{"title":"Causal Social Construction","authors":"Riin Kõiv","doi":"10.1515/jso-2019-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the social constructionist literature, little has been said about what it means for social factors to cause X in such a way that X would count as causally socially constructed. In this paper, I argue that being caused by social factors – and thus being causally socially constructed – is best defined in terms of a contrastive counterfactual notion of causation. Unlike some plausible alternatives, this definition captures what is at stake in actual social constructionist debates. It makes transparent which factors the truth of a causal constructionist claim may depend on. By doing so, it sheds light on what the disagreements over whether X is causally socially constructed may turn on. It also helps us to see under which condition the claim that X is socially causally constructed is compatible with the claim that X is caused by biological factors.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"77 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2019-0006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48750248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Simple to Composite Agency: On Kirk Ludwig’s From Individual to Plural Agency","authors":"Olle Blomberg","doi":"10.1515/jso-2019-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. Hence, individual action and collective action are ontologically on a par. Ludwig also exaggerates the contrast between individual and collective action by introducing a “sole agency requirement” in his account of the semantics of singular action sentences. However, sole agency is merely typically pragmatically implicated by singular action sentences, not entailed by them. If I say, “I turned on the light”, after we each flipped one of two switches that together turned on the light, then I might be misleading the audience, but what I say is true. Finally, I argue that, contra Ludwig, individuals often have “I-intentions” to bring about an event that can be satisfied even if there are co-agents who bring about the event in the same way.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"101 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2019-0023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48365100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Just What is Social Ontology?","authors":"L. Baker","doi":"10.1515/jso-2019-2001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-2001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Construing ontology as an inventory of what genuinely and nonredundantly exists, this paper investigates two questions: (i) Do all – or any – social phenomena belong in ontology? and (ii) What difference does it make what is, and is not, in ontology? First, I consider John Searle’s account of social ontology, and make two startling discoveries: Searle’s theory of social reality conflicts with his ontological conditions of adequacy; and although ontology concerns existence, Searle’s theory of social reality is wholly epistemic. Then, I offer my own view of social reality, on which social phenomena are ontologically significant. Since ontology concerns what genuinely and nonredundantly exists, anyone interested in what there is ought to care about ontology.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"1 - 12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2019-2001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42933032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Direct and Indirect Acts of Stigmatization","authors":"Jennifer Gleason","doi":"10.1515/jso-2019-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When considering the impact of stigmatization on society, we tend to think of one aspect of stigmatization while ignoring another. Drawing from historical and fictional cases, I argue that acts of stigmatization can be direct or indirect. Acts of direct stigmatization are acts taken by individuals or groups against an entity, while acts of indirect stigmatization are the specific acts taken by potential targets of stigmatization to prevent themselves from becoming victims of direct stigmatization. If we want a full understanding of the impact that stigmatization has on society, then we need to consider the impact of both direct and indirect acts of stigmatization.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"53 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2019-0026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46712748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg","authors":"K. Ludwig","doi":"10.1515/jso-2019-0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (2016): From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action 1. Vols. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). The first is that there are no collective actions in the sense in which there are individual actions. The second is that singular action sentences entail that there is no more than one agent of the event expressed by the action verb in the way required by that verb (the sole agency requirement). The third, is that an individual intention, e.g. to build a boat, is not satisfied if you don’t do it yourself. On the first point, I grant that Blomberg identifies an important distinction between simple and composite actions the book did not take into account, but argue it doesn’t show that there are collective actions in the same sense there are individual actions. On the second point, I argue from examples that the collective reading of plural action sentences doesn’t entail the distributive reading, which requires the sole agency requirement on singular action sentences. This settles the third point, since it entails that if you intend to build a boat, you are successful only if you are the only agent of it in the sense required by the verb.