社会类型、指称与元本体论修正主义

Q2 Arts and Humanities
Michel-Antoine Xhignesse
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要Julian Dodd将形而上学中的默认立场描述为元本体论现实主义:一阶本体论问题的答案被认为完全独立于我们对所讨论的实体所说和思考的事情。因此,民间本体论容易出现实质性错误。但是,尽管在自然种类的本体论方面,这种认识上的谦逊是值得赞扬的,但在社会种类方面,这种谦逊似乎是错误的,因为它们的本体论依赖于人类社会世界。以艺术和艺术种类作为社会种类的典范,我认为元本体论现实主义设定了过于严格的条件,无法适用于社会种类。然而,我认为,我们不应该太快接受这样一个结论,即我们的民间社会理论不能犯很大的错误。通过将社会类术语的引用与自然类术语的参考进行建模,很明显,在这两种情况下,我们唯一的认知特权在于我们能够准确定位我们的调查主题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Social Kinds, Reference, and Meta-Ontological Revisionism
Abstract Julian Dodd has characterized the default position in metaphysics as meta-ontologically realist: the answers to first-order ontological questions are thought to be entirely independent of the things we say and think about the entities at issue. Consequently, folk ontologies are liable to substantial error. But while this epistemic humility is commendable where the ontology of natural kinds is concerned, it seems misplaced with respect to social kinds since their ontology is dependent upon the human social world. Using art and art-kinds as paradigmatic examples of social kinds, I argue that meta-ontological realism sets conditions that are too strict to apply to social kinds. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not be too quick to embrace the conclusion that our folk theories of social kinds cannot err substantially. By modelling the reference of social kind-terms on that of natural kind-terms, it becomes clear that in both cases, our sole epistemic privilege lies in our ability to pinpoint the subject of our inquiries.
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来源期刊
Journal of Social Ontology
Journal of Social Ontology Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
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0
审稿时长
16 weeks
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