explosion problem commonly caused by asynchronous composition and symmetry redundancy. Athena also has the advantage that it can easily incorporate results from theorem proving through unreachability theorems. By using the unreachability theorems, it can prune the state space at an early stage, hence, reduce the state space explored and increase the likelihood of termination. As shown in our experiments, these techniques dramatically reduce the state space that needs to be explored.","PeriodicalId":374159,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125445768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 242

A logical framework for reasoning on data access control policies 用于对数据访问控制策略进行推理的逻辑框架

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779772

E. Bertino, E. Ferrari, F. Buccafurri, P. Rullo

{"title":"A logical framework for reasoning on data access control policies","authors":"E. Bertino, E. Ferrari, F. Buccafurri, P. Rullo","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1999.779772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1999.779772","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a logic formalism that naturally supports the encoding of complex security specifications. This formalism relies on a hierarchically structured domain made of subjects, objects and privileges. Authorizations are expressed by logic rules. The formalism supports both negation by failure (possibly unstratified) and true negation. The latter is used to express negative authorizations. It turns out that conflicts may result from a set of authorization rules. Dealing with such conflicts requires the knowledge of the domain structure, such as grantor priorities and object/subject hierarchies, which is used in the deductive process to determine which authorization prevails, if any, on the others. Often, however, conflicts are unsolvable, as they express intrinsic ambiguities. We have devised two semantics as an extension of the well-founded and the stable model semantics of logic programming. We have also defined a number of access policies, each based on two orthogonal choices: one is related to the way of how we cope with multiplicity of authorization sets in case of stable model semantics; the other is concerned with the open/closed assumption. A comparative analysis of the proposed authorization policies, based on their degree of permissivity shows that they form a complete lattice.","PeriodicalId":374159,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117124808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 67

A meta-notation for protocol analysis 用于协议分析的元符号

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779762

I. Cervesato, N. Durgin, P. Lincoln, John C. Mitchell, A. Scedrov

引用次数: 282

A logic-based knowledge representation for authorization with delegation 用于授权的基于逻辑的知识表示

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779771

Ninghui Li, J. Feigenbaum, Benjamin N. Grosof

{"title":"A logic-based knowledge representation for authorization with delegation","authors":"Ninghui Li, J. Feigenbaum, Benjamin N. Grosof","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1999.779771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1999.779771","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce Delegation Logic (DL), a logic-based knowledge representation (i.e., language) that deals with authorization in large-scale, open distributed systems. Of central importance in any system for deciding whether requests should be authorized in such a system are delegation of authority, negation of authority, and conflicts between authorities. DL's approach to these issues and to the interplay among them borrows from previous work on delegation and trust management in the computer security literature and previous work on negation and conflict handling in the logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning literature, but it departs from previous work in some crucial ways. We present the syntax and semantics of DL and explain our novel design choices. We focus on delegation, including explicit treatment of delegation depth and delegation to complex principles. Compared to previous logic-based approaches to authorization, DL provides a novel combination of features: it is based on logic programs, expresses delegation depth explicitly, and supports a wide variety of complex principles (including but not limited to k-out-of-n thresholds). Compared to previous approaches to trust management, DL provides another novel feature: a concept of proof-of-compliance that is not entirely ad-hoc and that is based on model theoretic semantics (just as usual logic programs have a model-theoretic semantics).","PeriodicalId":374159,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132316769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 122

CVS: a compiler for the analysis of cryptographic protocols CVS:用于分析加密协议的编译器

Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop Pub Date : 1999-06-28 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.1999.779774

Antonio Durante, R. Focardi, R. Gorrieri

引用次数: 44