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Do Environmental Effects of Herbicide-Resistant GM Plants Differ from Effects of Other Herbicide Resistant Plants? 抗除草剂转基因植物对环境的影响与其他抗除草剂植物不同吗?
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-11-05 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903030093
E. Tyystjärvi
{"title":"Do Environmental Effects of Herbicide-Resistant GM Plants Differ from Effects of Other Herbicide Resistant Plants?","authors":"E. Tyystjärvi","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903030093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903030093","url":null,"abstract":"Genetic modification of crop plants has promoted concerns about potential environmental effects of this new technology. In this essay, I will discuss the environmental effects of genetic modification of crop plants using herbicide resistance as an example. Considering herbicide resistance as an old agricultural trait, it is difficult to find any reason to assess the environmental risks of genetically modified herbicide resistant plants differently from the risks of traditionally bred herbicide resistant plants.","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126464140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Editorial: “Executive Compensation” 社论:“高管薪酬”
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-11 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903020040
Marjorie Chan
{"title":"Editorial: “Executive Compensation”","authors":"Marjorie Chan","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903020040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903020040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126723302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
HOT TOPIC: “Executive Compensation” 热门话题:“高管薪酬”
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-11 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903010040
Marjorie Chan
{"title":"HOT TOPIC: “Executive Compensation”","authors":"Marjorie Chan","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903010040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903010040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116334437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Rein in Executive Compensation 如何控制高管薪酬
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-06 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903020081
Marjorie Chan
{"title":"How to Rein in Executive Compensation","authors":"Marjorie Chan","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903020081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903020081","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines various corporate governance and compensation design issues that contribute to excessive executive compensation. It discusses numerous reform efforts to curb excessive executive pay. It provides some legal scholars' comments on the \"Say on Pay\" bill and the SEC's new compensation disclosure rules. In response to the global financial crisis, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). In order to stimulate a recessionary economy with tax cuts and spending, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The ESSA created the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) to purchase distressed assets from financial institutions. The ESSA stipulates executive pay restrictions at recipient institutions of TARP funds. The ARRA amended the EESA's executive compensation restrictions. In addition to the ESSA and the ARRA, Congress vigorously proposed various legislative measures to rein in executive pay at recipient institutions of government bailout funds, and these proposed measures are described in this article. In order to stave off further regulations/legislative measures, corporations have to engage in voluntary efforts to rein in executive pay.","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132627896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
EDITORIALGenetically Modified Plants Benefit Everybody 编辑:转基因植物使每个人受益
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-06 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903030091
P. Portin
{"title":"EDITORIALGenetically Modified Plants Benefit Everybody","authors":"P. Portin","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903030091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903030091","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129685299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why is Industry Related to CEO Compensation?: A Managerial Discretion Explanation 为什么行业与CEO薪酬相关?管理自由裁量权的解释
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-06 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903020042
S. Finkelstein
{"title":"Why is Industry Related to CEO Compensation?: A Managerial Discretion Explanation","authors":"S. Finkelstein","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903020042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903020042","url":null,"abstract":"Although research on CEO compensation is voluminous, only limited attention has been paid to the role of industry. In this paper we develop an industry-level explanatory theory based on the concept of managerial discretion, and test it using a multi-level structural equation modeling approach at the industry level. In contrast to previous work, this theory offers an explanation of why, and how, industry is related to CEO compensation. In a sample of 933 firms in 109 3-digit SIC industries, we find that the level of industry discretion is significantly related to both the level of CEO compensation, and the proportion of performance-contingent CEO compensation. The implications of these findings for industry-level research in general, and research on CEO compensation in particular, are discussed.","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"393 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126719067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 29
Pay Now, Lose Later: The Role of Bonuses and Non-Equity Incentives in the Financial Meltdown of 2007-2009 《现在付，以后赔:奖金和非股权激励在2007-2009年金融危机中的作用》
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-06 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903020076
Dan Palmon, M. Santoro, Ronald J. Strauss