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"125 - 146"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2019-0039","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43151923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conventions and Constitutive Norms","authors":"M. García‐Carpintero","doi":"10.1515/jso-2019-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper addresses a popular argument that accounts of assertion in terms of constitutive norms are incompatible with conventionalism about assertion. The argument appeals to an alleged modal asymmetry: constitutive rules are essential to the acts they characterize, and therefore the obligations they impose necessarily apply to every instance; conventions are arbitrary, and thus can only contingently regulate the practices they establish. The paper argues that this line of reasoning fails to establish any modal asymmetry, by invoking the distinction between the non-discriminating existence across possible worlds of types (“blueprints”, as Rawls called them) of practices and institutions defined by constitutive rules, and the discriminating existence of those among them that are actually in force, and hence truly normative. The necessity of practices defined by constitutive rules that the argument relies on concerns the former, while conventionalist claims are only about the latter. The paper should thus contribute to get a better understanding of what social constructs conceived as defined by constitutive norms are. It concludes by suggesting considerations that are relevant to deciding whether assertion is in fact conventional.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"35 - 52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2019-0013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49473636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional Identity","authors":"Joshua Rust","doi":"10.1515/jso-2018-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2018-0032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract For some sufficiently long-standing institutions, such as the English Crown, there is no single thread, whether specified in terms of constitutive rules or assigned functions, that would connect the stages of that institution. Elizabeth II and Egbert are not connected by an unbroken chain of primogeniture and they have importantly different powers and functions. Derek Parfit famously sought to illuminate his account of personal identity by comparing a person to a club. If Parfit could use our intuitions about clubs to help motivate his neo-Lockean account of personal identity over time, which resists the idea that personal identity requires a common psychological thread, then I argue that an adapted version of his account of identity might, in turn, be reapplied to clubs and other institutions, such as the Crown.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"13 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2018-0032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43847439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making Up Peoples? Conferralism about Nationality","authors":"M. Behrensen","doi":"10.1515/jso-2017-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2017-0020","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I will apply Ásta’s conferralist account of sex and gender to nationality, and distinguish two different ways in which nationality is conferred – by institutions (legal nationality), and in social interactions (social nationality). I will then turn to the moral and political conflicts that arise where different understandings of nationality and different ways of conferring it overlap and collide. My main thesis is that these conflicts are never simply factual disputes about who and what belongs to a nation, they are always normative conflicts about who ought to belong. This, in turn, means that we cannot think about the ontology of nationality without thinking about what nationality ought to be, a conclusion that is well in line with the basic tenets of conferralism.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"4 1","pages":"29 - 51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2017-0020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47684359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutions and the Artworld – A Critical Note","authors":"F. Buekens, J. Smit","doi":"10.1515/jso-2017-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2017-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contemporary theories of institutions as clusters of stable solutions to recurrent coordination problems can illuminate and explain some unresolved difficulties and problems adhering to institutional definitions of art initiated by George Dickie and Arthur Danto. Their account of what confers upon objects their institutional character does not fit well with current work on institutions and social ontology. The claim that “the artworld” confers the status of “art” onto objects remains utterly mysterious. The “artworld” is a generic notion that designates a sphere of human activity that involves practices that create goals that have led to the emergence of formal and informal institutions. But those institutions, rather than magically “creating” objects subjected to esthetic appreciation, merely solve familiar and ubiquitous coordination problems created by artistic activity in ways other institutions in other areas (science, religion, education…) solve similar and/or analogous coordination problems.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"4 1","pages":"53 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2017-0008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44427203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is the Appropriateness of Emotions Culture-Dependent? The Relevance of Social Meaning","authors":"Anna Welpinghus","doi":"10.1515/jso-2016-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2016-0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper contributes to the question to what extent the socio-cultural context is relevant for the appropriateness of emotions, while appropriateness of an emotion means that the emotion entails a correct, or adequate, evaluation of its object. In a first step, two adequacy conditions for theories of emotions are developed: the first condition ensures that the socio-cultural context is not neglected: theories must allow for the fact that appropriateness often depends on the social meaning of the emotion’s particular object. The second condition rules out implausible forms of cultural determinism. In a second step, an account that meets both conditions is presented: the Acceptance within Social Context account.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"4 1","pages":"67 - 92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2016-0024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46664861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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