{"title":"From Finance to Fascism: the Real Effect of Germany's 1931 Banking Crisis","authors":"S. Doerr, Stefan Gissler, J. Peydró, H. Voth","doi":"10.5167/UZH-168823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5167/UZH-168823","url":null,"abstract":"Do financial crises radicalize voters? We analyze a canonical case - Germany during the Great Depression. After a severe banking crisis in 1931, caused by foreign shocks and political inaction, radical voting increased sharply in the following year. Democracy collapsed six months later. We collect new data on pre-crisis bank-firm connections and show that banking distress led to markedly more radical voting, both through economic and non-economic channels. Firms linked to two large banks that failed experienced a bank-driven fall in lending, which caused reductions in their wage bill and a fall in city-level incomes. This in turn increased Nazi Party support between 1930 and 1932/33, especially in cities with a history of anti-Semitism. While both failing banks had a large negative economic impact, only exposure to the bank led by a Jewish chairman strongly predicts Nazi voting. Local exposure to the banking crisis simultaneously led to a decline in Jewish-gentile marriages and is associated with more deportations and attacks on synagogues after 1933.","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129336167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Was Obama Elected by the Internet? Broadband Diffusion and Voters' Behavior in US Presidential Elections","authors":"Valentino Larcinese, Luke Miner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3156861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3156861","url":null,"abstract":"What are the political consequences of the diffusion of broadband internet? We address this question by studying the 2008 US presidential election, the first political campaign where the internet played a key role. Drawing on data from the FEC and the FCC, we provide robust evidence that internet penetration in US counties is associated with an increase in turnout, an increase in campaign contributions to the Democrats and an increase in the share of Democratic vote. We then propose an IV strategy to deal with potential endogeneity concerns: we exploit geographic discontinuities along state borders with different right-of-way laws, which constitute the main determinant of the cost of building new infrastructure. IV estimates confirm a positive impact of broadband diffusion on turnout, while the pro-Democratic Party effect of the internet appears to be less robust.","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"181 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121822464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Integration Change Gender Attitudes? The Effect of Randomly Assigning Women to Traditionally Male Teams","authors":"Gordon B. Dahl, Andreas Kotsadam, Dan‐Olof Rooth","doi":"10.3386/W24351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W24351","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether exposure of men to women in a traditionally male-dominated environment can change attitudes about mixed-gender productivity, gender roles and gender identity. Our context is the ...","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124575086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies","authors":"H. Gersbach, O. Tejada","doi":"10.3929/ETHZ-A-010688177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3929/ETHZ-A-010688177","url":null,"abstract":"We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently. We identify a so-called Reform Dilemma, which manifests itself in two variants. From a static perspective, low-reform-ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized, who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step. This property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment. From a dynamic perspective, incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re-elected regardless of their reform ability.","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123846985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Electoral Effects of Biased Media: Russian Television in Ukraine","authors":"Leonid Peisakhin, Arturas Rozenas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2937366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2937366","url":null,"abstract":"We use plausibly exogenous variation in the availability of Russian analog television signal in Ukraine to study how a media source with a conspicuous political agenda impacts political behavior and attitudes. Using highly granular election data and an original survey we estimate that Russian television substantially increased average electoral support for parties and candidates with a 'pro-Russian' agenda in the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections. We show that this effect is attributable to persuasion rather than differential mobilization. The effectiveness of biased media varied in a politically consequential way: its impact was largest on voters with strong pro-Russian priors but was less effective, and to some degree even counter-effective, in persuading those with strong pro-Western priors. Our finding suggests that exposing an already polarized society to a biased media source can result in even deeper polarization.","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132240539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impact of Phone Reminders on Survey Response Rates: Evidence from a Web-Based Survey in an International Organization","authors":"Lodewijk Smets","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-8305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8305","url":null,"abstract":"This research note investigates the impact of phone reminders on response rates in the context of a web-based survey in an international organization, the World Bank. After randomly assigning treatment to 248 survey participants, the study finds an intention-to-treat effect of 19.86 percentage points. Given a relatively low treatment compliance rate (31 percent), the estimated average effect of treatment-on-the-treated is even