{"title":"Mediational Recognition and Metaphysical Power: A Systematic Analysis","authors":"Heikki J. Koskinen","doi":"10.1515/jso-2019-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Interhuman relations sometimes suffer from a lack of adequate recognition. Here I ask whether this can be caused by the “third” of representations of a superhuman ultimate object or source of recognition, that is, a personal God. In arguing for a positive answer, I articulate a notion of mediational recognition, and present a systematic analysis of a trilateral form of recognition in which one party claims to mediate normative judgements of another party to a third one. The analysis then focuses on the structure of metaphysical power that can be generated by religious groups and institutions.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"147 - 168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2019-0008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49177439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Response to Critics","authors":"Ásta","doi":"10.1515/jso-2020-2007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-2007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This is a response to the critical comments by Åsa Burman, Esa Díaz-León, Aaron Griffith, and Katharine Jenkins.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"273 - 283"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2020-2007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66897118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method","authors":"M. Andler","doi":"10.1515/jso-2019-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation (e.g. beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g. beliefs concerning whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be jettisoned or revised in cases of conflict with beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation. Yet, considering the influence of ideology on beliefs about socially significant phenomena, I argue for an epistemic reversal.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"205 - 227"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2019-0033","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47663053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conferralism and Intersectionality: A Response to Ásta’s Categories We Live By","authors":"K. Jenkins","doi":"10.1515/jso-2020-2004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-2004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The conferralist account of social properties that Ásta develops and defends in Categories We Live By is persuasive in many ways. Conferralism could however do better, by its own lights, at handling the phenomenon of intersectionality. This paper first suggests a friendly amendment to the schema for conferrals that Asta offers. This helps to explain the difficulty concerning intersectionality. Finally, the paper suggests a way of developing the conferralist account that would resolve this difficulty.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"261 - 272"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2020-2004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42645555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Response-Dependence, Misgendering, and Passing: A Comment on Ásta’s Categories We Live By","authors":"E. Díaz-León","doi":"10.1515/jso-2020-2005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-2005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This comment on Ásta’s Categories we live by: the construction of sex, gender, race, and other social categories discusses Ásta’s arguments that the conferralist view on social properties does better than a response-dependence view concerning gender. Her key argument is that a response-dependence does not allow for mistakes. This comment tries to show that a response-dependence view can accommodate misgendering and passing.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"5 1","pages":"245 - 249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2020-2005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44946314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Group Membership and Parthood","authors":"David Strohmaier","doi":"10.1515/jso-2018-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2018-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Despite having faced severe criticism in the past, mereological approaches to group ontology, which argue that groups are wholes and that groups members are parts, have recently managed a comeback. Authors such as Katherine Ritchie and Paul Sheehy have applied neo-Aristotelian mereology to groups, and Katherine Hawley has defended mereological approaches against the standard objections in the literature. The present paper develops the mereological approaches to group ontology further and proposes an analysis of group membership as parthood plus further restrictions. While all mereological accounts agree that group members are parts of the group, it has become clear that this analysis is insufficient. I discuss three proposals to develop the mereological analysis of group membership and then put forward a combined solution to the puzzle. According to my proposal, the members of a reading group are agents who are part of the group and have been designated to contribute to the group.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"4 1","pages":"121 - 135"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2018-0016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48449636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Social Ontology of Democracy","authors":"Roberto Frega","doi":"10.1515/jso-2018-0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2018-0025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper offers an account of the social foundations of a theory of democracy. It purports to show that a social ontology of democracy is the necessary counterpart of a political theory of democracy. It notably contends that decisions concerning basic social ontological assumptions are relevant not only for empirical research, but bear a significant impact also on normative theorizing. The paper then explains why interactionist rather than substantialist social ontologies provide the most promising starting point for building a social ontology of democracy. It then introduces and examines the three notions of habits, patterns of interaction, and forms of social organization, conceived as the main pillars of an interactionist social ontology of democracy and briefly discusses some major implications of this approach for democratic theory.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"4 1","pages":"157 - 185"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2018-0025","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45792429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Implicit Coordination: Acting Quasi-Jointly on Implicit Shared Intentions","authors":"Judith H. Martens, L. Roelofs","doi":"10.1515/jso-2018-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2018-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We identify a social phenomenon in which large numbers of people seem to work towards a shared goal without explicitly trying to do so. We argue that this phenomenon – implicit coordination – is best understood as a form of joint agency differing from the forms most commonly discussed in the literature in the same way that individual actions driven by “explicit” intentions (those available for reflection and report) differ from individual actions driven by “implicit” intentions (those not thus available). More precisely, implicit coordination is both analogous to wholly implicit individual intentions, and constituted by the partly implicit intentions of participants. We discuss the significance of this category for action theory, social ontology, and social criticism.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"4 1","pages":"120 - 93"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2018-0018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43550028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/jso-2018-frontmatter2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2018-frontmatter2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2018-frontmatter2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48900298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Kinds, Reference, and Meta-Ontological Revisionism","authors":"Michel-Antoine Xhignesse","doi":"10.1515/jso-2018-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2018-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Julian Dodd has characterized the default position in metaphysics as meta-ontologically realist: the answers to first-order ontological questions are thought to be entirely independent of the things we say and think about the entities at issue. Consequently, folk ontologies are liable to substantial error. But while this epistemic humility is commendable where the ontology of natural kinds is concerned, it seems misplaced with respect to social kinds since their ontology is dependent upon the human social world. Using art and art-kinds as paradigmatic examples of social kinds, I argue that meta-ontological realism sets conditions that are too strict to apply to social kinds. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not be too quick to embrace the conclusion that our folk theories of social kinds cannot err substantially. By modelling the reference of social kind-terms on that of natural kind-terms, it becomes clear that in both cases, our sole epistemic privilege lies in our ability to pinpoint the subject of our inquiries.","PeriodicalId":37042,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social Ontology","volume":"4 1","pages":"137 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jso-2018-0013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49136156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}