美国国家政治中的在职劣势:政策惯性和前瞻性投票的作用

Satyajit Chatterjee, Burcu Eyigungor
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摘要

我们的研究表明,战后美国全国大选显示出一种强烈的在位劣势模式:如果一个政党担任总统一段时间,那么这个政党往往会失去国会席位。我们开发了一个带有政策惯性和预期投票的党派政治模型来解释这一发现。探讨了该模型的积极和规范意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective Voting
We document that postwar U.S. national elections show a strong pattern of incumbency disadvantage\\": If the presidency has been held by a party for some time, that party tends to lose seats in Congress. We develop a model of partisan politics with policy inertia and prospective voting to explain this finding. Positive and normative implications of the model are explored.
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