larger, corresponding to an increase of 64 percentage points. Therefore, if ways can be found to increase treatment compliance, high response rates are attainable. This may lead World Bank surveyors to turn to sample surveys more often, reducing survey overload in the institution.","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125899721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Information Accumulation and the Timing of Voting Decisions","authors":"N. Canen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3514328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3514328","url":null,"abstract":"Surveys, polling data and media reports indicate that voters often choose who to vote for at different stages in the political campaign: some voters know from start of a campaign who they will vote for, while others decide on the last day. This dispersion of the timing of voting decisions can swing election results, thus are of importance to campaigns and policymakers. In this paper, I develop a model of costly information acquisition that rationalizes these observations. The model implies a key tradeoff between the cost of acquiring information, and the gain such information brings. The solution of this problem is an optimal stopping time decision, which is structurally estimated. I find that the information voters receive is noisy, with the standard deviation of a signal being around 25% of the support of the ideology variable. I show evidence that later deciders are different on observable characteristics such as age, religiosity, education and political knowledge, and discuss how these differences arise in voter beliefs and costs. There is significant unobserved heterogeneity in voters' costs of acquiring information, which explains different voting decisions by observationally similar citizens. Under this framework, I consider the implications of the widely used policy of information blackouts (i.e. forbidding campaigns or polls just before the election). Although it is often thought to promote fairness, I find that such a policy harms voters with a 1-2% welfare loss, as the restrictions to information affect only those to whom it would benefit.","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125109036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Effective Is Social Capital in Spreading Political Ideas? Evidence from ‘Facebook Likes’ in the 2015 Queensland and 2017 Western Australian State Elections","authors":"T. Bilson, R. Smyth, Liangcheng Wang, Yuan Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3099288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3099288","url":null,"abstract":"How effective are new forms of social capital, such as social media, in spreading political ideas? We use Facebook page ‘likes’ as a measure of social capital, and votes received as a measure of performance, to examine the effectiveness of social capital in disseminating political ideas. To do so, we use data from two state elections in Australia - the 2015 general election in Queensland and the 2017 general election in Western Australia. Our main results suggest that for every additional one percentage point district share of Facebook likes that a candidate has, they receive an additional 0.15 percentage point district vote share. This result is robust to alternative ways of measuring Facebook likes and votes received and a range of different specifications. Using social media data, we also correctly predict the outcome of 70.95 percent of the seats in both elections. We show that Facebook likes represent a better predictor of election outcomes than either ratings of candidates’ beauty or competency.","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"250 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133916574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective Voting","authors":"Satyajit Chatterjee, Burcu Eyigungor","doi":"10.21799/frbp.wp.2017.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.2017.43","url":null,"abstract":"We document that postwar U.S. national elections show a strong pattern of incumbency disadvantage\": If the presidency has been held by a party for some time, that party tends to lose seats in Congress. We develop a model of partisan politics with policy inertia and prospective voting to explain this finding. Positive and normative implications of the model are explored.","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134452153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Quasi-Natural Experiment on Electoral Rules and Political Representation","authors":"D. Stadelmann, Gustavo Torrens, Marco Portmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3092190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3092190","url":null,"abstract":"We combine roll call votes and referendum decisions on identically worded legislative proposals to identify the effect of electoral rules on the way Swiss Members of Parliament (MPs) represent their constituents’ preferences. We exploit the fact that MPs in both Houses of Parliament are elected in the same electoral districts (the cantons). Yet, in the Lower House, MPs are elected using a proportional rule, while in the Upper House they are elected employing a majoritarian rule. We find that electoral rules matter strongly for political representation. The voting patterns of MPs are in line with three theoretical predictions regarding the influence of electoral rules on representation of constituents’ preferences: 1) The probability that a proportional-elected MP accepts a legislative proposal closely follows the share of voters that accept the proposal in the referendum. 2) In contrast, majority-elected MPs only react to the share of voters accepting a proposal in the referendum for shares close to the 50% threshold. 3) The estimated probability that an Upper House MP votes “yes” as a function of the share of voters voting “yes” in the referendum has an S-shape form with an inflection point close to 50%.","PeriodicalId":365899,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Voting & Public Opinion eJournal","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132953167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}