{"title":"Pay Now, Lose Later: The Role of Bonuses and Non-Equity Incentives in the Financial Meltdown of 2007-2009","authors":"Dan Palmon, M. Santoro, Ronald J. Strauss","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903020076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903020076","url":null,"abstract":"This paper draws attention to and raises questions about an area of executive incentive compensation, bonuses and non-equity incentives, which seems to have disproportionally rewarded executives while shareholders remain exposed to substantial ongoing economic risks. This area of focus has surfaced because, beginning in 2007 and continuing throughout 2008, financial services firms incurred massive losses, while in the years immediately preceding this deluge of losses many executives were awarded substantial bonuses and non-equity incentives. We assess the risks associated with such payments and build a framework for assessing how shareholder and executive interests diverge as a result of bonuses and non-equity compensation. Our analysis is also meant to serve as a building block for future empirical studies about the relationship between executive incentive compensation paid in cash (bonuses and non-equity incentives) and the financial misstatements and overstatements of income that were at the heart of the financial meltdown.","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127517964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Effect of Missing Quarterly Earnings Benchmarks on Chief Financial Officer Turnover and Annual Bonus 缺失季度收益基准对首席财务官离职率和年度奖金的影响
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-06 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903020057
E. M. Matsumura, J. Shin, S. Wu
{"title":"The Effect of Missing Quarterly Earnings Benchmarks on Chief Financial Officer Turnover and Annual Bonus","authors":"E. M. Matsumura, J. Shin, S. Wu","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903020057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903020057","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of missing quarterly earnings benchmarks on Chief Financial Officer (CFO) turnover and compensation. We consider two well-known earnings benchmarks: 1) consensus analyst earnings forecast, and 2) earnings for the same quarter of the prior year. Our results are consistent with significant bonus and career consequences to CFOs of failure to meet quarterly earnings benchmarks. Our evidence suggests that missing one quarter of consensus analyst earnings forecast in the prior year increases the probability of CFO dismissal by 18.57%, after we control for established determinants of executive turnover. Overall, our findings provide evidence that missing earnings benchmarks has economically significant adverse consequences for a CFO's bonus compensation and future career. Further, we find that the effect of missing the consensus analyst forecast on CFO dismissal is more pronounced for firms with better governance, consistent with better-governed firms considering negative earnings surprise more seriously as a signal of poor performance. These adverse consequences create pressure for CFOs to manage or manipulate earnings in order to meet earnings targets. … Just after the IPO in 2000, Krispy Kreme replaced longtime Chief Financial Officer Paul Beitbach with newcomer John Tate … who was forced out as CFO of Williams-Sonoma after missing two quarterly earnings fore- casts. … Tate was promoted to Chief Operating Officer in 2002, and longtime controller Randy Casstevens was pro- moted to the top finance spot. Casstevens lasted less than eighteen months and turned in a \"purely voluntary\" resigna- tion just five months before the company's first quarterly earnings shortfall. To replace Casstevens, the company brought in Michael Phelan, a key member of the investment banking team that executed Krispy Kreme's IPO and follow- on offering, who in turn lasted less than two years in the","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130657347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
The Economic Crisis, Employees, and Executives: Who Wins? Who Loses? 经济危机、员工和高管:谁是赢家?谁输了?
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-06 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903020071
W. Heisler
{"title":"The Economic Crisis, Employees, and Executives: Who Wins? Who Loses?","authors":"W. Heisler","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903020071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903020071","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the effects of the current economic crisis from the perspective of who wins and who loses among employees and executives. While both executives and employees have suffered financially from this recession, employee losses are disproportionately more profound and are likely to have more lasting impact than losses experienced by executives. In a number of instances, executive losses may be more apparent than real.","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121946580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Economic, Moral, and Motivational Criteria of Executive Compensation: Recent Developments 高管薪酬的经济、道德和动机标准:最新发展
The Open Ethics Journal Pub Date : 2009-08-06 DOI: 10.2174/1874761200903020067
L. Vitulano, S. J. Hannafey
{"title":"Economic, Moral, and Motivational Criteria of Executive Compensation: Recent Developments","authors":"L. Vitulano, S. J. Hannafey","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903020067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903020067","url":null,"abstract":"Recent economic developments have renewed societal debate about executive compensation practices in business organizations. This study explores economic, moral, and motivational criteria in decisions about how to best compensate executives in organizations. The essay devotes particular attention to new developments in this controversial debate. The authors propose that managerial work implies a kind of fiduciary trust necessary for the proper functioning of business activity and argue that executive compensation decisions and levels should be based on objective criteria.","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130423670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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